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How to Think Constitutionally About
Prerogative: A Study of Early American
Usage
MATTHEW STEILEN†
ABSTRACT
This Article challenges the view of “prerogative” as a discretionary
authority to act outside the law. For seventy years, political
scientists, lawyers and judges have drawn on John Locke’s account
of prerogative in the Second Treatise, using it to read foundational
texts in American constitutional law. American writings on
prerogative produced between 1760 and 1788 are rarely discussed
(excepting The Federalist), though these materials exist in
abundance. Based on a study of over 700 of these texts, including
pamphlets, broadsides, letters, essays, newspaper items, state

† Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law. I want to thank the University
of Wisconsin Law School for the use of its library and other resources during my
sabbatical. I also want to thank Jim Gardner, Fred Konefsky, David McNamee,
Henry Monaghan, and Jack Schlegel for their comments, as well as audience
members at the Eighth Annual Loyola University of Chicago Constitutional Law
Colloquium and the University at Buffalo School of Law, where portions of the
study were presented. I want to thank the student editors of the Buffalo Law
Review, led by Christian Cassara and Jack Murray, for their painstaking work
checking my sources and correcting my errors. Lastly, although I realize law
review articles aren’t usually dedicated, this Article is for my father, James
Ronald Steilen, Harvard Law School class of 1974, a brilliant lawyer whose career
was cut short by Parkinson’s disease.

557

558

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

papers, and legislative debates, this Article argues that early
Americans almost never used “prerogative” as Locke defined it.
Instead, the early American understanding of “prerogative” appears
to have been shaped predominantly by the imperial crisis, the series
of escalating disputes with the British ministry over taxation which
preceded the Revolutionary War; in this crisis, Americans based
their claims to enjoy rights of self-taxation on their colonial
charters, which were issued by the King’s prerogative. The primary
connotations of “prerogative” for Americans were thus selfgovernment and the benefits of government, principally the
protection of property and liberty. Drawing on this view, the Article
proffers several principles for constructing the powers of the
President. It argues that the Article II Vesting Clause should be
treated as a substantive grant of executive power, but conceived
narrowly as the power to carry out the law and not as a grant of
prerogative. It is the enumerated powers in Article II that establish
presidential prerogatives. These powers should be treated as
“defeasible” in the sense that they may be regulated by statute and
judicial decision, within limits reflecting the independence of the
presidential office. This framework is consistent with the series of
modern statutes regulating presidential emergency powers,
including the War Powers Resolution and the National Emergencies
Act.

INTRODUCTION
What does “prerogative” mean in American
constitutional law? What does it mean to say that it is
someone’s “prerogative” to decide on a course of action? To
describe the powers of an office as “prerogatives”?
A common answer to these questions is that to have a
“prerogative” is to enjoy a kind of discretion. More precisely,
“prerogative” is a discretionary power that inheres in an
office, and which cannot be controlled by law, but only guided
by the officer’s sense of public interest.1 American writers
1. See, e.g., HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS
INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 13, 71 (2015); SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH,
IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE
206–15 (2015) [hereinafter PRAKASH, IMPERIAL]; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 2–3, 8–10, 23–25, 115–16, 142–43, 147–49, 263–64
(1973); David Gray Adler, The Framers and Executive Prerogative: A
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giving this account largely credit John Locke.2 A short
chapter in the Second Treatise of Government, conveniently
titled “Of Prerogative,” tells us that prerogative is the
executive’s “[p]ower to act according to discretion, for the
publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and
sometimes even against it.”3 Originally, Locke surmised,
“Government was almost all Prerogative,” but over time its
misuse by “weak Princes” led the people to form legislative
assemblies and “by express Laws to get Prerogative
determin’d.”4 What remained was a kind of residual
executive discretion. William Blackstone repeated Locke’s
definition in the first book of his Commentaries on the Laws
Constitutional and Historical Rebuke, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 376, 377–79
(2012); Larry Arnhart, “The god-Like Prince”: John Locke, Executive Prerogative,
and the American Presidency, 9 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 121, 122–25 (1979);
Richard H. Cox, Executive and Prerogative: A Problem for Adherents of
Constitutional Government, in 2 CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: EL [sic]
PLURIBUS UNUM: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT 102, 111–18 (Sarah Baumgartner Thurow ed., 1988); Robert J.
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 808–13 (2013); Clement Fatovic, Constitutionalism
and Presidential Prerogative: Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Perspectives, 48 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 429, 437–38 (2004); Owen Gross, Emergency Powers, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 785, 792 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber,
& Sanford Levinson eds., 2015); Benjamin A. Kleinerman, Cant the Prince Really
Be Tamed? Executive Prerogative, Popular Apathy, and the Constitutional Frame
in Locke’s Second Treatise, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 209, 209–10 (2007); Jules Lobel,
Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1392 (1989);
Julian Davis Mortenson, A Theory of Republican Prerogative, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
45, 50, 54–57 (2014); Richard M. Pious, Inherent War and Executive Powers and
Prerogative Politics, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 66, 67–71 (2007); Robert Scigliano,
The President’s “Prerogative Power”, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
236, 239–46 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President
and the Law, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 321–23, 331–38 (1952). Cf. Prerogative, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “prerogative,” without reference to the
public interest, as “[a]n exclusive right, power, privilege, or immunity, usu[ally]
acquired by virtue of office”).
2. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 375 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). On Locke’s influence on the literature on
presidential prerogative, see, for example, Adler, supra note 1, at 377; Scigliano,
supra note 1, at 236–39.
3. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 375.
4. Id. at 376.
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of England, inserting it into a catalogue of traditional royal
powers—making war, concluding peace, appointing
ministers, dispensing justice, and so on—which, taken
together, described the King’s place in the British
constitution. He called these powers the King’s
“prerogatives.”5
The notion of prerogative as a kind of discretion has been
extremely important to the development of American
constitutional law, especially in the last seventy years. It has
furnished a language and a set of ideas for describing the
extent of the President’s subordination to law. In denying
that the President could seize domestic steel mills in the face
of contrary legislation, Justice Jackson described the
assertion of such a power as “military prerogative,” and the
President’s duty to comply with legal limits, an absence of
“prerogative.”6 To others it has seemed undeniable that the
President requires this discretion, and that presidents have
actually employed it to manage foreign affairs, military
conflicts and emergencies.7 Lawyers have used “prerogative,”
5. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 244–70
(David Lemmings ed., Oxford University Press 2016). Modern commentators use
Locke and Blackstone to interpret prerogative talk in The Federalist and other
early sources. For commentators relying on Locke, see sources cited supra note
1. For an analysis of executive power based on Blackstone’s catalogue of
prerogatives, see generally, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive
Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009). Other writers combine Locke and
Blackstone, suggesting (or implying) that the powers Blackstone identifies are in
some way discretionary or immune to regulation by law. See generally, e.g.,
Michael W. McConnell, The Logical Structure of Article Two (Nov. 14, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/colloquium/constitutionallaw
/documents/2016_Fall_McConnell_Art.pdf.
6. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
641, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“What the power of command may
include I do not try to envision, but I think it is not a military prerogative, without
support of law, to seize persons or property because they are important or even
essential for the military and naval establishment.”).
7. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1981)
(Rehnquist, C.J.); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (Sutherland, J.);
Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area:
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as well, to mark an upper boundary on Congress’s power over
the President under the portion of the Necessary and Proper
Clause known as the “Sweeping Clause.”8 In this sense, to
say a presidential power is a “prerogative” is to suggest that
Congress has limited authority to regulate that power—or
perhaps no authority at all.9 Such “prerogatives” are powers
the President can exercise unilaterally, without consulting
Congress or following any particular procedures.10
“Prerogative” may even imply the absence of legal limits
altogether. As one historian memorably described this idea,
which he attributed to Americans, “to be governed by
prerogative was to live at the mere grace and pleasure of a
master.”11
Hearing on S. Res. 8 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations & S. Comm. on
Armed Servs., 82d Cong. 88–93 (1951) (statement of Dean Acheson, Sec’y of
State); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 173, 202–07 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) (regarding standards of conduct for interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340–2340A); John G. Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formulation
and Implementation of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229, 231–34
(1981). For scholarly use of “prerogative” to describe such powers, see EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 7–10, 169–81
(Randall w. Bland, Theodore T. Hindson, & Jack W. Peltason eds., 5th ed., 1984);
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 43 (1972).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”).
9. E.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (Field, J.) (“The
benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions.”); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262–63 (1974) (similar); McConnell,
supra note 5 (manuscript at 90) (concluding that the powers listed in Article II,
section 2, clause 1 are “[p]rerogative powers, meaning powers that the President
has the constitutional right to exercise without need for statutory authorization,
and which cannot be regulated or abridged by Congress”).
10. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS 14 (1976) (arguing that, with respect to prerogative powers,
“the executive could take any action . . . on its own responsibility, without
consulting [the legislature] in advance”).
11. Eric Nelson, Patriot Royalism: The Stuart Monarchy in American Political
Thought, 1769–75, 68 WM. & MARY Q. 533, 542 (2011). Nelson was criticized for
this line. Referring in particular to James Wilson, from whose views Nelson drew
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This view of prerogative has had its proponents, but it is
worth understanding that eighteenth-century Americans
were generally not among them. This Article is a study, first,
of how early Americans actually used the word “prerogative.”
Its aim is to describe and make sense of the forensic
arguments in which they employed the term, and to identify
various constitutional roles for which they recruited
“prerogative” over time. Rather than returning, yet again, to
Locke and Blackstone, and relying, as one leading historian
has put it, on Americans’ “presumed uncritical acceptance”
of their theories,12 this study is based on a much larger body
of texts: over 700 American pamphlets, broadsides, letters,
essays and newspaper items, along with state papers and
legislative debates, all created between 1764 and 1788.13
Broadening the body of evidence and setting that evidence in
its political and social context reveals patterns of usage that
support, historian Pauline Maier responded,
Wilson thought the harmony and interests of the British people would be better
preserved under “the legal prerogatives of the Crown” than “an unlimited
authority by Parliament,” but neither he nor any other colonial writer thought of
the prerogative as a means of subjecting the people, as Nelson assumes, to “the
mere grace and pleasure of a master.”
Pauline Maier, Whigs Against Whigs Against Whigs: The Imperial Debates of
1765–76 Reconsidered, 68 WM. & MARY Q. 578, 580 (2011) (emphasis in original).
See discussion infra Section I.A on Wilson.
12. Jack N. Rakove, Taking the Prerogative out of the Presidency: An
Originalist Perspective, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 85, 88 (2007).
13. There is a large volume of printed material from this period that discusses
prerogative or mentions the term. For example, a search of “prerogative” in the
Readex database of “Early American Newspapers” between 1764 and 1783
returned roughly 2200 items. To reduce the amount of material, I narrowed my
search of pre-independence texts in Readex to the dates 1764–68 and 1774–75,
in light of their importance in the imperial crisis. This resulted in 677 items
mentioning “prerogative,” all of which were examined. I searched for postindependence materials mentioning “prerogative” in Peter Force’s “American
Archives,” the National Archives’s “Founders Online,” and Rotunda’s “American
Founding Era Collection,” which includes the Jefferson, Hamilton, and Adams
papers, as well as a digital edition of the Documentary History of the Ratification
of the Constitution. I combined this body of material with pamphlets and other
texts identified in the existing secondary literature, nearly all of which are now
available in Gale’s “Eighteenth Century Collections Online,” HathiTrust Digital
Library, Internet Archive, Google Books, or similar digital repositories.
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are otherwise invisible.14 It also corrects for errors of
perspective, showing actual lines of influence of European
writers on Americans and setting American innovations in
relief.
The results of following this approach are set out below.
As we will see, the revolutionaries and framers of our state
and federal constitutions almost never used “prerogative” as
Locke defined it, though they understood well the
importance of discretion.15 Far more common were a
different set of uses. Americans used “prerogative” to
describe the power of the King over his subjects’ liberty and
property, both within the realm and in the colonies of the
British empire. They used it to refer to the King’s authority
to charter colonial governments. They used it to describe
specific royal powers under the British constitution, as
Blackstone had, but also Mansfield, Bacon, Comyns and
other English legal writers, whose texts Americans cited.
When it came time to frame the first state constitutions,
Americans pointedly contrasted these “royal prerogatives”
with “executive power,” which, in that context, they
conceived as a narrower power to carry out the law.16 A

14. Cf. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English
Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 581–83
(2008) (faulting legal scholarship on the Suspension Clause for relying on “the
same problematic body of evidence,” i.e., leading legal treatises).
15. See infra Part I. On discretion, see Jefferson Powell, The Political
Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 949, 996–97 (1993)
(“‘Discretion’ was an important and extremely controversial concept in early
American constitutional discourse . . . .”). Powell observes that “discretion” had
two principal meanings: prudence and knowledge or skill; and uncontrolled,
unconditional power. Id. at 996 (citing 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755)). The issue raised by Lockean prerogative is the place
of the second kind of discretion in constitutional government.
16. For this definition of “executive power,” see, for example, Adler, supra
note 1, at 380–81; Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive
Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 704, 716; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 334. This
is what Harvey Mansfield calls the “dictionary definition” of the executive, in
contrast to the Machiavellian conception of “execution” as action that is sudden,
secret, performed by a single person, without procedure, and for the purpose of
preserving the state. HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE
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principal constitutional task of the 1780s was figuring out
which prerogatives could be vested in an executive
department (understood narrowly), consistent with
republicanism.17 Prerogatives like the veto could be used to
prevent the legislature from interfering with law
enforcement, giving the executive some “independence” and
thereby enhancing its ability to carry out the law and bring
security to liberty and property; the danger was that
prerogatives would also give the executive the appearance of
a monarch, or even an ability to “corrupt” the legislature, as
British kings had done by offering members lucrative offices
or special privileges. If anything, then, it was government,
not discretion, that was the core connotation of “prerogative”
for early Americans. Appeals to prerogative were typically
appeals to the benefits of government—self-government
under colonial legislatures, or, later, a more “vigorous”
execution of state government. But usage was hardly
uniform. The English constitutional heritage of “prerogative”
was layered, and disputants digging through it for helpful
precedents came away with diverse notions.18
AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER 2, 130–49 (1989).
17. Consider Madison’s account of the aim of the Philadelphia Convention:
“blending a proper stability & energy in the Government with the essential
characters of the republican Form.” Letter from James Madison to Edmund
Pendleton (Sept. 20, 1787), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0110-02-0124. (Very similar language can be found in Number 37 of The Federalist.)
Even though Madison did not contribute significantly to the design of the federal
executive, he understood the parameters well.
18. The early modern law of prerogative was, in essence, the predecessor to
English public law. For a sense of its scope in the relevant periods, see 4 A NEW
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW, “A Table of the Several Titles” and 149–214 (1759)
(entries on “prerogative”); Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King, 92
SELDEN SOC’Y, at xii–xx (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1976) (figures depicting the law of
prerogative). From an historical perspective, “prerogative” was connected to a
variety of issues in the English constitution and government, including royal
pleading rights, royal revenue, succession, foreign affairs, the nature of
‘sovereignty,’ the authority of Parliament, and Crown supervision of imperial and
local government. See, e.g., P. R. CAVILL, THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENTS OF HENRY
VII: 1485–1504, at 207–10 (2009); S. B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS
IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 41–62 (1936); ALAN CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1450–1642, at 179–233
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The Article’s second aim is to explore some implications
of these findings for our own understanding of Article II. It
is not my position that we can derive concrete answers to our
questions about presidential power, and, even if we could,
much has happened in the interim that I would want to
consider. Still, early Americans’ views about prerogative do
suggest some principles useful for constructing Article II and
its relationship to Article I. These principles are meant to
constitute a framework for, as my title has it, “thinking
constitutionally about prerogative,” in the sense that they
help to situate prerogative within a government whose
powers are limited by fundamental law.
First, as I have already noted, Americans engaged in
framing our first republican constitutions regularly
distinguished executive power from prerogative. A
presumption that the federal Constitution reflects this
distinction would be of some use in resolving a well-known
interpretive dispute over the meaning of the Article II
(2009); G. R. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 17–
20, 25–26 (1960); J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 48–49, 56, 67–72 (1961); PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64–95 (2010); 4 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 190–217 (3d ed. 1945); MARGARET ATWOOD JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGH IN ENGLAND,
1603–1645, at 23–34 (Octagon Books 1971) (1949); DANIEL LEE, POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 274–82 (2016);
JENNIFER LOACH, PARLIAMENT UNDER THE TUDORS 105–08 (1991); MARGARET
MCGLYNN, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE AND THE LEARNING OF THE INNS OF COURT 1–
26 (2003); CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND
MODERN 111–25 (1940); FRANCIS OAKLEY, OMNIPOTENCE, COVENANT, AND ORDER:
AN EXCURSION IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS FROM ABELARD TO LEIBNIZ 103–18 (1984);
THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE: LAW, PREROGATIVE AND EMPIRE 19–60 (2015);
FRANCIS D. WORMUTH, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE, 1603–1649, at 47–82 (1939); G.
R. Elton, The Rule of Law in Sixteenth-Century England, in TUDOR MEN AND
INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN ENGLISH LAW AND GOVERNMENT 265, 270–81, 286
(Arthur J. Slavin ed., 1972); G. L. Harriss, Medieval Doctrines in the Debates on
Supply, 1610–1629, in FACTION AND PARLIAMENT: ESSAYS ON EARLY STUART
HISTORY 73, 75–80, 90–91, 100–03 (Kevin Sharpe ed., 1978); Francis Oakley,
Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers of the King, 29
J. HIST. IDEAS 323, 326–29, 334–46 (1968); Kevin Sharpe, Introduction:
Parliamentary History 1603–1629: In or Out of Perspective?, in FACTION AND
PARLIAMENT, supra, at 1, 28–32.
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Vesting Clause. One party in that dispute would read the
Vesting Clause merely as providing for a single chief
executive officer, while their antagonists would read it as a
substantive grant of all powers traditionally held by
executives, including a number of prerogatives.19 Here, I
suggest we presume the clause is a grant of substantive
power, but only “executive power” narrowly conceived—the
power to carry out the law. The power to carry out the law
implies a significant discretion, but it is not a discretionary
authority to contravene the law for the public good; this, or
any other presidential prerogative, should be derived from
an enumerated grant of power. Second, early Americans
discussing prerogative generally assumed that it was defined
and limited by law. They called it “legal prerogative”; in
contemporary terms, we would say that prerogative powers
were regarded as “defeasible.”20 This assumption appears to
have been widely held. Thus, for example, the staunchest
defender of an independent executive in the Philadelphia
Convention, James Wilson, was also the author of the
Sweeping Clause, which, by its terms, grants Congress a
power to regulate the President and the administration.21

19. See, e.g., PRAKASH, IMPERIAL, supra note 1, at 84–85.
20. On this usage of “defeasible,” see, for example, Jack Goldsmith & John F.
Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006);
McConnell, supra note 5 (manuscript at 88). In this context, to say an executive
power is defeasible is to say that the legislature may define it and prescribe the
manner in which it is exercised; however, it is not to say that the legislature may
eliminate the power entirely. For this reason, I sometimes write of the legislature
“regulating” prerogative, or of prerogative powers being “regulable.”
21. John Mikhail, who has studied the Sweeping Clause in greatest depth,
has argued persuasively that Wilson was its principal author (as well as the
source of a similar provision in Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan), and that he
“presumably intended to give Congress whatever instrumental power it needed
to organize and regulate the other branches and agencies of the government.”
John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1056
(2014). In the same vein, but one step further, Jack Goldsmith and John Manning
have provocatively described the Sweeping Clause as Congress’s portion of
executive power. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 20, at 2307 (“In a quite literal
sense, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress a form of executive
power . . . .”).
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Yet, there must be some limits to the power to regulate
presidential prerogatives. I suggest that congressional
regulation of prerogative powers under the Sweeping Clause
should not compromise the President’s “independence of
judgment”—his autonomy in exercising the power as limited
by law—a capacity leading framers thought necessary for a
“vigorous” executive power. Finally, I explore the
Constitution’s framework for handling emergencies. Early
Americans tended to regard executive action without
sanction of law as illegal, but expected that an officer could
be indemnified after the fact by the legislature.22 This
approach has been mistakenly credited to Locke.23 The
embrace of the Lockean prerogative, which began in earnest
during the Cold War, sought to justify the adoption of a very
different regime: executive unilateralism. Although the early
institutional framework for handling emergencies has not
persisted, its core political values have, and are reflected
today in framework statutes regulating the President’s use
of emergency power, and in judicial decisions, like Jackson’s
Steel Seizure concurrence, which buttress those statutes. 24
The executive discretion and institutional flexibility under
this regime leave little practical need for a Lockean
prerogative.
What follows is divided into two parts, corresponding to

22. Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 324 (“That this doctrine was accepted by
every single one of our early statesmen can easily be shown.”). Scigliano objects,
but only to Wilmerding’s requirement that the executive immediately report his
illegal conduct to the legislature. Scigliano, supra note 1, at 252–53 (“We should
amend Wilmerding’s statement: executive officers must be prepared to justify
acts outside the law to Congress . . . should the acts be questioned.”); see also
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 10, 148–49.
23. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1, at 1392. This is the basis for the proposition,
often encountered in the political science literature, that Thomas Jefferson
believed the President to possess a Lockean prerogative. For the distinction
between Lockean prerogative and Jefferson’s views—that an executive acting
illegally might be indemnified by the legislature—see Mortenson, supra note 1,
at 63–65, 64 nn. 49 & 51; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 323, 328–38.
24. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
635–38, 649–51 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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my two announced aims. Part I, the bulk of the Article,
describes the uses that Americans made of “prerogative”
between 1764 and 1788. On the basis of this account, Part II
proffers three principles for the construction of Article II,
applying them to the Vesting Clause, the Take Care Clause
and the question of emergency power.
I. HOW AMERICANS USED “PREROGATIVE”
“Prerogative” wore a Janus face for Americans. Viewed
from one side, it was the source of their rights to govern
themselves, and of the liberties self-government secured. As
one writer reminded the American patriots, they were
“contending for the crown and prerogative of our King, as
well as for liberty—property—and life.”25 Turned round,
however, prerogative was power, and like all kinds of power,
it sought aggressively to expand, and if left unchecked would
destroy liberty. It was this guise that James Warren
described as “the dirty part of the Constitution.”26
The
upheaval
and
transformation
Americans
experienced between 1764 and 1788 brought out both faces,
in some cases simultaneously. The first problem that
presents itself is therefore how to impose some order on the
evidence without doing violence to it. Below, I have divided
my study into three periods. First is the imperial crisis, by
which I mean the political struggle between the British
ministry and the colonial gentry over the series of taxation
measures beginning in the mid-1760s, which led to armed
conflict in April 1775 and a declaration of American
independence about a year later. The second period is the
formation of the first American governments, including the
revolutionary conventions and congresses that took over

25. Letter, To the Freemen of America, PA. J., May 18, 1774, at 3.
26. Letter from James Warren to John Adams (Nov. 5, 1775), in FOUNDERS
ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov [hereinafter FOUNDERS
ONLINE] (Warren was referring in particular to the prerogatives exercised by
governors, as opposed to the King or Crown).
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when imperial government lapsed, followed by the framing
of state constitutions and the establishment of government
under those constitutions. The third period is the framing
and ratification of the federal Constitution. In each of these
periods, I will argue, Americans faced specific political and
constitutional problems that gave shape to their uses of
“prerogative.” By consulting a broad range of sources and
paying close attention to context, we can untangle the term’s
various uses and describe how those uses changed over time.
The result might be called a “conceptual history” of
prerogative in the era of revolution and state formation.27
A. The Imperial Crisis
The core of the ideological account of the imperial crisis,
probably the account most influential among lawyers, is the
debate between the British ministry and Americans over the
meaning of parliamentary sovereignty.28 In its mature form,
parliamentary sovereignty was the doctrine that, as
Blackstone put it, there must exist in every state a “supreme,
irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority,” which in
Great Britain was vested in the national legislature,
Parliament.29 This theory had a wide currency in the late
eighteenth century. Even Americans acknowledged it; the
difficulty was then explaining why Parliament should lack a
power to tax them. In the late 1760s, patriots aired a series
of distinctions, now familiar, between external taxes
(permissible, they said) and internal taxes (not), taxes with
a regulatory purpose (okay) and taxes for raising revenue

27. See, e.g., Peter S. Onuf, Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional
Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective, 46 WILL. & MARY Q. 341, 354–55
(1989) (On Onuf’s usage, following Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock, “conceptual
history” is more concerned with political context than are traditional histories of
ideas.).
28. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 198–229 (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 344–54 (1998 ed.) (1969).
29. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 39–41.
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(not okay), and commercial regulation (yes) and taxes (no),
but these did little to persuade British administrators, whose
views largely hardened over the same period.30 By the early
1770s, the state of debate brought about what Gordon Wood
describes as “a fundamental shift in the American
position.”31 Unable to work around parliamentary
sovereignty, American writers began to disavow
Parliament’s authority entirely and to appeal instead to the
person of the King. The colonies, they maintained, were his
overseas “dominions,” granted and chartered under the
authority of the King’s prerogative.32 Thus we see an
increasing reference to “prerogative” in the final stages of the
crisis.
The conventional account encourages us to think about
prerogative in a particular way. That royal prerogative was
a solution to a crisis caused by insisting on parliamentary
jurisdiction over an empire implies, or at least suggests, that
prerogative was thought to be immune from parliamentary
control. In fleeing from parliamentary sovereignty to royal
prerogative, the colonists were fleeing to a royal jurisdiction
unregulated by acts of Parliament. The suggestion is,
further, that royal jurisdiction is something like the
equitable jurisdiction of early Chancery, in which the King’s
conscience is the measure of state power, rather than the
common law or statute.33 Yet if we study how Americans
wrote about prerogative during the imperial crisis, it
becomes obvious that the term could not stand, simply, for
immunity from parliamentary control and subjection to royal
30. The imperial administrator William Knox is the leading example. BAILYN,
supra note 28, at 218.
31. WOOD, supra note 28, at 352.
32. See, e.g., CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 18–21, 112–47 (1923); ERIC NELSON, THE
ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 33 (2014);
Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 1157, 1194–1211 (1976).
33. Eric Nelson’s repeated invocations of a patriot embrace of “sweeping
prerogatives” carry this connotation. See NELSON, supra note 32, at 5, 123.
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control. As I show in the next several subsections, Americans
often used “prerogative” to justify their immunity from
parliamentary and royal control, by analogizing their
charters to Magna Carta and arguing that the King had
indefeasibly delegated his law-making power to colonial
assemblies. On other occasions, writers used “prerogative” to
describe matters within Parliament’s jurisdiction, in order to
emphasize that royal power was limited by law. The term
was ambiguous, and because it was ambiguous it could be
used to describe a variety of institutional and legal
relationships of value to writers uncertain about the
constitution of the British empire, or who intended to invoke
different constitutions at different times. “Prerogative” thus
illustrates what John Phillip Reid called the “state of
contrariety” or “polarity” in eighteenth-century British
constitutional thought.34
In the last subsection, I explore the differences in
American and English perspectives on “prerogative,” and the
significance it had for the imperial crisis. From the American
perspective, prerogative’s role in sanctioning the royal
charters that formed the basis of their political communities
seems to have left an indelible mark on the term,
transforming it into a metonym for American rights to selfgovernment. This is why “prerogative” formed a crucial
component in what Charles McIlwain called “the charter
claim” against metropolitan English power.35 From the
metropolitan perspective, in contrast, American appeals to
“prerogative” invoked past efforts to undermine Parliament’s
control over governmental supply, principally King Charles’s

34. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 4 (1993).
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35. MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 184. Rather uncharacteristically, McIlwain
took a Londoner’s dismissive view of the argument. For more sympathetic
accounts of the charter argument, see Black, supra note 32, at 1198–1207, as well
as the sources cited in Jack P. Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and
Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S. ATL. Q. 56, 58–73
(1986).
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use of “prerogative taxation.”36 Not sharing the Americans’
association of royal prerogative with political community, the
ministry could not understand how prerogative might
sanctify colonial assemblies any more than it had
“prerogative courts,” commissions, monopolies or other
instruments
of
royal
administration
subject
to
parliamentary dissolution.37 As McIlwain put it, that a
colonial charter “was in fact . . . a provincial constitution for
some thousands of Englishmen affected its legal status not
in the slightest degree. From that point of view, the people of
Maryland did not exist . . . .”38 The focus on charters may
explain why Americans found little occasion to use
“prerogative” as Locke had defined it, since a discretionary
authority to violate the law would be at cross-purposes with
paeans in its defense.
1. Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the
Legislative Authority
We should begin with James Wilson’s short pamphlet,
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative
Authority of the British Parliament, which was written in
1768 and, although not published until 1774, is probably the
most important treatment of the issue from the crisis.39 The

36. See Black, supra note 32, at 1200 (describing the metropolitan concern
that “royal power must not wax fat on contributions from grateful colonial
beneficiaries of royal license, lessening dependence on Parliament”). “Prerogative
taxation” refers to royal powers to raise money from subjects without
parliamentary consent. For its use under Charles I, see J. P. KENYON, THE STUART
CONSTITUTION, 1603–1688: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 53–89 (1966).
37. “Prerogative courts,” sometimes “conciliar courts,” emerged from the
King’s Council after the common law courts were already distinct, with relatively
settled forms and a body of professional advocates and judges. The most famous
of these courts, Star Chamber, was used to political ends and abolished by
Parliament in 1641. See KENYON, supra note 36, at 117–24, 192, 223–25.
38. MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 179, 180–81 (emphasis added).
39. JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT (Philadelphia, William &
Thomas Bradford 1774). Wilson tells us that the pamphlet was “written during
the late Non-Importation Agreement,” id. at iii, and Robert McCloskey dates it to
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pamphlet illustrates well the diversity of meanings I have
already attributed to “prerogative.” Wilson uses the term to
describe the power of the Crown generally; its specific
powers, among which he lists war, peace, and treating with
foreign nations; the particular royal powers to establish
governments and regulate domestic trade; and, most familiar
to us, a “discretionary power of acting where the laws are
silent,” a prerogative Wilson thinks “most properly entrusted
to the executor of the laws.”40 In the last phrase, the
expression “discretionary power” is appositional to
“prerogative” and can be read naturally as a definition,
though it does not account for the term’s other uses in the
pamphlet. We read of “its prerogative” (the Crown’s), “his
prerogative” (the King’s, used four times, twice italicized),
“all prerogative” (plural), “this prerogative” and
“prerogative” (both singular, but the latter a putative ‘kind
term’), “Royal prerogative” and “legal prerogative”—without
any hint as to whether these are meant to be the same or
different things.41 Indeed, the last two uses, or even the first
two, could refer to contrasting or opposed things; and if we
look to see what idea, institution or practice prerogative is
opposed to, we see that it is opposed to “the privileges of the
people” or “the liberties of the people”—except, apparently,
when the liberties of the people are secured by “governments
under the sanction of his prerogative”; and that prerogative
is opposed to law or “the exertion of an unlimited authority
by Parliament”—except, that is, when prerogative is
expanded by acts of Parliament, whose House of Commons,
says Wilson, has occasionally “thr[own] into the scale of
prerogative all that weight, which they derived from the

1768. Robert Green McCloskey, Introduction to 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 9
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). Its importance for us stems in part from
Wilson’s sustained discussion of prerogative; he uses the term seventeen times in
thirty-five pages.
40. WILSON, supra note 39, at 6, 9, 13, 29, 33.
41. Id. at 6, 9, 11–14, 29, 33–35, 34 n.*.
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people.”42 It is enough to make one’s head spin. And this from
James Wilson, generally regarded as one of the patriots’ most
acute legal thinkers.43
Wilson was one of the patriots’ most acute legal thinkers.
Acute lawyers did not grasp at general principles where none
were to be had; they understood how to use terms whose
meaning depended on context and purpose. We can make
better sense of Wilson’s varied uses of “prerogative” if we
approach the pamphlet from this perspective. His core
purpose, announced on page three, is to trace the
consequences of the view that “lawful government” rests on
“the consent of those, who are subject to it.”44 This was a
familiar starting point for American writers disputing
Parliament’s power to tax the colonies, but it also could be
used to impugn any parliamentary jurisdiction over the
colonies, as demonstrated in a pamphlet by the radical
William Hicks, published the year Wilson was writing.45
Wilson quotes Burlamaqui, the Swiss legal theorist, for the
proposition that “sovereigns” derive their authority from the
agreement of “individuals” to part with a portion of their
natural liberty in exchange for happiness.46 Yet, reasons
42. Id. at 6, 9, 11, 13, 29, 34.
43. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 39, at 6.
44. WILSON, supra note 39, at 3.
45. See WILLIAM HICKS, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PARLIAMENTARY POWER
CONSIDERED 3–5, 21 (New York, John Holt 1768). Hicks regarded the general
assemblies as guarding the “liberties” of “colonists” “not only . . . against the
encroachments of the royal prerogative, but” also protecting “their property
against the invasions of their more powerful brethren” (in Parliament). Id. at 4–
5. On the role of consent in arguments by American Whigs against parliamentary
taxation, see The Virginia Petitions to the King and Parliament (1764) as
reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP
ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 14 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959) [hereinafter
PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION]; The New York Petition to the House of Commons
(1764), as reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra, at 8–9; The Resolutions
as Recalled by Patrick Henry, as reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra,
at 48; and MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 156–57.
46. WILSON, supra note 39, at 3. This looks like the familiar social contract.
Burlamaqui followed Pufendorf in identifying two contracts: the first was the
transfer of some portion of individual rights to a sovereign, constituting the
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Wilson, the British Parliament cannot actually promote the
happiness of Americans, since Americans lack the privilege
to vote for its members. History shows that such a
Parliament will be corrupted by the Crown, who will use
offices and emoluments to extend “the prerogative” and
destroy the privileges of the people. Since Parliament could
not secure Americans against the prerogative, it could not be
their sovereign.
An imperial Parliament would threaten the ‘balanced
constitution’ so praised by establishment Whigs in a second
way, as well.47 Parliaments elected by the people, whose
members share interests with the people, are “[s]ensible” of
the need to limit themselves, says Wilson, and thus preserve
for “the executor” “a discretionary power of acting where the
laws are silent.”48 This he also calls “prerogative.”49 We are
left to infer that the present British Parliament will not
preserve this prerogative in the empire, since its members
know little of American interests; it would surely trench on
uses of executive discretion that accommodated and
benefitted the colonies.
The consequence to which Wilson is drawn is that
imperial sovereignty cannot constitutionally be lodged in the
British Parliament. He closes his essay by turning, briefly,
to an alternative account of how lawful government in the
colonies is constituted.50 Here Wilson drops the
constitutional framework of the establishment Whig and
formation of political society (this is the ‘social contract’); the second was a
contract settling the form of government. J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITIC LAW 29 (Nugent trans., London, J. Nourse 1752); see RICHARD TUCK, THE
SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 129–30 (2016);
Mikhail, supra note 21, at 1076–77 (describing the first contract and Wilson’s use
of the idea).
47. On the constitutional views of establishment Whigs, see JERRILYN GREENE
MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774–
1776, at 14–16 (1987); REID, supra note 34, at 160.
48. WILSON, supra note 39, at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 28–29.
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assumes a different perspective, more distinctively
American. He adopts the views, then in print, of former
Massachusetts Governor Thomas Pownall, as well as “N.N.,”
the author of a series of letters published in the Pennsylvania
Chronicle, who turns out to be Benjamin Franklin.51 Their
accounts feature the King presiding over an “imperial
federation,” whose provinces each have a basic charter and
an independent legislative assembly.52 The King can occupy
this place in the empire because he has a constitutional
obligation to protect his subjects, wherever they are, in
exchange for their obedience.53 To manage the “great
machine” of imperial government, the King is to employ a
litany of traditional royal powers, called “prerogatives,”
using them to balance conflicting interests expressed by
“different legislatures throughout his dominions.”54 Note
again how “prerogative” is being used. In this part of the
essay, Wilson opposes “prerogative” to itself, but in two
51. THOMAS POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES 43–55 (4th ed.,
London, J. Walter 1768); Benjamin Franklin (N.N.), On the Tenure of the Manor
of East Greenwich, PENN. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1767 (essay dated Jan. 6, 1766),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-13-02-0006. Franklin also
authored a letter from “A Briton,” published in the London Chronicle, which
advanced the same views. Benjamin Franklin (A Briton), To the Printer of the
London Chronicle, LONDON CHRON., Oct. 18–20, 1768, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 233–37 (William B. Willcox ed., 1972). Wilson is likely to
have read or at least discussed these texts. In 1767 he was reading law with John
Dickinson, who was then publishing the Farmer’s Letters, which argued that
Parliament lacked a power to tax the colonies for purposes of raising revenue and
thus was engaged in this debate. Wilson was apparently drafting Considerations
around the same time. McCloskey, supra note 39, at 10. In addition to Pownall
and Franklin, James Otis had advanced a similar argument several years earlier,
also in print (in several editions) by the late 1760s. E.g., JAMES OTIS, A
VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES, AGAINST THE ASPERSIONS OF THE HALIFAX
GENTLEMAN 21, 23–24 (Boston, Edes & Gill 1765).
52. RANDOLPH GREENFIELD ADAMS, POLITICAL IDEAS
REVOLUTION 29–39 (1922).
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53. WILSON, supra note 39, at 31. As Aaron Knapp has observed, “although
Wilson advocated remaining loyal to the crown’s ‘legal prerogatives’ . . . [it was]
only so long as the king protected the colonists.” Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s
Revolutionary: James Wilson and the Birth of American Jurisprudence, 29 J. L.
& POL. 189, 200 (2013).
54. WILSON, supra note 39, at 33–34.
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different senses: first, as a royal power to charter assemblies,
which serve to express local interests; and second, as a set of
powers to manage an empire of conflicting local interests.55
In no case was there a “royal prerogative” to alter colonial
charters, since, as Wilson explained later, this would be
“diametrically opposed to the principles and the ends of
prerogative.”56
Using the structure of the argument as a guide, there
appear to be at least four senses of “prerogative” in
Considerations. “Prerogative” means: (1) royal power over
subjects; (2) an executive discretion to act where the laws are
silent; (3) a royal authority to charter provincial
governments and legislative assemblies, although not to
alter or destroy them; and, (4) a traditional set of specific
royal powers, set out in English legal literature, with which
the King is to manage and direct an imperial federation of
provincial governments. Wilson is not alone in using the
term these ways for these purposes. Indeed, as we will see,
the four senses of “prerogative” just identified occur

55. Id. at 29, 33–34. Among the royal powers to manage imperial government,
Wilson includes “regulat[ing] domestic trade by his prerogative.” Id. at 33. Eric
Nelson finds the passage “remarkable.” NELSON, supra note 32, at 35–36. The
power to regulate domestic trade is, however, included in most period treatises
on prerogative. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 176; 6 JOHN COMYNS, A
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50–51 (4th ed., Dublin, Luke White 1793). The
King traditionally regulated trade by chartering associations for that purpose.
See 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 203–04 (London,
Catherine Lintot 1759). These associations self-regulated by law or custom. A
defense of their charter liberties was in this sense corporatist and anti-Stuart,
not absolutist and pro-Stuart, as Nelson frames the passage. See Victor Morgan,
Whose Prerogative in Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Century England?, 5
J. LEGAL HIST. 39, 47–49 (1984); Catherine Patterson, Quo Warranto and
Borough Corporations in Early Stuart England: Royal Prerogative and Local
Privileges in Central Courts, 70 ENGLISH HIST. REV. 879, 879, 905 (2005).
56. That is, altering a charter would be opposed to the well-being of the
people. James Wilson, Speech Delivered in the Convention for the Province of
Pennsylvania (Jan. 1775), in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 39, at
754, 756. Again, Benjamin Franklin had made the same argument, in print, over
ten years earlier. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, COOL THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT
SITUATION OF OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY 18–
19 (Philadelphia, W. Dunlap 1764).
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throughout American writing during the imperial crisis.
Each is relevant to the arguments advanced by American
writers, but in different ways.
2. “Prerogative” in Pamphlets and Broadsides
Like Wilson, but to a greater degree, the leading
pamphlet literature reveals a concern with establishing the
sanctity of American charters and positioning their
legislative assemblies as a check on imperial power, whether
royal or parliamentary. For example, in response to the gibe
of metropolitan writers that appealing to the royal
prerogative invited “Danger,” Edward Bancroft reminded his
readers that “Royal Charters” are “fundamental, and
consequently indefeasible Acts, equally binding on the Prince
and his Subjects.”57 These royal charters confer “[l]iberties,”
and render these liberties “at least as secure from the
[e]ncroachments of Prerogative” as Parliament does within
the realm.58 Once the King divested himself of authority to
convene a legislative assembly, “the Royal Prerogative could
afterwards have no Power,” thereby exempting colonists
from “Impositions by the King’s Prerogative.”59 To Bancroft’s
eye, then, colonial charters were indefeasible acts of
prerogative, and as such served to check imperial
administrative power, also described as “prerogative.” But
why should colonial charters be indefeasible? Any other view,
wrote James Iredell, would fashion the charters “a mere
snare and delusion to induce our forefathers to come
abroad.”60 In truth, “the share which the people have in the
57. EDWARD BANCROFT, REMARKS ON THE REVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSY
GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES 9, 11 (London 1769). The charter
specifying the form of government was an exercise of “his Prerogative.” Id. at 43.
BETWEEN

58. Id. at 13.
59. Id. at 20, 24, 40, 41. Bancroft makes the same point about judicial
authority, although a right of final appeal to the Privy Council was reclaimed
from corporate colonies in the eighteenth century. Id. at 66–67; see generally
MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004).
60. James Iredell, To the Inhabitants of Great Britain, September 1774, in 1
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legislative power” under those charters was “the chief
essential” for protecting their property from arbitrary
deprivation; and the king “had a right to stipulate the
conditions upon which his subjects might be encouraged to
venture risks.”61 Americans therefore would “not submit to
any alteration of the original terms of the contract, because
they were the price for which the service was engaged.”62 The
position was self-consciously anti-Stuart. As American expat
Stephen Sayre observed, the practice of “the faithless
Stuarts” had been to “look[] upon the people’s charters as
waste-paper.”63 Moses Mather, a Connecticut clergyman,
imagined an idealized past in which charters had been
“settled and established, determining and bounding the
power and prerogative of the ruler” and the liberties of the
subject.64 Though the charters rested on “certain
prerogatives,” they were now “permanent and perpetual, as
unalterable as Magna Charta,” and could not be “vacated or
changed by the king.”65 Mather’s argument followed that of
another minister, the Georgian John Zubly, who had earlier
observed that the Crown did not “reserve unto itself a right
to rule over [the colonies] without their own Assemblies.”66
THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL 253, 253 (Don Higginbotham ed., 1976).
61. Id. at 260. Several years later, Thomas Jefferson made the same point in
his draft of resolutions in response to Lord North’s “Conciliatory Proposal,” which
would exempt any colony from parliamentary taxation for common defense or
support of government if the assembly voluntarily voted a supply. Jefferson
objected that it was “the freedom of granting our Money for which we have
contended. Without this we possess no check on the royal prerogative . . .”
Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Resolutions on Lord North’s Conciliatory Proposal,
10 June 1775, in FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 26.
62. Iredell, supra note 60, at 261.
63. STEPHEN SAYRE, THE ENGLISHMAN DECEIVED; A POLITICAL PIECE 27
(London, Samuel Hall 1768).
64. MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 22 (Hartford,
Ebenezer Watson 1775).
65. Id. at 25.
66. JOHN ZUBLY, AN HUMBLE ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE DEPENDENCY
AMERICAN COLONIES UPON THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT-BRITAIN 23
(Charleston 1769). Zubly, it should be noted, sought reconciliation during the
imperial crisis and eventually became a loyalist. The passage quoted here speaks
OF THE
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Nor could Parliament alter colonial charters, maintained
another writer, for that would be inconsistent with “the
Dignity of the British Crown.”67
Pamphlet-writers also regularly invoked the fourth
sense of “prerogative” to describe the structure of the
imperial federation. “Prerogative” in this sense referred to a
traditional set of royal powers with which the King
conducted the business of government. Perhaps the most
distinctive contribution to the line of argument from a patriot
was from John Adams, writing to the people of
Massachusetts as “Novanglus.” Although Adams described
something like a federative imperial structure, he insisted
that “the British government is not an empire.”68 Properly
understood, an empire was “a despotism,” in which the ruler
was “bound by no law or limitation, but his own will.”69 The
British government, in contrast, was a “government of laws”
and thus a republic. That the King possessed “ample and
splendid prerogatives” did not make it an empire, Adams
maintained, since his government was “bound by fixed laws,
which the people have a voice in making.”70 So bound,
Adams’s “prerogative” could not refer to Locke, but had to
mean the royal powers, regulated by Parliament, with which
the King governed this massive, transatlantic “republic.”
John Dickinson, too, had been converted to this vision of
British government, although he did not express it in
Adams’s terminology. From the very beginning of his lengthy
of royal “right” but not “prerogative”; the pamphlet mentions “prerogative” three
times, each time opposing it to privilege or right, a traditional usage. Id. at 10,
15, 20.
67. BENJAMIN PRESCOTT, A FREE AND CALM CONSIDERATION OF THE UNHAPPY
MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DEBATES 4, 43 (Salem, S. & E. Hall 1774). “Dignity” and
“Prerogative” are closely related in early English writings on monarchical power.
68. John Adams, Novanglus VII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of the
Massachusetts-Bay of the Colony of the Massachusetts-Bay, in 2 THE ADAMS
PAPERS DIGITAL EDITION 307, 314 (Sara Martin ed., 2018) [hereinafter ADAMS
PAPERS].
69. Id. at 314.
70. Id.
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Essay on the Constitutional Power of Great-Britain over the
Colonies in America, Dickinson thought it important to
“acknowledge the prerogatives of the sovereign,” including
powers of making “peace and war, treaties, leagues and
alliances,” citing Blackstone’s Commentaries in support.71
Just as treatise writers insisted, these prerogatives were
limited, having been “vested in the crown for the support of
society,” and infringing natural liberty no more “than is
expedient for the maintenance of our civil.”72 These limits
were firm. As Dickinson explained elsewhere, it was because
Charles I had not satisfied himself with “the points of
prerogative . . . contested and settled,” that even powers
“legally vested” in the Crown had been lost.73
Of course, the King might go astray by misusing his
lawful prerogatives, as Thomas Jefferson explained in
Summary View of the Rights of British America.74 George III
had used his prerogative to veto salutary acts of colonial
assemblies (in particular, observed Jefferson, laws that
would have ended the slave trade in Virginia), while failing
to stop the enactment of unjust legislation by Parliament.75
For the King to be a true “mediatory power,” “holding the
balance of a great, if a well poised empire,” he would need to
exercise his prerogatives with greater concern for the wellbeing of his American subjects.76

71. JOHN DICKINSON, AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF GREATBRITAIN OVER THE COLONIES IN AMERICA 10 n* (Philadelphia, William & Thomas
Bradford 1774).
72. Id. at 11–12.
73. John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, to the Inhabitants
of the British Colonies: Letter XI, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE; & COUNTRY J., Mar. 5,
1768, at 1.
74. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH
AMERICA 16 (Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1774) [hereinafter SUMMARY VIEW].
75. See id.
76. Id. at 15, 22. For incisive comments on this aspect of Jefferson’s
constitutionalism, see PETER ONUF, THE MIND OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 83–95
(2007). Iredell, too, thought the King should use his veto to “prevent the actual
injury” of his colonies by a foreign legislature, Parliament. Iredell, supra note 60,
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3. “Prerogative” in American Newspapers
We see a similar set of uses if we expand the scope of our
sources beyond the leading pamphlets. These uses are
subsumed within a larger body exhibiting some variety;
“prerogative” was not uncommon in print, and seems
regularly to have suggested itself to writers in need of a
synonym for “power,” or even a piquant name for a racehorse
or a boat.77 In most cases, the term was used simply to refer
to royal authority and contrasted with the privileges,
liberties, or rights of the people.78 Elsewhere, “prerogative”
at 266.
77. As a synonym for power, “prerogative” could be applied to Parliament,
colonial legislative assemblies, or even “the kingdom.” See A. B., To the Printers,
BOS. EVENING-POST, Aug. 12, 1765, at 1 (Parliament); Cato, From the Gazetteer,
CONN. GAZETTE & UNIVERSAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 21, 1774, at 2 (Parliament);
John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the
British Colonies: Letter V, PA. CHRON., Dec. 28, 1767, at 195 (“The people of GreatBritain consider that kingdom as the sovereign of these colonies, and would now
annex to that sovereignty a prerogative, never heard of before.”); Great and
Glorious News to America, and Comfortable News to the Printer of the Virginia
Gazette, VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg), May 2, 1766 at 1 (colonial assemblies).
“Prerogative” could be used, and regularly was, to refer to God’s power or special
authority, see, e.g., From the Free Savages I now come to the Savages in Bonds,
MASS. GAZETTE & BOS. NEWS-LETTER, Apr. 2, 1767, at 1 (“[t]o know what
constitutes mine or your Happiness, is the sole Prerogative of Him who created
us, . . .”), or the special authority of married men, see C. Arpasia, The Visitant,
PA. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, Apr. 11, 1768, at 81 (the husband’s “lordly
prerogative”), or even “the prerogative of every human being” to “commend Virtue
and . . . oppose Vice . . .” See Felton, From the Boston Gazette to Mr. Hutchinson,
DUNLAP’S PA. PACKET, OR GEN. ADVERTISER, Jan. 31, 1774, at 2. For other uses,
see reports of the “Scotch horse Prerogative” in Westminster Races, N.Y.
MERCURY, July 22, 1765, at 3, or the wreck of “the Prerogative, a Custom-house
Yatch, bound for the Leeward Islands” in More Ship News, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec.
26, 1765, at 2.
78. See Americanus, To the Printers of the New-Hampshire Gazette, N.H.
GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1768, at 2 (referring to “a Balance between the
Prerogative of the Crown, and the Rights of the People”); Claud, The Nature and
Extent of Parliamentary Power Considered, N.Y. J., OR GEN. ADVERTISER, Feb. 6,
1768, at 4 (“[Colonists] have not only to guard their liberties against the
encroachments of the royal prerogative, but even to protect their property against
the invasions of their more powerful brethren.”); Extract of a Letter from
Dominica, Dated October 10, N.Y. GAZETTE; OR, THE WEEKLY POST-BOY, Nov. 26,
1767, at 2 (“The four and a half per cent duty upon our produce, causes much
murmuring, being not laid upon us by act of parliament, or act of assembly, but
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was used to refer to a particular royal power or a power
attached to a royally commissioned office.79 These
only by prerogative royal, which is looked upon as unconstitutional and
dangerous . . .”); Extract of a Letter from London, PA. J.; & WKLY. ADVERTISER,
Sept. 7, 1774, at 3 (“The Bostonians . . . are cruelly used, deprived of their natural
rights and liberties. . . . [C]ontinual steps advance, and increase the power of the
ministry, and influence of the crown and prerogative.”); From the New York
Gazette, BOS. EVENING-POST, July 22, 1765, at 1 (opposing “the prerogatives of
the crown” and “the encroachments of the people” and “the rights of the
commons”); T. M., Mr. Printer, CONN. COURANT, Mar. 28, 1768, at 1 (“[T]he stretch
of the prerogative in King James the Second’s short reign, brought all people to
see the necessity of a revolution.”); May it Please Your Excellency, BOS. EVENINGPOST, Oct. 28, 1765, at 3 (“[T]he King . . . holds the rights of all his subjects sacred
as his own prerogative . . .”); Messeurs Edes & Cill, BOS. GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 1767,
at 4 (“It is as much the duty of a member of society to oppose every encroachment
on the subject, as it is to support the prerogative when in danger, from the
licentiousness of the people.”); N.Y. MERCURY, Sept. 2, 1765, at 3 (describing the
General Assembly “weighing the privileges of the prerogative on the one side and
the liberty of the subject on the other”); Observations Historical and Political,
N.Y. GAZETTE, Apr. 21, 1766, at 1 (stating that under Elizabeth, “it became the
grand struggle of the people and their sovereign, on the one part, to enlarge the
royal prerogative, and on the other to preserve the CHARTER of LIBERTY
entire.”); John Penn, On Delaware, and Province of Pennsylvania, to the General
Assembly of the said Counties, PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 12, 1764, at 1 (“The Harmony
and good Understanding, which have so long and happily subsisted between the
Legislative Branches here, have principally been owing to a due and constant
Attention to the civil and religious Rights of the People, without attempting to
invade the Royal Prerogative, or trample on the just Rights of Government.”); To
the Publisher of the New-Hampshire Gazette, N.H. GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., Apr.
1, 1774, at 1 (contrasting “the Rights of the Prerogative,” entrusted to the Peers
of Great Britain, with “the People’s Privileges”). This use is also present in the
leading pamphlet literature. See PRESCOTT, supra note 67, at 31; ZUBLY, supra
note 66, at 15, 20.
79. See A Letter from Mr. Wilkes to his Grace the Duke of Grafton, BOS. POSTBOY & ADVERTISER, July 6, 1767, at 1 (describing the “Prerogative” of “mercy”); A
Letter to a Right Noble Lord, BOS. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., July 22, 1765, at 2 (“It
is a maxim at this day that the Crown by royal prerogative alone can levy no
taxes on the subject.”); Copy of a Petition Reported to the Late House of
Representatives, ESSEX GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 1768, at 7 (noting the “Royal
Prerogative” to grant “a Charter for a College”); London, BOS. POST-BOY &
ADVERTISER, Apr. 1, 1765, at 3 (judicial prerogatives); London, February 4, BOS.
POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, Apr. 15, 1765, at 2 (prerogative to levy an impost);
Phocion’s Letter to the K—, DUNLAP’S PA. PACKET OR, GEN. ADVERTISER, Aug. 29,
1774, at 1 (appealing to the King to use “Your prerogative . . . power to suppress
the unjustifiable invasions of our fellow-subjects [in] the Parliament”); To His
Excellency Josiah Martin, N.Y. J., OR GEN. ADVERTISER, Feb. 10, 1774, at 4
(referring to “his Majesty’s prerogative,” vested in the governor, to issue
“commissions of Oyer and Terminer”); To Metriotes, VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg),
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prerogatives had legal limits; even “the most extensive
prerogatives of the crown,” while “discretionary,” were not
“unlimited.”80 To maintain otherwise was to advocate
prerogative “above [l]aw,” rather than prerogative “limited
by the law.”81 Whether the precise legal limits on prerogative
should be settled by Parliament or by some other body was
disputed.82 Whoever it was, however, this approach to
“prerogative” was the seed of a more general theory of
government. As one essayist put it, drawing on language
attributed to Lord Mansfield, prerogative was not “some
peculiar riches, or interest, which the crown has above, or
opposed to, the rights and privileges of the people,” but “in
reality, no more than that share of the government, which is
vested in the crown . . . for the general welfare of the
community.”83 Thus, we see in the period two uses of
Sept. 12, 1766, at 1 (describing an “ancient prerogative,” given the King’s Bench,
to bail in criminal cases); To the Printers, BOS. GAZETTE, & COUNTRY J., Aug. 20,
1764, at 3 (prerogative to “prorogue the assembly”).
80. A Citizen, To the Farmer, N.Y. MERCURY, Dec. 21, 1767, at 2.
81. Mr. Parker, N.Y. GAZETTE; OR, WKLY. POST-BOY, Feb. 15, 1768, at 2
(prerogative limited by law); Preface for a 30th of January Sermon, BOS. GAZETTE,
& COUNTRY J., Feb. 29, 1768, at 1 (prerogative above the law). “Prerogative above
the law” was likely something akin to what Englishmen called “high prerogative,”
a general power to act when necessary to protect the public. See Wilmerding,
supra note 1, at 322.
82. Compare Queries Proposed to the Committee of Philadelphia Merchants,
Now Sitting, MASS. GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 1768, at 2 (“Whenever any Contention or
Controversy arises between the Governors and Governed, whether the
Legislature is not the proper Tribunal for the Determination of them; being a
Body of Men, duly authorized, in a legal Capacity, to address, redress, hear and
determine the Rights of the Subject and the Prerogative of the Crown . . .”), with
The British American: Number IX, VA. GAZETTE (Rind), July 28, 1774, at 1
(“[T]hough this prerogative may be exercised oppressively, still the subject must
submit. He may petition, but majesty only can redress the grievance.”).
83. Further Remarks on the British Government, GA. GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 1768,
at 1. For Mansfield’s view, see 16 WILLIAM A. COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY
OF ENGLAND: FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST, IN 1066 TO THE YEAR 1803. AD 1765 –
1771, at 266–67 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813) (“[P]rerogative is that share of the
government which, by the constitution, is vested in the king alone.”). For other
American expressions of this view, see A View of the British Constitution, ESSEX
GAZETTE, Oct. 25, 1768, at 54 (listing powers of war and peace, assenting to “new
laws” or withholding assent, etc.); At a Provincial Meeting of Deputies Chosen by
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“prerogative,” coexisting alongside one another: prerogative
as opposed to privilege or right, and prerogative as a suite of
powers associated with the Crown, with which imperial
government could be conducted.
We see, also, beginning in the mid-1760s, royal
“prerogative” regularly adduced (or denied) as authority for
colonial charters and legislative assemblies.84 In his 1771
Oration commemorating the Boston Massacre, James Lovell
told his listeners that the colony’s first settlers had “entered
into a mutual, sacred compact” with the King, in which “we
find our only true legislative authority.”85 This compact, said
Lovell, bound the British King, “though the most powerful
the Several Counties of Pennsylvania, PA. J., July 23, 1774, at 1 (similar).
84. See A Vindication of a Late Pamphlet, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE; & COUNTRY
J., Mar. 2, 1765, at 1 (describing the colony charters as “mere efforts of the royal
prerogative”); Causes of the Present Discontent and Commotion in America, VA.
GAZETTE (Pinkney), Feb. 16, 1775, at 2 (“such are the great charters of the
colonies, each alike deriving its vigour and activity from the same immutable
source, the ROYAL PREROGATIVE.”); Extract of a Letter from London, N.Y.
MERCURY, May 27, 1765, at 3 (“[I]t was absurd, to suppose that a body of
Adventurers could carry the Legislative power of Great-Britain along with them;
that he was sure the charters could convey no such power, for the very best reason
in the world, because the prerogative could not grant it.”); From the Public
Advertiser, London, April 11, N.H. GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., June 20, 1766, at 1
(“[T]he Moment that the Crown parted with a Grant, or a Charter, the Colonists
considered themselves as possessed of the very Power which the King had given
away, and that it was not even in his own Option to resume it. . . .”); MASS.
GAZETTE, Mar. 6, 1766, at 2 (describing the colonies “claim to . . . their respective
legislatures” under the “royal prerogative”; and continuing, “it has been asserted
with more justice and consistency, that the King’s Scepter is the instrument of
power over the colonies, and Prerogative the rule by which their obedience must
be regulated. In this case, however, have not the royal charters been granted,
establishing a constitution, and delegating to them [a] qualified power of
legislation?”); PA. GAZETTE, May 29, 1766, at 1 (“King, Lords and
Commons . . . would, in effect, surrender their ancient unalienable rights of
supreme jurisdiction, and give them exclusively to the subordinate provincial
legislatures, established by prerogative . . . .”); To the Printer of the London
Chronicle, PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 1766, at 1 (“[T]he modelling of those matters
[i.e., relating to currency] peculiarly belongs to the Royal Prerogative, and was
certainly not conceded to the Colonies by their Charters . . .”).
85. James Lovell, Remarks at Boston (Apr. 2, 1771), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 17, 19 (H. Niles ed., 1822). Lovell made no
mention of the revocation of the original colonial charter and the colony’s
royalization in the late seventeenth century.
OF THE
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prince on earth, yet, a subject under a divine constitution of
LAW,” while expressing, at the same time, his constitutional
authority as “royal landlord of this territory.”86 Parliament’s
assertion of the right to legislate for the colonies ‘in all cases
whatsoever’
was,
therefore,
“A
DOWN-RIGHT
USURPATION OF HIS PREROGATIVE as king of
America.”87 Probably the line drove the crowd to huzzahs, as
it expressed the ‘cult’ of limited, protestant monarchy that
took hold in the colonies after the Glorious Revolution, and
which traced sovereign authority to a sacred contract, in
contrast to the arbitrary rule of Catholic princes.88 Thus,
when the author of an Address to the Freemen of America
reminded his “countrymen” that “we are contending for the
crown and prerogative of our King, as well as for liberty,
property, and life,” no one thought him guilty of
contradiction, since prerogative was the origin of charter
rights, by which life, liberty and property were secured.89 The
measure of colonial legislative authority under the
prerogative, according to another, more lawyerly writer, was
the limitation expressed in the writ of Quo Warranto, “illi qui
86. Id.; see also A.B., The Centinel No. VII, BOS. EVENING-POST, June 6, 1768,
at 1 (arguing that it had been “prudent . . . to receive a charter,” because it
enabled colonists to “direct the mode of exercising their privileges, and
to . . . ascertain the bounds of royal prerogative with regard to them.”).
87. Lovell, supra note 85, at 19.
88. See BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THE KING’S THREE FACES: THE RISE & FALL OF
ROYAL AMERICA, 1688 – 1776, at 15–21, 40–46, 203–04 (2006).
89. To the Freemen of America, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 335,
336 (Peter Force ed., 1837); see also MASS. GAZETTE: & BOS. WKLY. NEWSL., Jan.
6, 1774, at 2 (“We are of Opinion, that the Prerogative of the Crown and the
Rights of the Subjects are by the English Constitution inseparable, so in the
Maintenance of the one we shall secure the other.”). Indeed, the same argument
could be made about Magna Carta and English liberty; according to “Caius
Memmius,” a metropolitan writer sympathetic to the Americans, colonial
governments “derived from the same authority from which we have received our
great charter of liberties,” and that “in this light,” Parliament’s effort to tax the
colonies was “an infringement of the sovereign’s prerogative.” Caius Memmius,
From the Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, N.Y. GAZETTE, & WKLY. MERCURY,
Dec. 5, 1768, at 2. The argument implies Magna Carta is a fundamental law, by
framing it as an exercise of the sovereign’s prerogative to enter into a “sacred”
compact.
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habent chartas regales, secundum chartas istas et earundem
plenitudinem judicentur [Let those who have royal charters
be judged according to those charters and their breadth of
content].”90 Even if granting the charters had exceeded “the
power of prerogative,” the fact was, wrote one commentator,
that “prerogative did grant them, [and] parliament
acquiesced in the grant, and the free people of Britain acted
under the security of that grant”—an argument Benjamin
Franklin would reiterate, several months later, writing as “A
Briton” in the London Chronicle.91 It was only during the
English Civil War that Parliament had begun “to interfere in
that prerogative” and “usurped the government” in all the
King’s dominions.92 Thus, prescription ratified the King’s use
of prerogative and now guaranteed Americans’ charter
rights.93 No American took the opposing view, defended on
the floor of Commons by Welbore Ellis, who maintained that
“chartered rights are by no means those sacred things which
never can be altered,” and that, while “vested in the crown
as a prerogative, for the good of the people at large,” they
might be altered “if the supreme legislature find [them] unfit
and inconvenient.”94 Rather, according to the authors of the
90. To P. P., Author of the Letters to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies in
America, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 396
(emphasis added). Authority to conduct government was legally understood as a
franchise, derived by grant from the King by his prerogative; this is why it might
be challenged in a quo warranto proceeding. See Hale, supra note 18, at 240–41.
91. Monitor V, N.Y. J.; OR, GEN. ADVERTISER, Apr. 14, 1768, at 1; see Franklin,
supra note 51, at 233.
92. B. Franklin, The Answer, PA. J., Apr. 20, 1774, at 5.
93. See Black, supra note 32, at 1201–02 (discussing the doctrine of usage).
94. Interesting Debate on the Second Reading of the Bill for Regulating the
Civil Government of Massachusetts Bay, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH
SERIES, supra note 89, at 415. Eric Nelson cites Bancroft for the proposition that
“the King might, by his Prerogative, put the Inhabitants of that Colony under
whatever Form of Government he pleased,” but the language is a quotation
Bancroft attributes to the King’s judges, and which Bancroft himself denies,
concluding that the King “could not, by his Prerogative” alter their form of
government. Compare BANCROFT, supra note 57, at 43 (emphasis added), with
NELSON, supra note 32, at 46. According to Gervase Parker Bushe, attacks on the
sanctity of colonial charters, even by British administrators and members of
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Humble Petition and Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica,
“the royal prerogative” was “totally independent of the
[English] people,” who could not, through their House of
Commons, “restrain or invalidate those legal grants which
the prerogative hath a just right to give, and hath very
liberally given for the encouragement, of colonization.”95
4. “Prerogative” and Self-Government: The Imperial
Crisis
Of the different senses of “prerogative,” by far the most
important in the imperial crisis was the third, which
Americans used to describe the founding of their political
communities and the basis of those communities’ continuing
rights of self-governance. In this sense, from the American
perspective, the question of the King’s power to raise money
by grant of supply from his provincial legislative assemblies
Parliament, “have been very weak, and very few.” G. P. BUSHE, THE CASE OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA 2–3 (Dublin, James Williams 1769). Asserting a
sovereign power to alter charters was Stuartist in its connotation; compare the
claim advanced 150 years earlier by Archbishop William Laud: “all corporations,
societies, nay counties, provinces and depending kingdoms, have all their
jurisdictions and governments established by [the King]; and by him (for public
good) to be changed or dissolved.” Morgan, supra note 55, at 47 (emphasis added)
(quoting Statutes of Oxford).
95. To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council: The Humble Petition and
Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES,
supra note 89, at 1073. Notably, the Jamaican Assembly had opposed itself to the
royal prerogative in the struggle to maintain its privileges with the colony’s
governor during the 1760s. See JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 135 (2011). There was no charge of inconsistency for
first attacking and then invoking “prerogative” in a different context. Similarly,
when in the Quebec Act, Parliament did transfer legislative power from
provincial assembly to royal governor and council, Americans could describe it as
“the most daring stretch of the prerogative of the Crown.” Extract of a Letter from
a Very Respectable Gentleman in London, to a Correspondent in Philadelphia, in
1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 513. Complaining of a
different feature of the act, Alexander Hamilton remarked that “[t]here must be
an end of all liberty, where the Prince is possessed of such an exorbitant
prerogative as enables him, at pleasure, to establish the most iniquitous, cruel,
and oppressive courts of criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and to
appoint temporary judges and officers, whom he can displace and change, as often
as he pleases.” Remarks on the Quebec Bill: Part One, in 4 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON DIGITAL EDITION 165, 167 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 2011).
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was different than the question of his power to raise money
by non-parliamentary mechanisms within the realm.
Members of Parliament, in contrast, might sensibly debate
whether grants of supply by American assemblies violated
the English Bill of Rights, which prohibited “levying
money . . . by pretence of Prerogative, without grant of
Parliament.”96 Their constitutional views were formed by a
need to control the King and his administration of
government.97 From this metropolitan perspective,
“prerogative” suggested
that American
legislative
assemblies were like prerogative courts, or other
instruments of administration founded on prerogative,
whose so-called ‘liberties’ or ‘privileges’ might be employed to
undermine Parliament. This is what Benjamin Franklin
meant when he suggested that the right of colonial
assemblies to grant supply to the King “begins to give
[Parliament] jealousy.”98
From the American perspective, “prerogative” connoted
a right of government the King had transferred to colonial
communities. “The original intent of the prerogative,” wrote

96. Debate on Mr. Burke’s Resolutions, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH
SERIES, supra note 89, at 1776 n.* (“[I]f the dispositions of the Colonies had been
as favourable as they were represented, still it was denied that the American
Assemblies ever had a legal power of granting a revenue to the Crown. This they
insisted to be the privilege of Parliament only; and a privilege which could not be
communicated to any other body whatsoever. In support of this doctrine, they
quoted the following clause from that palladium of the English Constitution, and
of the rights and liberties of the subject, commonly called, the Bill, or Declaration,
of Rights: viz. that ‘Levying money for, of to the use of the Crown, by pretence of
prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for a longer time, or in other manner,
than the same is, or shall be granted, is illegal.’”).
97. See REID, supra note 34, at 151. In this respect, there is another
constitutional parallel to be drawn between mechanisms of legal control over
localities under a developing English public law, and those asserted against
American colonies. See Joanna Innes, The Local Acts of a National Parliament:
Parliament’s Role in Sanctioning Local Action in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 17
PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 23, 30–37 (1998); Michael Lobban, Custom, Nature, and
Authority: The Roots of English Legal Positivism, in THE BRITISH AND THEIR LAWS
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 27, 57–58 (David Lemmings ed., 2005).
98. Franklin, supra note 51, at 260–61.
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one author, “was to enable the representatives of the State
to form inferiour communities, with municipal rights and
privileges.”99 The King had exercised his “prerogative right”
to form the colonies “into separate civil states” by “solemn
compact.”100 Because this exercise of the prerogative
established a political society, it implied limits on royal
power. The King’s “prerogatives” had to be exercised for “the
happiness of the people” whose political community his
prerogative had created.101 As the author of a series of letters
To the Inhabitants of Massachusetts-Bay described it, “The
prerogatives of the Crown are defined, and limited with
convenient certainty by our several Charters, the ends of
Government being confined within the circle of doing
good.”102 Most charters limited prerogative by requiring that
colonial laws conform to English law, so as to “reduce to a
certainty the rights and privileges we were entitled to by our
Charter, [and] to point out and circumscribe the prerogatives
99. A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of GREAT BRITAIN and
her COLONIES, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 88.
100. E. B. Grotius, Extract Referred to by the British American No. VI, N.Y. J.;
Sept. 1, 1774, at 1.

OR GEN. ADVERTISER,

101. Argumentative Part of the Instructions to the Representatives in Assembly,
in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 565.
102. Id. at 246 (emphasis added) (To the Inhabitants of the Massachusetts-Bay.
No. VII.). For other examples of this argument, see Continuation of the Piece in
Our Paper of the 30th September Last, BOS. GAZETTE, Oct. 21, 1765, at 2 (“Let it
be known, that British liberties are not the grants of princes or parliaments but
original rights, conditions of original contracts, coequal with prerogative & coeval with government . . .”); From a London Paper, MASS. GAZETTE & BOS.
NEWSL., Feb. 7, 1765, at 2 (“Thus the good of the people may spring from
prerogative, &c. but prerogative cannot spring from the good of the people.
Prerogative is established to produce the good of the people.”); From the Newport
Mercury, CONN. GAZETTE, Jan. 24, 1766, at 2 (“I know no prerogative in the crown,
which is not, at the same time, a certain privilege of the people, for their sake
granted, and for their sake to be exerted . . . .”). The claim in To the Inhabitants
of Massachusetts-Bay that prerogatives could be “defined, and limited” by those
who decide what the public good is thoroughly anti-Stuart, to the extent that it
denies what James called “the mysterie of the Kings power,” which “is not lawful
to be disputed.” It is, insisted James, “Atheisme and blasphemie to dispute what
God can do. . . . So, it is presumption and high contempt in a Subject, to dispute
what a King can doe, or say that a King cannot doe this, or that. . . .” OAKLEY,
supra note 19, at 103–18.
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of the Crown,” which were consequently “as much limited
and confined in the Colonies as they are in England.”103
Again, this put “prerogative” on both sides of the
constitutional balance, in two difference senses. Prerogative
became associated both with American privileges of selfgovernment and with the imperial power that selfgovernment checked. The logic was captured in July 1775 by
the Continental Congress, which explained that the
“privilege of giving or withholding our moneys”—a charter
right originating in prerogative—“is an important barrier
against the undue exertion of prerogative, which, if left
altogether without controul, may be exercised to our great
oppression.”104 Such arguments can be found throughout the
final decade of the imperial crisis. Although Charles
McIlwain thought all but “a handful” of Americans conceded
the weakness of the charter claim, the evidence examined
here suggests that American reliance on charters was
widespread and persistent.105
Largely in the background during the imperial crisis is
“prerogative” in the second sense, executive discretion to act
where the law is silent.106 There are occasional references to
103. To the Inhabitants of Massachusetts-Bay No. VII, in 1 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 292.
104. Report of the Committee on the Resolve of the House of Congress, in 2
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1775, at 224, 226–27 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1905).
105. MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 185. McIlwain focuses on the authority at
English law for the insulation of colonial charters from legal and parliamentary
challenge, which he reasonably judges to be poor; American writers focused, in
contrast, on the connection between the charters and their long-standing
privileges of self-government—liberties American elites claimed as a matter of
birthright. See MICHAEL JAN ROZBICKI, CULTURE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74–77, 81–82, 83–84 (2011).
106. For two uses of “prerogative” in something like this sense, see A Letter to
G. G., BOS. POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, May 18, 1767, at 2 (“[T]he King of this
country has ever been invested with a prerogative, during the intervals of
parliament, to lay embargoes in case of famine, or other natural necessity,
although in no other case whatever.”); Vaneris, 8 Die Novembris, A.D. 1765, BOS.
GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Nov. 11, 1765, at 1 (“[T]he Good of the Society for obvious
Reasons requires, that, several Things should be left to the Direction of him or
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Blackstone and a handful to Locke, but many, many more to
colonial charters and acts of Parliament. It is therefore
almost certainly a mistake to read writers like Wilson as
defining “prerogative” as Lockean executive discretion;
rather, because it was an exceptional usage in this context,
writers were explicit when they intended to invoke the idea.
For the same reason, it is also incorrect to cite Americans’
invocation of prerogative during the imperial crisis as
evidence of their desire to live under a royal jurisdiction
resembling equity. Indeed, I am unaware of a single patriot
text that expresses such a view. If anything, this was their
principal fear, the boogeyman of Catholic despotism from
which the colonists’ beloved protestant monarch was
supposed to protect them, by use of his lawful prerogative.
The nightmare was memorably captured by one American
writer, who described a feverish vision of England’s Glorious
Revolution, in which
English Liberty, like a beast, was made to run on all four with
Prerogative mounted on her back, whipping and spurring her, and
running her out of breath, till at last she droped down, and, would
have expired with her sister Religion by her side, had not the belgie
Hero [William III], at the request of the Whigs, hurried to her relief,
and drove the detestable tyrant, who had gagged, bound, and
trampled on them, out of the kingdom, set Liberty and Religion free,
and exalted their banners high.107

them who have the Executive Power. But this hinders not but that the
Prerogative should in certain Instances be limited and bounded.”). These are the
only pre-independence examples I found.
107. From the London Public Advertiser, N.H. GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., Aug.
31, 1764, at 1. Americans widely perceived a connection between lawful
prerogative, liberty and resistance to Catholicism. In October 1774, “Scipio”
reminded his King that “’Tis your’s, Sir, to maintain and support, equitably, the
prerogative of your Crown:—’Tis your Subjects to oppose every encroachment of
that authority, to prevent the smallest violation of their civil and religious
liberties, and to endeavor to be always before hand with the Pope, the Devil, and
ALL their Emissaries . . .” Scipio, To the King, CONN. COURANT, & HARTFORD
WKLY. INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 24, 1774, at 2. It was princely discretion that these
writers feared; as Benjamin Prescott explained, “I am sadly sensible, that in some
former Reigns the King’s Prerogative has been carried to an enormous Heighth,
so high as to include in it a Power, at Pleasure, to take and apply to his own Use
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B. Revolutionary Government and State Constitutions
This background should serve as a premise in an account
of the place of prerogative in the first state constitutions.
What we know, already, of how Americans used
“prerogative” during the imperial crisis tells us that a
purported “[i]dentification by the popular mind of executive
strength with the limitation of individual rights” gets things
nearly backwards.108 In explaining how framers thought
about executive power and its relationship to prerogative, we
cannot begin from the premise that all good Whigs distrusted
“magisterial power.”109 That was true in some contexts, but
his Subjects Property; and King Charles the First proceeded so far in the
exercising such a Power, as cost him first his Crown, and soon after His Head
that wore it. But our wise and gracious Sovereign, now upon his British Throne,
lays Claim to no such Prerogative as vests him with a Right to do Wrong to any
of his Subjects . . .” PRESCOTT, supra note 65, at 51. For further discussion of these
ideas, see MARSTON, supra note 47, at 29; MCCONVILLE, supra note 86, at 108,
136–37, 192–219, 250. The emphasis on charter rights as constituting legal limits
on prerogative is one reason I regard the account of prerogative given in Francis
Oakley and Paul Halliday’s writings—as an absolute power to perform ‘miracles,’
intervening in a legal order—as incomplete and, as applied to this context,
unsatisfactory. Here, the aim was to vindicate legal restrictions embodied in
colonial charters (which functioned as ‘franchises’), not to dissolve them or act
arbitrarily by absolute power. See OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 103–18; Halliday &
White, supra note 15, at 600–03.
108. CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789, at
25 (1922). As Thach summarized his view of the changes in this period, “[i]n
short, the change of emphasis from liberty to authority had meant a
corresponding change of emphasis from the legislature to the executive.” Id. at
51–52. But magisterial power could be associated with liberty or authority; a
desire to protect liberty explains, in part, why mere ‘executives’ were invested
with prerogatives.
109. See PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 31–34; WOOD, supra note 28, at
135–36. Jefferson’s own request in Summary View that the king use his
prerogative to protect the rights of Virginians, described above, cautions us
against interpreting too broadly the oft-quoted remark in his 1821 Autobiography
that “[b]efore the Revolution we were all good English Whigs, cordial . . . in their
jealousies of their executive Magistrate.” Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in 1
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 121 (Thomas Leicester Ford ed., 1904). This
was not true of all Whigs. As Jerrilyn Marston observed, “[w]ith the very
definition of the king’s prerogative precluding the abuse of such discretionary
power, Whigs could defend the considerable prerogative powers that the
eighteenth-century constitution confided in the king.” MARSTON, supra note 47,
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not in others. From the imperial perspective, the King’s
prerogative was the source of their liberties.
Again we have a conventional account to help us frame
our study. The account distinguishes two stages of
constitution-making in the period from 1776 to 1786.110 State
constitutions framed in 1776 and 1777 (sometimes described
as the “first wave”) expressed a distrust of imperial
government and consequently emptied the governorship of
all prerogatives, leaving it a mere executive department with
the power to carry out laws passed by the state legislature.
The executive department was in this sense an agent of the
legislature and executive power an inferior power.
Beginning, however, with the New York Constitution
enacted in April 1777 (the start of the “second wave”),
governors were reinvested with some prerogatives,
principally the veto, and made independent of state
legislatures by longer terms and direct election. Prerogative
played a key role in this transformation. Indeed, a leading
commentator has maintained that “[t]he history of
constitutional doctrine in the decade between the
Constitution of Georgia [enacted in 1777] and the Federal
Constitution is, in part at least, the history of the search for
a rationale for dealing with the former prerogatives of the
Crown.”111 Constitutions in the first wave withheld these
prerogatives entirely, or deposited them in the legislature;
constitutions in the second wave (and beyond) allocated them
at 30.
110. See DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 96–
110 (1988); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 86–88 (1998);
WOOD, supra note 28, at 127–60, 430–67. For a brief account that does not
emphasize this transition, at least in terms of separation of powers, see GERHARD
CASPER, SEPARATING POWER 7–16 (1997). In contrast to Casper, Marc Kruman
argues that from the beginning, state constitutions largely embraced separation
of powers, and that in the service of this end, they stripped state executives of
prerogative powers like the veto. See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY &
LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 109–30
(1997).
111. M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1967).
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more evenly, in an effort to give the executive independence
and thereby bring “energy” to “the administration of
government.”112
The conventional account has much to recommend it, but
it is marred by an overemphasis of American distrust of
magisterial power. We have to start with the right
perspective. There was no abstract problem of ‘allocating
powers among the branches,’ as if the framers were
theoretical writers, or retirees recalling events from far
outside the window of threat. Framers were revolutionaries
trying to achieve ends of government—security, peace,
order—and to preserve what they regarded as their rightful
place in government. Ordinary forms of government, rather
than ad hoc revolutionary forms, secured these goals best,
but ordinary government required a plan or frame—what
Americans called a “written constitution.”113 “Prerogative”
was useful to the elites drawing up constitutions insofar as
it referred to a suite of relatively well-known, legally defined
powers that had been used to administer government in the
empire. These were powers that American writers had
entreated the King to exercise in their defense during the

112. WOOD, supra note 28, at 432 n. 5 (quoting the Hartford Connecticut
Courant published on September 16, 1783); see also THACH, supra note 108, at
36–37, 44.
113. For a period expression, see THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3–5 (Philadelphia, Robert Bell 1784) [hereinafter
POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENTS]. This proposition—that framers sought ordinary
government to achieve security, peace and order, principal ends of government—
is consistent both with the thesis that framers sought ordinary government
because they felt insecure under revolutionary forms of government, see, e.g.,
WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 40–46
(Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001)
(1973), and that they sought benefits that flowed from recognition by the
international community, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio:
Constitution-Making and the Wider World in the American Revolution, 47
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 770–90 (2014). On the significance of written
constitutions, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 40 (2004); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23–30 (1990).
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imperial crisis. Now their natural repository was with “the
people” whose safety and security they were meant to ensure,
embodied in the assembly by colonial elites.114 James Wilson,
seeking to justify efforts by the Continental Congress to
establish military forces, described the “Prerogative of the
Crown” as that “Share of Power, which the King derives from
the People,” and which “the sacred Authority of the People”
now required Congress to exercise for their safety.115
“Prerogatives” in this sense were, Wilson wrote, “well known
and precisely ascertained,” since they had long been subject
to law.116 They fit naturally in an assembly whose acts were
law. It was this connection between prerogative and “the
people,” along with an expectation that colonial elites would
continue to fill the assembly, that led the framers of ‘firstwave’ constitutions to invest assemblies with such extensive
authority. Where it was thought that a strong magistrate
would be necessary to preserve the existing social and
political order, elites considered sharing a portion of the
prerogative with the chief executive; as we will see, these
debates occurred in the framing of the earliest state
constitutions, rather than awaiting a ‘second wave.’
The demands of the war and conduct of assemblymen
soon exposed difficulties with the first constitutions. State
assemblies did not exercise their prerogative powers merely
by the passage of laws; assemblies regularly embraced
extraordinary and irregular forms to accomplish their ends,
in some cases executing government directly.117 The resort to
114. See ROZBICKI, supra note 105, at 115–16, 122–23 (describing the
relationship between the King and “the people” and the presence of “the people”
in the legislature).
115. James Wilson, To the Inhabitants of the Colonies of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the Counties of New Castle and Sussex on
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia,
from their Delegates in Congress, in 4 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774–1789, at 134, 135, 141 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906).
116. Id. at 135.
117. See Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the

2018]

EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE

597

“novelties and singularities,” wrote one contemporary, had
left “prerogative and privilege . . . wholly undefined and
unlimited,” with “no rule established for public procedure.”118
This destabilized and enervated government, as the
conventional account emphasizes, but it also endangered the
liberties protected by executing ordinary forms.119 Old
concerns about the sanctity of colonial charters, which
writers had linked to the King’s prerogative, now resurfaced
as concerns about the inviolability of state constitutions,
which were made to rest on what Wilson had identified as
the font of prerogative, “the sacred Authority of the People.”
Just as before, the security of liberty and the protection of
property seemed at risk. This is one reason why, in a 1783
draft of a new constitution for Virginia, Thomas Jefferson
thought it important to expressly deny the legislature a
“power to infringe this constitution.”120 To give effect to such
a limit, however, required that the departments of
government have some independence from the legislative
assembly, so that they might employ customary forms
without interference. In the case of the executive, this was
accomplished, to some degree, by its investiture with the
prerogative powers of the veto and appointment.121

Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30
AM. HIST. REV. 511, 514–15, 519–20 (1925).
118. POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 113, at 22. The author of Political
Establishments is unknown. Edmund S. Morgan, The Political Establishments of
the United States 1784, 23 WILL. & MARY Q. 286, 286–87 (1966).
119. Corwin, supra note 117, at 513–14, 517.
120. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION 294, 298 (James P. McClure & J.
Jefferson Looney eds., 2018) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS].
121. The extent of change in the constitution of the executive department was
not great and has been, at times, exaggerated. Compare WOOD, supra note 28, at
433–34, and THACH, supra note 108, at 44–48 (describing the Essex Result and
the office of Governor under the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780), with
CASPER, supra note 110, at 15 (“In the end, the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution
was not dramatically different from the 1778 draft in the manner in which it
distributed powers, although the later document did provide for the
(overrideable) gubernatorial veto.”).
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In what follows, I explore these developments in more
detail. I begin by tracing the efforts of revolutionary bodies
to reclaim and exercise royal prerogatives on behalf of the
people. I then examine debates over the allocation of
prerogative powers under what is perhaps the most
influential of the early state constitutions, the Virginia
Constitution of 1776. It was to quiet concerns among the
Virginia elite about preserving the existing social order that
John Adams recommended they vest their executive with a
veto. Adams’s advice evolved into one of the leading
pamphlets of the period, Thoughts on Government. Finally, I
briefly consider changes in second-wave state constitutions.
1. Revolutionary Government
To understand this perspective requires that we begin,
briefly, with the revolutionary governments that emerged
after the collapse of royal authority in 1775 and 1776. There
is no question that revolutionary governments that took
control after the dissolution of royal colonial governments
exercised powers that could be described as “prerogatives.”
Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina complained that
companies of North Carolina volunteers had “usurp[ed] the
prerogative of the Crown, by forming a Militia, and
appointing officers thereto.”122 When the Second Continental
Congress turned in the summer of 1775 to supplying and
regulating a continental army, it, too, was described as
asserting a “claim” to the King’s “prerogatives.”123 It was
these actions that Wilson sought to justify by describing
them as a popular reclaiming of prerogative.124 Congress
worked in conjunction with the Provincial Congresses or
Conventions, which provided men and supplies, thereby

122. Martin, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 63.
123. Patriotic Letter from a Minister of the Church of England, to the Earl of
Dartmouth, in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, supra note
85, at 265; see also A Proclamation, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE; & COUNTRY J., Nov. 19,
1774, at 3 (similar).
124. Wilson, supra note 115, at 135, 141.
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partitioning the royal obligation to “protect the continent”
along lines the Articles of Confederation would later
confirm.125 Local committees, too, exercised a “prerogative”
to protect their communities. Recent studies of the
revolutionary committees have tended to focus on their
harsh treatment of loyalists who violated the continental
boycott of British goods or refused to subscribe to a loyalty
oath.126 The focus is understandable but risks throwing the
committees
out
of
perspective.
The
intolerance
committeemen showed for speech ‘inimical to the common
cause’ and symbolic conduct like ‘toasts to the King’
expressed largely conventional views of seditious libel and
“hot and angry words” that tended to disturb the public
peace.127 In handling such cases, committees built upon
existing practices and understandings that had long
characterized local government in the American colonies
(and which are seriously invasive by modern standards).128
And while the committees used force, intimidation,
harassment, and mock or summary legal proceedings to
coerce the intransigent, they also took steps to ensure that
revolutionary action did not unwind into complete
lawlessness or uncontrolled violence—thereby exercising

125. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX; see also MARSTON, supra
note 47, at 131–32 (“The appointment of Virginia’s George Washington to
command the New England troops symbolized congressional acceptance of the
old royal responsibility of protecting the continent.”). On the role of the provincial
congresses and conventions in establishing, supplying and regulating a regular
armed force, see MARSTON, supra note 47, at 140–41.
126. See, e.g., T. H. BREEN, AMERICAN INSURGENTS, AMERICAN PATRIOTS: THE
REVOLUTION OF THE PEOPLE 185–206 (2010). Breen calls the committees “schools
of revolution” for their role in disciplining political ideology and consolidating the
revolutionary movement. While there is a renewed interest in this function of the
committees, the thesis itself isn’t new. Hamilton Eckenrode described the same
function for the county committees of safety in Virginia. H. J. ECKENRODE, THE
REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 96 (1916).
127. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 241–54.
128. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND
LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 8–27 (Peter Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull eds., 2000)
(Chapter 1, The Consensual Community).
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what was, in effect, a kind of police power.129 In legal
treatises, this power was sometimes described as patria
potestas, the King’s power to preserve order and protect the
well-being of the community, another form of royal
prerogative.130
2. Adams, Jefferson and the Virginia Constitution of
1776
The transition from revolutionary government by
committee to ordinary government began in 1776 with the
formation of the first state constitutions. Rather than survey
the appearance of “prerogative” in these documents, I want
to focus on one particular, influential constitution: the
Virginia Constitution of 1776. As it happens, a number of the
most important texts discussing “prerogative” from the
period can be linked to this constitution and its framing. Set
in context, what they suggest is that the framers of our first
constitutions associated “prerogative” primarily with
governmental structures that ensured order, peace and the
preservation of existing social and political hierarchies. The
question faced by those drawing up republican constitutions
was the degree to which these values—peace and order—

129. ADAMS, supra note 113, at 32; RICHARD D. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY
POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE BOSTON COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE AND
THE TOWNS, 1772–1774, at 213–14, 220–22, 225 (1970); EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, A
PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY IN
NEW YORK, 1760–1790, at 136–43 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1989) (1981); see Jack P.
Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of
the American Revolution, 85 S. ATLANTIC Q. 56, 61 (1986) (advancing a similar
claim about mobbing during the Revolution); Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings
and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 28–29
(1970) (similar). Breen edges up this point, but he doesn’t focus on it. BREEN,
supra note 126, at 199.
130. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 162–63 (describing the King’s
prerogative over domestic commerce and the establishment of marts, “which,
considering the kingdom as a large family, and the king as the master of it, he
clearly has a right to dispose and order as he pleases”); id. at *375–76 (similar,
with respect to criminal law). These ideas are the subject of an ambitious and
important study. See MARKUS DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 16–20, 29, 42–43, 49–61 (1999).
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could be achieved under a government whose dominant
central body was an assembly and in which a considerable
amount of governance took place solely at the local level.
Our account of Virginia’s constitution begins in
November 1775, when John Adams wrote to Richard Henry
Lee on the “curious problem” of what form of government “is
most readily and easily adopted by a Colony, upon a Sudden
Emergency.”131 The two men had conversed while serving as
delegates at the Continental Congress, and Lee “quickly
perceived the value of Adams’s approach to constitution
making for persuading hesitant colonists that the practice
difficulties of declaring independences were not as great as
they feared.”132 Leading men in Virginia were concerned that
a democratic form of government, which declared and
guaranteed the natural equality of men, would serve, in the
words of planter Robert Carter Nicholas, as a “forerunner or
pretext of civil convulsion.”133 Nicholas referred to an
emancipation of Virginia’s slaves, a prospect he knew
triggered deep-seated fears of violence, but planters were
also concerned with preserving their economic independence
and prominence in the colonial political order.134 The elderly
131. Letter from John Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Nov. 15, 1775), in 3 ADAMS
PAPERS, supra note 68, at 307.
132. John E. Selby, Richard Henry Lee, John Adams, and the Virginia
Constitution of 1776, 84 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 387, 391 (1976).
133. Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Virginia Convention of 1776: A Study in
Revolutionary Politics 185 (1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
134. JOHN E. SELBY, THE REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 1775–1783 106–08 (1988);
Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 220–21. As Selby notes, George Wythe later held
that language in the constitution’s Declaration of Rights freed the state’s slaves,
although the position was rejected by St. George Tucker on the state’s high Court
of Appeals. SELBY, supra at 107. The case was Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen.
& M.) 134 (1806). See ALAN TAYLOR, THE INTERNAL ENEMY: SLAVERY AND WAR IN
VIRGINIA, 1772–1832 106–10 (2013). On the decline of the social standing of
Virginia gentry in the decades prior to the Revolution, see generally RHYS ISAAC,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740–1790 (1982). Edmund Randolph
explained in his History that “it was tacitly understood, that every body and
individual came into the revolution with their rights, and was to continue to enjoy
them as they exixsted under the former government.” Edmund Randolph, Essay
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Landon Carter suspected middling Virginians were after “a
form of government” that would make them “independent of
the rich men,” so “every man” could “do as he pleased.”135
From this perspective, Adams’s aim was to advise Lee how
republican government could be established while
preserving—indeed, buttressing—“the form we have been
used to,” the political institutions through which men like
Nicholas and Carter had exerted such a profound influence
on colonial life.136 As Adams explained later, his advice to Lee
was particularly “calcullated for Southern Latitudes, not
northern.”137 In particular, he thought, “[t]he Negative
given . . . to the first Magistrate” (that is, the veto given to
the governor) would “be adopted no Where but in S.
Carolina,” and Adams himself would “certainly never be
happy under such a Government.”138 A number of southern
delegates also sought Adams’s advice, and each time he
refined it slightly. A copy was finally printed as Thoughts on
Government, Applicable to the Present State of the American
Colonies, and, far from being “a poor Scrap,” as Adams
described it, it became one of the most influential plans of

on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, 1774–1782, 44 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 35, 48–49 (1936).
135. Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 225 (quoting Letter from Landon Carter to
George Washington (May 9, 1776)).
136. Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Constitution: Editorial Note, in 1
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120, at 334; Selby, supra note 132, at 396.
137. Letter from John Adams to Francis Dana (Aug. 16, 1776), in ADAMS
PAPERS, supra note 68, at 465, 466.
138. Id. at 466–67; see also id. at 181 (Letter from John Adams to James
Warren) (“In New England, the ‘Thoughts on Government’ will be disdained,
because they are not popular enough. In the Southern Colonies, they will be
despised and dissected, because too popular. . . . I dont expect, nor indeed desire
that it should be attempted to give the Governor a Negative, in our Colony. Make
him President, with a casting Voice.”). Interestingly, Adams prediction was
reversed; Virginia did not adopt an executive veto in its 1776 Constitution, while
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 did—which Adams endorsed. See John
Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America, Letter LIII, in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 87, 87 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009)
[hereinafter DHRC].
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government circulated during the revolutionary period.139
Adams didn’t mention prerogative powers in his initial
letter to Lee, but subsequent versions did, including one to
Virginian George Wythe that became Thoughts on
Government. He began by revisiting a point he had made
during the imperial crisis as “Novanglus”: that men had
nothing to fear from republican government, as “[t]he British
Constitution itself is republican,” since it was “‘an Empire of
Laws and not of Men,’” which was “the very definition of a
Republic.”140 Novanglus had not complained of the British
King’s “ample and splendid prerogative,” since it was (he had
said) “bound by strict laws,” but now Adams recommended
that governors “be stripped of most of those badges of
domination called prerogatives.”141 The office was merely to
have “the executive power.”142 The only prerogative a
governor should possess over a state’s legislative assembly
was “a negative,” in order to prevent the legislature from
“continually encroaching upon” his executive office.143 The
result, thought Adams, would be a balance between
executive and legislative departments, rather than a
government in which they “oppose and enervate upon each

139. See Martin, supra note 139, at 72.
140. Adams, supra note 140, at 86–87. To be sure, Adams’ use of “empire of
laws” shows he had amended his categories, since as Novanglus he had
contrasted an empire with a government of laws.
141. Id. at 89; Adams, supra note 68, at 314. As Adams explained in an earlier
version of Thoughts, it was not the possession of prerogative that made the
“spirit” of colonial government absolute rather than republican, but the Crown’s
possession of “the whole of the Executive [power],” “with an enormous
Prerogative,” and the legislative and judicial powers as well. Letter from John
Adams to William Hooper (Mar. 27, 1776), in ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 68, at
74. The concern about “badges of domination” thus appears to concern the use of
prerogative against the legislature or judges, rather than private persons. In
another version of Thoughts, however, Adams uses “badges of slavery” rather
than “domination,” invoking constitutional ideas relating to security of property
and liberty, rather than governmental balance.
142. Adams, supra note 140, at 89.
143. Id.
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other,” a “contest” Adams worried would “end in war.”144
Adams would also grant the governor the King’s prerogative
powers to command the army and militia; with the approval
of a privy council, he might also pardon crimes and appoint
civil and military officers.145 On the other hand, indictments
should be framed as against the peace of the colony (they had
formerly been contra pacem regis) and writs run in the
colony’s name, rather than the governor’s.146 The aim, in
short, was to alloy executive power with a few traditional
royal powers, thereby securing for the governor the “free and
independent exercise of his judgment,” which was necessary
for “an impartial and exact execution of the laws”—
something Virginia planters wanted—while avoiding, at the
same time, magisterial domination of the assembly, where
the leading planters would sit.147 If the proposal proved
“inconvenient,” wrote Adams, there should be no worry; “the
legislature” could “devise other methods of creating” an
executive department.148
When, on May 15, 1776, the Virginia Convention
appointed a committee to prepare a “plan of government as
will be most likely to maintain peace and order in this
colony,” Adams’s pamphlet did its intended work.149 Richard
144. Id. James Warren had pressed this point in a series of letters to Adams
during late 1775, when the lower house of the General Court was struggling with
the Council over the right to appoint military officers. He complained in one letter
that “we are plagued with a Constitution where the Prerogative of the Crown,
and the Liberty of the Subject are Eternally militateing,” a state of affairs that
led him to declare, “I am so sick of our Constitution.” Letter from James Warren
to John Adams (Nov. 14, 1775), in ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 68, at 303.
145. Adams, supra note 140, at 90.
146. Id. at 90–91. Commissions would likewise be under the seal of the colony
and the signature of the governor.
147. Id. at 87, 89. Interestingly, after the Revolution, a movement arose to have
judicial process run in the name of the President. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO
1801, at 538–40 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1971).
148. Adams, supra note 140, at 90; Martin, supra note 139, at 66.
149. Proceedings of the Ninth Day of Session, Fifth Virginia Convention (1776),
in 7 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE 141, 143 (Brent
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Henry Lee was not in attendance, as he was again serving as
a delegate to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, but
he mailed printed copies of Thoughts on Government to the
framing committee’s leading men, including Patrick Henry,
Robert Carter Nicholas and others.150 At the same time, Lee
drew up a handbill of his own setting out a simple plan of
government, based on Adams’s earlier letter to him (though
saying nothing about prerogative), which was printed and
then published in the Virginia Gazette.151 Lee pitched both
plans as familiar, orderly and flexible, and it seems the pitch
was successful.152 Adams’s plan would likely continue the
lower house of the assembly as the dominant force in
Virginia’s central government, and it said nothing of (and
thus left undisturbed) the system of local county courts
through which planters’ exercised much of their authority.
Moderates were attracted enough so that by the time a more
aristocratic plan surfaced, in late May, it could be derided by
Patrick Henry as “a silly thing.”153 Unlike Adams, the author
of this plan, Carter Braxton, saw no danger from vesting the
royal prerogative in a governor who held his office for life. “If
placemen and pensioners were excluded a seat in either
house,” he reasoned, describing men whose financial
connection to the governor might corrupt their judgment,
“what danger could be apprehended from the
prerogative[?]”154 Yet Adams had struck first, and, as
Tarter ed., 1983).
150. CHARLES RAMSDELL LINGLEY, THE TRANSITION IN VIRGINIA FROM COLONY TO
COMMONWEALTH 169 (1910); Jefferson, Editorial Note, in JEFFERSON PAPERS,
supra note 120, at 333–34.
151. A Government Scheme, VA. GAZETTE (Purdie), May 10, 1776, at 1.
152. See SELBY, supra note 134, at 112–13; Selby, supra note 132, at 394–96.
Hilldrup paints a less sanguine picture, influenced by his odd attachment to
Carter Braxton’s plan of government. Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 244–51.
153. Letter from Patrick Henry to John Adams (May 20, 1776), in 1 PATRICK
HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 412, 412–13 (William Wirt Henry
ed., 1891).
154. CARTER BRAXTON, AN ADDRESS TO THE CONVENTION OF THE COLONY AND
ANCIENT DOMINION OF VIRGINIA 11 (Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1776) (emphasis
added). Braxton’s governor would continue in his office during good behavior, “of
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committeemen began their work with his pamphlet at hand,
its ideas acquired a degree of normativity, giving the Braxton
plan a look of “extreme conservativism.”155
Lee and Adams had succeeded in checking the effect of
conservatives on the framing process, but the framing
committee was still dominated by politically moderate, older
planters, and these men proved equally resistant to
incorporating democratic features into the constitution.156
Another delegate to the Continental Congress frustrated
with having to miss the Virginia Convention was Thomas
Jefferson, who drafted three versions of a state constitution
and dispatched them to Williamsburg in early June.157
Jefferson’s plan included liberal provisions that broadened
which the two houses of the Council of State and Assembly should jointly be the
Judges,” and thus “have dignity to command necessary respect and authority, to
enable him to execute the laws, without being deterred by the fear of giving
offence; and yet be amenable to the other branches of the legislature for every
violation of the rights of the people.” Id. at 20, 21–22.
155. Jefferson, supra note 150, at 335. Braxton’s defense of “elegance and
refinement,” BRAXTON, supra note 154, at 16–17, helps both to capture the point
of view from which Braxton wrote and the vague embarrassment with which the
plan was apparently greeted. Braxton’s argument was that Adams, in connecting
happiness to virtue, had confused public virtue with private virtue; private virtue
was an interest in one’s own welfare, and it was this self-interestedness that had
made a “bountiful” country like Virginia so wealthy. There was thus nothing
wrong with the “elegance and refinement” of the great planters, contrary to the
sumptuary laws included in Adams’s plan. Id. at 15–17. A certain ambivalence,
even among planters, about luxury, gaming and idleness had characterized
Virginia society since the rise of evangelical religions in the 1750s. See generally
ISAAC, supra note 134. For more on Braxton’s pamphlet, see WOOD, supra note
28, at 96–97; Isaac Kramnick, The “Great National Discussion”: The Discourse of
Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 22 (1988). With respect to the formation of
the Virginia Constitution, at least, it is hard to accord the Braxton pamphlet the
significance Wood and Kramnick want to give it.
156. Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 171–76.
157. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson (May 16, 1776), in
JEFFERSON PAPERS supra note 120, at 292 (“Should our Convention propose to
establish now a form of government perhaps it might be agreeable to recall for a
short time their delegates [to the Congress]. It is a work of the most interesting
nature and such as every individual would wish to have his voice in. In truth it
is the whole object of the present controversy . . .”). On the dating of the draft
constitutions, see First Draft by Jefferson, in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120,
at 345.
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suffrage, subjected local offices like the sheriff to popular
vote, and ended the importation of slaves, but these “fell by
the roadside,” arriving too late in the framing process and
challenging too centrally the gentry’s social authority and
way of life.158 In contrast, provisions in Jefferson’s plan
relating to prerogative did have some influence. Jefferson
faulted the King for misusing his prerogative to veto colonial
legislation and (through his governor) to dissolve legislative
assemblies, a complaint Jefferson had made previously in
Summary View, and he now proposed that the state’s
legislative assembly should continue to sit “so long as they
shall think the publick service requires.”159 Jefferson’s
governor, like Adams’s, was expressly divested of a set of
identified royal prerogatives, retitled “Administrator” and
granted only undefined “executive powers.”160 The
prerogatives, including “declaring war or concluding peace,”
“raising or introducing armed forces,” and “erecting courts,
offices, boroughs, [or] corporations,” were to be “exercised by
the legislature alone.”161 Other provisions in Jefferson’s plan
stripped the Administrator of the veto and the pardon,
making him weaker than Adams’s governor relative to the
legislative assembly, although both offices possessed a power
to appoint civil and military officers, subject to the approval
of another body.162 Neither office approached Braxton’s
governor-for-life.
When the framing committee’s draft constitution came
before the full Convention, it debated Jefferson’s language on

158. SELBY, supra note 134, at 120.
159. Third Draft by Jefferson, in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120, at 356,
358; SUMMARY VIEW, supra note 74, at 19, 23.
160. Jefferson, supra note 159, at 359–60.
161. Id. at 360.
162. Id. at 359–60. In addition, the same Administrator could not be appointed
by the lower house twice in a row. Id. at 359. Thoughts on Government did express
some support for a requirement of rotation in office. Adams, supra note 140, at
90.
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prerogative and added some of it to the draft.163 It added and
then deleted the list of prerogative powers Jefferson had
expressly prohibited, opting instead for a general prohibition
on exercising “any power or prerogative by virtue of any law
statute or custom of England.”164 The only exception was the
pardon, a power the governor could exercise with the
approval of his privy council, setting aside impeachment or
where “the law shall otherwise particularly direct.”165 The
governor was to have no veto.166
That the governor was to exercise no prerogative “by
virtue of any law” evidenced an understanding that royal
prerogatives were in some cases articulated in acts of
Parliament and judicial decisions. The delegates’ concern
was, it seems, to prohibit “laws for enlarging the
prerogatives”—and not, as Jefferson recalled some years
later, to “prescribe[] under the name of prerogative the
exercise of all powers undefined by the laws.”167 Restrictions
on the exercise of “powers undefined by law” did exist in the
new constitution, but they were to be found elsewhere.
Earlier in June, “Democraticus,” writing in the Virginia
Gazette, had suggested granting an executive department a
163. See Amendments to the Plan of Government Continued, Proceedings of the
Forty-sixth Day of Session, Friday, June the 28th 1776, in The Draft Reported by
the Committee, in 7 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE supra
note 147, at 635, 637, 642 n.16; Thomas Jefferson, The Draft Reported by the
Committee (Amendments Thereto Offered in Convention), in JEFFERSON PAPERS,
supra note 120, at 373, 376 n.1.
164. Thomas Jefferson, Amendments to the Plan of Government Continued, in
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 134, at 637.
165. The limitation on the pardon power was the source of the famous Case of
the Prisoners. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 492 (2008);
William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial
Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994).
166. Henry pushed for a veto, without which he thought the governor would be
“a mere phantom,” but no other delegate supported the proposal. LINGLEY, supra
note 150, at 173; SELBY, supra note 134, at 119.
167. Albemarle County Instructions Concerning the Virginia Constitution, [ca.
September–October 1776], in FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 26; THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 127 (William Peden ed., 1982)
(1787). Notes was initially composed in 1781. Id. at xiv–xv.
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power to act “in all cases of emergencies not provided for by
the laws,” but “aided and assisted by the upper house.”168 The
Convention expressly rejected the suggestion, requiring that
the governor exercise his executive powers “according to the
laws of this common Wealth.”169 It reserved a power of
“suspending laws, or the execution of laws” for the legislative
assembly.170 During deliberations on the state’s new
Declaration of Rights in May, Patrick Henry and his allies
had insisted on removing language that banned ex post facto
laws and bills of attainder, on grounds that “the safety of the
state” might require the legislature to employ them in place
of judicial proceedings.171 Moreover, a power to act where the
laws were silent, in order to safeguard the welfare of the
community, had remained all along in the hands of elite
planters, implicitly attached to local offices like justice of the
peace.172 The state’s constitution would do nothing to disturb
this.173
In short, while ‘conservative’ Adams differed from
‘liberal’ Jefferson in proposing an executive veto and pardon,

168. Loose Thoughts on Government, VA. GAZETTE (Purdie), June 7, 1776, at 2.
169. Amendments to the Plan of Government Continued, supra note 147, at 637.
A number of state constitutions in the first wave followed Virginia in restricting
the exercise of executive power to state law. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art.
VII; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII; N.C. CONST.
OF 1776, art. XIX.
170. A Declaration of Rights, VA. GAZETTE (Purdie), June 14, 1776, postscript
at 1.
171. SELBY, supra note 134, at 102; Randolph, supra note 134, at 47 (“An article
prohibiting bills of attainder was defeated by Henry, who with a terrifying picture
of some towering public offender, against whom ordinary laws would be
important, save that dread power from being expressly proscribed.”); Hilldrup,
supra note 133, at 183–84, 202–03.
172. See 3 WILLIAM NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE
CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 1660–1750 33–37, 43–45, 49–50 (2016); A. G.
ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680–1810 44 (Morris S. Arnold, ed. 1981).
173. Thus breaking the control of the planter gentry over local justice became
a principal object of law reform spearheaded by Jefferson and James Madison in
the decades after independence. See generally ROEBER, supra note 172.
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neither approached the full panoply of prerogative implied
by the Braxton plan, which appeared reactionary and had
little influence. Delegates were principally concerned with
which traditional royal powers should be vested in a
republican governor, so he could execute the law and
preserve order without unduly interfering with planter
control; constitutional allocations of emergency power and
the discretion to act where the law was silent, where such
powers existed at all, were given to bodies those planters
dominated. Practice under Virginia’s first three governors
largely followed these forms. As historian Emory Evans has
put it, “the legislature had been more powerful than the
executive in Virginia for a number of years. The new House
of Delegates was a mirror of the old House of Burgesses, and
it was accustomed to a position of leadership.”174 Henry’s
principal task was to raise military forces and supply them,
and to do this he “worked primarily with the various county
lieutenants,” the leading planters who commanded them.175
Even directing the movement of Virginia soldiers required
the assembly to pass a law delegating the authority to the
governor, which it did on a temporary basis, typically until
the next meeting of the assembly. Henry found the office “too
much cramped,” and though he did not complain about the
need to seek legislative authorization, says Evans, he and his
council were “very sensitive of their own prerogatives,”
especially his power, in conformance with state law, to direct
the militia.176 When the British navy threatened an invasion
from the Chesapeake, Henry and the council ordered
loyalists forcibly removed from the area, for which the

174. Emory G. Evans, Executive Leadership in Virginia, 1776–1781: Henry,
Jefferson, and Nelson, in SOVEREIGN STATES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 188
(Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1981).
175. Id. at 189.
176. Id. at 190–92. The Constitution granted the Governor the authority to
raise the militia with the approval of the privy council, and, when raised stated
that he “shall alone have the direction of the Militia under the laws of the
Country.” VA. CONST. of 1776.
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legislature later indemnified him.177 When the Norfolk
County Lieutenant requested another mass removal
sometime later, Henry forwarded the request to the House of
Delegates, along with a message stating that as “the
executive power” was “not competent to such a purpose, I
must beg leave to submit the whole matter to the general
Assembly, who are the only Judges how far the methods of
proceeding directed by Law are to be dispensed with on
occasion.”178 The methods proved cumbersome for
prosecuting the war.179 Governor Nelson, who took office
following Jefferson, obtained sweeping grants of authority
from the legislative assembly to call out the militia, direct its
forces, impress food and supplies, confiscate the property of
those who resisted state law, constitute common-law courts
and declare martial law.180 Nelson exceeded even these
grants of authority, for which he was again indemnified by
the Virginia elite sitting in the General Assembly.181

177. At a General Assembly Began and Held at the Capitol in the City of
Williamsburg (Oct. 20, 1777), in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF
ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE 337, 373–
74 (William Waller Hening, 1821). Jefferson was a member of the legislative
committee that drafted the indemnity bill. See Bill Indemnifying the Executive
for Removing and Confining Suspected Persons (Dec. 16–26, 1777), reprinted in
2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 119 (James P. McClure & J. Jefferson
Looney eds., 2008–18). Although the Convention did not adopt the provision,
Jefferson’s third draft of a proposed constitution had made the Administrator
“liable to action, tho’ not to personal restraint[,] for private duties or wrongs.”
Third Draft by Jefferson, in FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 26. Perhaps delegates
thought it unnecessary. On the important role of civil damages suits against
public officers in Jefferson’s constitutional thinking, see David Thomas Konig,
Nature’s Advocate: Thomas Jefferson and The Rule of Law (2017) (unpublished
manuscript of chapter titled, “Jefferson and Whig Lawyering”) (on file with
author). In this respect, Jefferson’s thinking was representative of the early
American approach to the legal accountability of government. See JAMES E.
PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 3–11 (2017).
178. Letter from Governor Patrick Henry to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates, Benjamin Harrison, (May 27, 1778), in 1 OFFICIAL LETTERS OF THE
GOVERNORS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 283 (H. R. McIlwaine ed., 1926).
179. See, e.g., SELBY, supra note 134, at 123.
180. Evans, supra note 174, at 218–19.
181. Id. at 223–24; 1 THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER 525 (Thomas Lloyd ed.,
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3. Prerogative in Second-Wave Constitutions
Second-wave state constitutions tended to make two
changes to this allocation of powers. First, they pared back
the ability of legislative assemblies to interfere in judicial
proceedings by directly exercising judicial power. In
Virginia’s case, as early as 1783, Jefferson proposed revisions
to the constitution that would bar bills of attainder outright
and guarantee access to habeas corpus.182 Second,
constitutions elevated the governor by vesting royal
prerogatives in the executive department. Jefferson retitled
his Administrator as “Governor,” but would still deny him
“the prerogative powers of erecting courts, . . . laying
embargoes, . . . of retaining within the state or recalling to it
any citizen thereof,” along with other powers, “except so far
as he may be authorized from time to time by the legislature
to exercise.”183 The last phrase clarified the relationship
between the assembly and the governor in matters of
prerogative; rather than the assembly exercising prerogative
powers itself, it could empower the governor to exercise them
by passing a law. Other prerogative powers, like declaring
war and concluding peace, entering into alliances and
regulating weights and measures, were to be reserved for a
national assembly, acting “under the authority of the
Confederation.”184 What about the authority to act where the
law was silent? Jefferson addressed the matter explicitly, but
described the power as a matter of “execution” rather than
“prerogative.” Jefferson wrote, “We give [the Governor] those
powers only which are necessary to carry into execution the
laws, and which are not in their nature either legislative or
Judiciary. The application of this idea must be left to
1789) (statement of Representative Alexander White (June 18, 1789)) (Nelson
“exceeded his authority, . . . and [was] he himself afterwards indemnified by the
legislature.”).
182. JEFFERSON’S DRAFT OF A CONSTITUTION FOR VIRGINIA (1783) reprinted in 6
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 175, at 298, 304.
183. Id. at 299.
184. Id.
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reason.”185 In no sense did “Executive powers” mean “powers
exercised under our former government by the crown as of
it’s prerogative.”186 Jefferson followed most other states in
still denying the Governor a veto. But it was clear that he
was trying to solve much the same problem as was being
confronted elsewhere: how to make an executive department
sufficiently independent for it to execute the law.
C. The Federal Constitution
As we have seen, Americans engaged in framing state
constitutions tended to distinguish executive power and
prerogative. “Executive power” was a power to carry out the
law, and it might be vested in a department that lacked
prerogatives, in the sense of discrete, traditionally royal
powers used to conduct government. There are textual
signals of this distinction; for example, grants of executive
power were usually general, while grants of prerogative
powers were specific and defined.187 A second point about
usage was that “prerogative” did not signal immunity from
the power of a legislative assembly. Indeed, legislative
assemblies in the states both regulated prerogatives and
exercised such powers themselves by passing acts. The
problems raised by legislative exercise of prerogative powers
185. Id.
186. Id. at 298–99.
187. See, e.g., MARGARET BURNHAM MACMILLAN, THE WAR GOVERNORS IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 62–63 (1943); PRAKASH, supra note 1, at 73–74, 77;
THACH, supra note 108 at 36–37. Prakash reads these general grants differently
than I do. He maintains that their coupling with express exclusions of specific
prerogative powers implies that the grants were of a substantive executive power
including prerogatives, while I do not see the necessity of that reading. The
exclusions may have been included because of a customary association of certain
prerogatives with the office holding executive power. After all, there were also
express inclusions of prerogative power, which would have been unnecessary had
a grant of “executive power” simply implied prerogative. There may also have
been disagreements, or confusion, or compromise, concerning which royal
prerogatives were appropriate for republican executives—a possibility that
suggests we should not simply assume express exclusions or inclusions of
prerogative power reflect broadly shared understandings.
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led framers to search for ways to ensure the independence of
the executive department; and this they did not only by
adjusting the institutional form of the office, but also by
vesting it with prerogative powers. The difficult question,
which continued to divide elites at the time of the
Philadelphia convention, was which powers could be vested
in an executive consistent with the premises of republican
government. Most men believed that establishing a vigorous,
independent executive department did not require rejecting
a government in which the legislature was superior and
possessed the greatest share of power.188 Still, certain
prerogatives could not be vested in the executive without
creating at least the appearance of a monarchy. Finally,
framers did not tend to use “prerogative” to describe the
discretion that attached itself to a power to carry the law into
effect (that is, executive power), or to powers to act in the
absence of the law or even against the law to protect the
public. “Prerogative” certainly could be used to describe
executive discretion; it just usually wasn’t. As we’ve seen,
emergency powers found their way to legislative assemblies
by means of powers of suspension and legislative
adjudication.
Drawing on this background, the men framing a federal
constitution at Philadelphia employed “prerogative” for two
related purposes. First, they drew on associations with
prerogative to describe and defend an exclusive jurisdiction
for the national government.189 As Charles Pinckney put it,
188. As Thach describes the views of the Virginia delegation, for example, “the
executive proposed by them was essentially subordinate to the legislature. The
fixed nature of the executive salary, the provision for ineligibility for reelection,
and the council of revision point unmistakably towards a desire for an
independent exercise of the executive powers. But legislative election and
legislative determination of the major part of executive competency negated any
idea of departmental coordination.” Id. at 84. Not everyone believed a vigorous
executive was possible in a republic. For example, see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 86 (speech of John Dickinson (June 2, 1787))
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
189. The usage was familiar; Hamilton, writing in 1781 as “The
Continentalist,” had complained of the states, driven by “ambition and local

2018]

EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE

615

speaking in defense of a proposed national veto over state
legislation, “the States must be kept in due subordination to
the nation,” and without a veto, “it wd. be impossible to
defend the national prerogatives, however extensive they
might be on paper.”190 “Prerogative” could be used to describe
national powers because of the imperial connotations it still
retained. In making his own case for a congressional veto
over state legislation, Madison argued that “[t]his
prerogative of the General govt. is the great pervading
principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the
States.”191 The imperial comparison expressed the need not
only to defend properly national interests, but to harmonize
discordant state policies and maintain order. The veto,
Madison thought, had operated just this way in the British
empire, where “[n]othing could maintain the harmony &
subordination of [its] various parts . . . , but the prerogative
by which the Crown, stifles in the birth every Act of every
part tending to discord or encroachment.”192 And, in a long
speech criticizing the New Jersey Plan, Madison observed
that “omitting a controul over the States” through the veto
left the “defence of the federal prerogatives . . . particularly
defective.”193 The weakness of the national government
might be used to justify withholding “every effectual
prerogative,” a result familiar to those who had sat in the
Confederation Congress.194
Second, framers invoked “prerogative” to advance
interests,” “constantly undermining and usurping” the “prerogatives” of “the
FOEDERAL GOVERNMENT.” Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. 1, in
FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 26.
190. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 164 (speech of Charles Pinckney
(June 8, 1787)).
191. Id. at 165 (speech of James Madison (June 8, 1787)).
192. 2 id. at 28 (speech of James Madison (July 17, 1787)). In contrast, the
power of taxation was “the highest prerogative of supremacy”—another use of
“prerogative” that alluded to the imperial crisis. 1 id. at 447 (speech of James
Madison (June 28, 1787)).
193. 1 id. at 317 (speech of James Madison (June 18, 1787)).
194. Id. at 551 (speech of James Madison (July 7, 1787)).
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arguments about the form national government should take.
Which powers should be allocated to the national legislature
and which to the national executive? Securing the
“independence” of the executive was important, but this was
not merely a question of what we would call today separation
of powers; it had a federalism dimension as well. If the
national government was going to curb the excesses of state
legislatures, it seemed important to ask whether that should
be done in a national legislature, a national executive, or
even by means of a system of national courts. Thinking about
the constitutional role of courts had developed considerably
in the five years before 1787, to the extent that most framers
now assumed courts would confine state legislatures to
constitutional limits through judicial review.195 But what
should the role of the national executive be?196 According to
one commentator, delegate John Dickinson worried that a
firm national executive would centralize political authority
by “its inevitable concomitant, a bureaucracy.”197 There is
evidence that other delegates, too, felt this concern. Although
during the imperial crisis patriots had used “prerogative” to
press a case for a constitution of imperial federation, linked

195. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, 175 (1996).

IN

POLITICS

AND

IDEAS

IN THE

196. See Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the
Founding, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 490, 534–67 (2014). Although the veto had
been theorized as a device for keeping a legislature within constitutional bounds,
most of the men at Philadelphia seemed to think of it as a defensive device for
preserving executive power. But nearly everyone who spoke described judicial
review in more expansive terms.
197. THACH, supra note 108, at 90. Dickinson connected the firmness of the
executive and the existence of separate states in a speech on June 2. 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 188, at 86. Responding to this concern, Luther Martin
remarked several weeks later, “A general government may operate on individuals
in cases of general concern, and still be federal. This distinction is with the states,
as states, represented by the people of those states. States will take care of their
internal police and local concerns.” Id. at 439. Gouverneur Morris, for his part,
was more forthright in his view that states’ “internal police . . . ought to be
infringed in many cases, as in the case of paper money & other tricks by which
Citizens of other States may be affected.” 2 id. at 26; see also 1 id. at 164 (speech
of James Madison (June 8, 1787)).
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through the Crown, reformers now sought to combine a
national (imperial) executive with a national (imperial)
legislature. Nationalists like James Wilson, Gouverneur
Morris and Benjamin Franklin, who desired to establish a
central government with powers over public finance and
western lands, saw the Sweeping Clause as a key text, since
it empowered Congress “[t]o make all Laws . . . necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States.”198 Thus, even proponents of a strong executive
envisioned that “national prerogatives” would be regulated
by a national legislature.199 Congress would establish a
national bureaucracy by law, articulating legal limits that
might be enforced in a suit for damages before the courts.
The legalization of bureaucratic power under the Sweeping
Clause was an important concession to the tradition of
radical English ‘country’ thinking distrustful of centralized
state power, from which the patriots and now the AntiFederalists drew so much inspiration.200 From this
perspective, a grant of prerogatives would not secure the
President’s discretion to act outside the law—the Lockean
theory—but, rather, as we will see, his “independence of
judgment” within the law: his autonomy to exercise the
legally defined powers vested in his office. Nor should there
be worries that Congress would threaten local power, since it
lacked “the Royal prerogative[]” to directly veto state laws,
ensuring state control over internal police.201

198. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added); Mikhail, supra note 21, at
1070, 1078–86, 1121–24.
199. See Mikhail, supra note 21, at 1078–86, 1121–24.
200. MAX EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 45–46, 61–66 (2003);
Kramnick, supra note 155, at 23–24, 30.
201. In place of a national veto, Madison observed, was “the general provision
that the Constitution & laws of the U. S. shall be paramount to the Constitutions
& laws of the States.” Letter from James Madison to W. C. Rives (Oct. 21, 1833),
in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 521–22; 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786–1870, at 392 (1905).
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In designing the presidency, then, the framers used
“prerogative” in debating which of the traditional royal
powers of government could be vested in a national
republican executive. But they always assumed that the
administration of national power would be under law, and no
one used “prerogative” to press the case for a discretionary
authority to act outside the law. This would pose too great a
threat to local discretionary authority and police. To see this
in more detail, I turn first to the use of “prerogative” in the
first debates about the national executive on June 1, early in
the Convention. The second subsection deals with the
mysterious exchange over Congress’s power to “make war”
two-and-a-half months later, in mid-August. As far as we can
tell, the exchange concerned the need for a discretionary
authority in the President to respond to sudden attacks
without a legislative declaration of war; yet no one,
apparently, used the word “prerogative” to describe such a
power. In the final subsection, I turn to the ratification
debates, and show that disputants largely employed
“prerogative” as the term had been used in the imperial crisis
and the framing of the first state constitutions. The principal
divide was over whether the executive had been given the
necessary prerogatives to be independent, or so many that he
was, in fact, a monarch. “Prerogative” played a role, as well,
in supporting the Anti-Federalist case for a bill of rights, as
we can see from the debate in the Virginia ratifying
convention.
1. Prerogative Powers
Independent Executive

and

the

Problem

of

the

“Prerogative” made its first appearance at Philadelphia
on June 1, when Resolution 7 of the Virginia Plan came up
for discussion.202 As it was drafted, Resolution 7 was sparse,
reflecting Madison’s own uncertainty about the executive
Of course, in the Philadelphia Convention Madison had strongly supported a
national congressional veto over state laws. RAKOVE, supra note 195, at 51.
202. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 64–69.
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and perhaps, too, differences about the executive within the
Virginia delegation.203 The resolution stated that “a national
Executive” should be “chosen> by the national Legislature,”
and possess “the executive powers of Congress &c.”204 It said
nothing about whether the office was singular or plural, its
tenure or the length of term. (Resolution 8, not then under
discussion, also made the executive part of a “Council of
Revision,” which was to possess a qualified veto over national
law.205) Several issues surfaced during the first exchange,
but for our purposes most important was the association by
several delegates of particular prerogative powers with
monarchy. Charles Pinckney began debate by speaking in
favor of “a vigorous Executive,” but thought if it possessed
the “Executive powers of <the existing> Congress,” including
“peace & war,” it would “render the Executive a
Monarchy.”206 John Rutledge, too, opposed granting the
executive “the power of war and peace.”207 James Wilson,
who favored a strong national executive, seems to have
thought the objection serious. Speaking after Rutledge, he
declared that “[h]e did not consider the Prerogatives of the
British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers.”208 A short time later, Wilson returned to the point,
and, writes Madison, “repeated that he was not governed by
the British model which was inapplicable to the situation of
203. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 66, 74, 88 (views of Virginia
Governor Edmund Randolph); THACH, supra note 108, at 81–84.
204. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 64.
205. See id. at 105.
206. Id. at 64–65. Historian Richard Beeman suggests that Pinckney was
speaking in support of the President in his own plan, who was made “Commander
in chief of the Land Forces of U.S. and Admiral of their Navy,” and granted
powers to convene the legislature “on extraordinary occasions,” and to prorogue
them when they could not agree on a time to adjourn; but he did not possess a
power of initiating war or concluding peace. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST
MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 126 (2009); 3 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 188, at 606. It’s possible, but I see no evidence of it in
Pinckney’s remarks.
207. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65.
208. Id.
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this Country.”209 Advocating a single executive officer, as
Wilson had, was apparently close enough to “the British
model” that it required a disavowal.210 He would assert,
again, several days later, that “[a]ll know that a single
magistrate is not a King.”211 Wilson favored an executive
that had “energy dispatch and responsibility,” because he
thought it “would be the best safeguard against tyranny.”212
The danger during the Revolution, after all, had come from
“a corrupt multitude,” “the parliament.”213 But energy did
not necessitate vesting the executive with a power of war and
peace. The only powers the executive had to possess were the
powers “of executing the laws and appointing officers” not
“<appertaining to . . . >“ the legislature and thus rightly
appointed by it.214 The scope of executive powers would be
determined by reference to the purpose of the department;
“Extive. powers,” Wilson said, “are designed for the execution
of Laws” and the appointment of executive officers.215
Madison agreed. “[E]xecutive powers,” Rufus King recorded
him saying, “ex vi termini, do not include the Rights of war
& peace.”216 After a brief discussion, the Convention modified
Resolution 7 to empower the executive “to carry into effect.
the national laws [and] to appoint to offices in cases not
otherwise provided for.”217
209. Id. at 66.
210. Eric Nelson has argued that Wilson understood his June 1 motion “that
the Executive consist of a single person” to be an embrace of monarchy. NELSON,
supra note 32, at 185. Wilson denied this very point on June 4, but the denial
clearly did not convince Randolph and Mason. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 188, at 96, 101.
211. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 96.
212. Id. at 65, 66.
213. Id. at 71.
214. Id. at 66.
215. Id. at 70.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 67. Madison suggested the delegates begin by ‘defining’ what powers
were included, and then decide on the size and form of the office. Id. at 66–67. As
King recorded Madison, “the powers shd. be confined and defined – if large we
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This opening exchange was conventional in substance
and well within the range of debate on state executive
departments. Wilson’s use of “prerogatives” clearly refers to
traditional royal powers used to conduct government, several
of which are identified, and not to executive discretion or
emergency power.218 Indeed, Madison was the only delegate
who recorded anyone using the term “prerogative” at all
during the discussion, and at this point of the convention, he
was still writing from memory twice a week, with the
assistance of rough notes.219 William Pierce recorded Wilson
as disclaiming the “powers” of “Making peace and war,”
which “Writers on the Laws of Nations” had described as
“legislative.”220 Rufus King recorded Madison speaking of
shall have the Evils of elective Monarchies.” Id. at 70.
218. For a defense of the contrary position, see McConnell, supra note 5
(manuscript at 5–8).
219. BILDER, supra note 59, at 61–62. Bilder notes that Madison “translated
the speakers’ political concepts and ideas into his own terminology,” and that
other note-takers “recorded an inconsistent variety of political concepts and
vocabularies.” Id. at 64. The diction and organized composition of Madison’s notes
during this debate, in particular, make a striking contrast with the diaries of
King, Hamilton and Pierce. Copies of rough notes included with Madison’s
manuscript can be found in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION,
1787–1870, at 34–35 (1900) [Hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
220. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 73–74. The reference to
“[w]riters on the Laws of Nations” could be taken as a reference to Locke, whose
Second Treatise was in conversation with Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf. See
TUCK, supra note 46, at 117–20. Yet Locke famously describes war as a
“[f]ederative” power, not a legislative one. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 365. Other
writers take a variety of positions. Pufendorf distinguishes “the [l]egislative
[p]ower” and “the power of [w]ar and [p]eace” as different “[p]arts of
[s]overeignty.” SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, BOOK
VII 165–66 (Oxford, Lichfield 1703). Vattel takes the position that the sovereign
possesses both the right to enter treaties and to make war, although he observes
that this sovereign may constituted by fundamental law either as a prince or a
legislative assembly. With regard to treaties, in particular, Vattel observes that
some sovereigns “are obliged to take the advice of a senate, or of the
representatives of the nation.” EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 192–93,
292–93 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1863); see also LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 297–98 n.10 (1972). It is possible, too,
that by describing war as “legislative,” Wilson’s intent was to describe it as an
attribute of “sovereignty,” in light of the contrast writers like Grotius and
Pufendorf drew between sovereign lawmaking and the execution of government.
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“Rights of war & peace &c.”221 Thus, if “prerogative” was, in
fact, used by any speaker at all, it was used in a sense that
made it nearly synonymous with “power.”222 The usage was
fitted to the problem delegates faced, set by Wilson, which
was how to make a national executive sufficiently
independent of the legislature to ensure “a vigorous
execution of the Laws.”223 As we have seen, the strategy
employed in state constitutions was, in part, to vest
particular ‘prerogative powers’ in the executive department.
This reflected what was a longstanding association between
prerogative and providing, as Wilson put it, “security to
liberty.”224 But too many prerogative powers, or the wrong
sort, and the executive would appear to be a monarch, since
it might frustrate or corrupt the legislature.225 Wilson
assured his audience that there was no need for a vigorous
executive department to possess powers of war and peace.
Indeed, an executive should not possess such a power, since,
as “Writers on the Laws of Nations” had explained, it was a
prerogative “of a Legislative nature.”226 The words signaled
to men from states whose legislative assemblies possessed
many prerogative powers that even the learned, Tory James
See TUCK, supra note 46, at 1–9 (distinguishing sovereignty and government, and
crediting to Rousseau the view that war was a power of government). Madison,
writing later as Helvidius, cites publicist writers for the proposition that “the
powers to declare war, to conclude peace, and to form alliances, [are] among the
highest acts of sovereignty; of which the legislative power must at least be an
integral and preeminent part.” JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS, NO. 1,
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 66, 67 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987).
221. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 70.
222. This use of “prerogative” was familiar from the imperial crisis. Supra
Section I.A.
223. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 71 (speech of James Wilson); see
CORWIN, supra note 7, at 11–12; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL, supra note 1, at 27; RAKOVE,
supra note 195, at 259.
224. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 186, at 74. Pierce’s notes also state,
“Safety to liberty the great object.” Id. at 73.
225. See PRAKASH, IMPERIAL, supra note 1, at 17 (observing that “[c]ertain
powers . . . were said to make a single executive a monarch.”).
226. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65, 74.
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Wilson, might be an ally.227 No one on June 1 was advocating
for the creation of an executive discretion immune from law;
the thrust was exactly the opposite.
The discussion of the council of revision and an executive
veto power assumed much the same form. On the morning of
June 4, Wilson finally prevailed on the Convention to make
the executive unitary.228 The next issue up for discussion was
the Council of Revision described in Resolution 8. The
Council, which comprised the executive and “a convenient
number of the National Judiciary,” was proposed to have a
power to examine and reject every act of the national
legislature.229 Elbridge Gerry thought the proposal
problematic, since judges sitting on the Council would
already possess a power of expounding the laws in cases that
came before them, and thus (on occasion) “deciding on their
Constitutionality.”230 In place of the Council, Gerry proposed
that the executive “have a right to negative any Legislative
act,” subject to legislative override.231 Wilson thought Gerry
did not “go far enough,” as “a distinct & independent”
“Exetiv” required “an absolute negative.”232 Hamilton
agreed.233 The pace of proposals came fast, and other
delegates expressed concern at the shape the national
executive was assuming. Pierce Butler of South Carolina
professed he “had been in favor of a single Executive
Magistrate,” but had he known it would possess “a compleat
negative on the laws,” “he certainly should have acted very
differently.”234 George Mason agreed. “We are Mr. Chairman

227. On Wilson’s reputation as a stiff pedant with Tory sympathies, see
BEEMAN, supra note 206, at 129–35.
228. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 93, 97.
229. Id. at 21.
230. Id. at 97–98.
231. Id. at 98.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 100, 109.
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going very far in this business. We are not indeed
constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous
monarchy, an elective one.”235 The threat of a veto would
enable the executive to control the legislature, a practice
inconsistent with “the Genius of our People wh. is
republican.”236 Again, only Madison records any of these
delegates using the word “prerogative.” This time he puts it
in his own mouth, speaking against an absolute veto. “To
give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the
<temper of this country; its present temper at least.>“237
The debate over the veto was inconclusive on June 4, but
still the discussion does something to reveal why delegates
distinguished the veto from other prerogative powers like
appointment. The issue was not the nature of the veto power.
Madison did not mention the distinction between
prerogatives “of a Legislative nature” and those “strictly
Executive,” which he had drawn several days earlier, though
it would have advanced his cause, as the veto was in an
obvious way legislative rather than executive.238 Apparently
the distinction had no purchase on the fourth, if it ever had
any; after disapproving of an absolute veto, the delegates
also voted to reject a more executive-like substitute, a power
of suspension.239 Instead, delegates concerned about the veto
focused on its application to corrupt the legislature, by
requiring that it abandon a policy favored by the community,
consent to desired appointments, or even that it pay the
executive.240 Without the benefit of a council, there was no

235. Id. at 101.
236. Id. at 107–08.
237. Id. at 100. In Farrand’s edition, language enclosed in angle brackets was
added after the Convention had concluded, as late as 1819. See id. at xvi–xix. In
this case, Madison inserted the text to replace other text that he struck out and
rendered illegible. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 219, at 57.
238. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65–66.
239. Id. at 103–04.
240. Franklin suggested that the veto would be used as it had in proprietary
Pennsylvania, to extract special benefits that enriched the governor. Id. at 99,
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reason to think the views of the executive should be superior
to “the decided and cool opinions” of “the best men in the
Community,” sitting together in an august national
legislature.241 This veto would likely function something like
the modern Senate’s filibuster, keeping government
“clogged” until private interests could be gratified, rather
than “expeditiously executed” as Pierce Butler desired.242 It
was because the negative empowered the executive to
corrupt legislative judgment that it was “obnoxious” to the
republican “genius” or “temper” of the people. When the veto
came up for discussion again, several months later, Wilson
succeed by insisting that where an executive did not possess
the “formidable” powers of the British King—his other
prerogatives—he did not pose this threat.243 The legislature
would be far more powerful than the executive, and thus pose
the real danger of tyranny.244 In essence, the dispute was
which prerogatives had to be vested in the executive for the
desired “vigor,” but which could not be without creating an
appearance of monarchy and a threat of corruption. The line
was contested, and it would remain so for some time.245
106, 109. Mason used the same logic, applying it to appointments. Id. at 101.
Butler worried more generally that the veto would feed a “constant course of
increase” in executive power “in all countries.” Id. at 100. It was for this reason,
Roger Sherman explained in the United States Congress several years later, that
the Convention “prohibited the President from the sole appointment of all
officers,” since the British Crown had used “that prerogative” “to swallow up the
whole administration” and by its “influence . . . upon the Legislature” subject
Parliament “to its will and pleasure.” 3 id. at 357 (1789) (statement of Roger
Sherman in the House of Representatives).
241. 1 id. at 98, 99.
242. Id. at 109.
243. 2 id. at 301.
244. Id. at 298, 300–01. Gouverneur Morris, too, argued that “[t]he British
Executive has so great an interest in his prerogatives and such powerful means
of defending them that he will never yield any part of them. The interest of our
Executive is so inconsiderable & so transitory, and his means of defending it so
feeble, that there is the justest ground to fear his want of firmness in resisting
incroachments.” Id. at 76.
245. That the Constitution could generate these conflicting appearances was
well expressed by Jefferson in a letter to Massachusetts Attorney General James
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2. War Power, Invasion and Discretion
A resolution instituting a national executive was
approved on June 4 and delivered to a committee of detail on
July 23.246 The office consisted of a single person, and enjoyed
powers to execute the national laws and appoint executive
officers. What the committee reported to the convention on
August 6, however, was quite different.247 It added a number
of prerogative powers, although it vested them primarily in
the legislature. Thus, the committee’s draft gave the Senate
a “power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and
Judges of the supreme Court.”248 Congress was empowered
“To make war.”249 The Senate’s foreign policy prerogatives
remained in that body until the end of August, when the
“Committee of eleven” transferred them to the President.250
The war prerogative remained in Congress, although the
convention had earlier made one important, and very famous
change.
Sullivan. Jefferson wrote,
Where a constitution, like ours, wears a mixed aspect of monarchy and
republicanism, it’s citizens will naturally divide into two classes of
sentiment, according as their tone of body or mind, their habits,
connections, and callings induce them to wish to strengthen either the
monarchical or the republican features of the constitution. ome will
consider it as an elective monarchy which had better be made
hereditary, and therefore endeavor to lead towards that all the forms
and principles of it’s administration. Others will [view it] as an energetic
republic, turning in all it’s points on the pivot of free and frequent
elect[ions].
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Sullivan (Feb. 9, 1797), in 29 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1 MARCH 1796 TO 31 DECEMBER 1797, at 289 (Barbara B.
Oberg ed., 2002).
246. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 129, 132.
247. E.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 24 (“On a range of issues, the Committee
did not hesitate to exceed the instructions of the Convention. It added many
provisions . . . . It even adopted provisions inconsistent with the votes of the
Convention.); see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 177, 182, 183, 185.
248. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 183.
249. Id. at 182.
250. Id. at 493, 495. The Committee of Eleven is sometimes delightfully called
the “Committee on Postponed Parts.”
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On August 17 the convention changed the power “To
make war” to a power “To declare war.”251 It is difficult to
understand precisely why. Here we really are, as Justice
Jackson put it, divining meaning “from materials almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret
for Pharaoh.”252 Madison’s record of the debate preceding the
alteration is almost certainly incomplete, as his notes
degraded appreciably in the second half of August.253
Unfortunately, the completeness of the notes is relevant to
our study here. What was absent, apparently, from
deliberations over the draft’s allocation of war power was the
word “prerogative.” There was certainly reason to invoke the
concept. Pinckney opened the discussion by complaining that
a legislature was “too slow” to make war.254 If ever there was
an occasion to invoke the Lockean prerogative to justify
cleaving the war power so as to ‘leave’ an unregulated
discretion for the President, here it was. Yet Madison made
no mention of the concept when he proposed substituting
“declare” for “make,” with the aim, he said, of “leaving to the
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.”255 Several
days later, members debated the draft’s handling of the
treaty power, but again omitted any mention of prerogative,
despite one delegate’s description of the President as “the
general Guardian of the National interests,” a paternal
image often associated with the King.256
It is a mistake to hang much on omissions in the records
of the Philadelphia Convention, but here we should couple

251. Id. at 319.
252. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. V. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). As Arthur Schlesinger remarked about the
discussion, which he placed at the beginning of his own book, “no one really quite
knows what this exchange meant.” SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 4.
253. BEEMAN, supra note 206, at 292; BILDER, supra note 59, at 122–25.
254. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 318.
255. Id.; see Scigliano, supra note 1, at 245.
256. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 540–41; see DUBBER, supra note
130, at 16–20, 29.
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the omission with several other acts the convention took, of
which we possess a positive record. The President’s power to
repel sudden attacks must be read alongside an allocation of
emergency power that actually resembles structures
employed under early state constitutions. The convention
empowered the national legislature “to provide for calling
forth the militia” to, among other things, “suppress
insurrections and repel invasions.”257 Although it denied
Congress (and state legislatures) the power to pass bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws, two devices state legislatures
had used in emergencies, Congress was authorized to
establish military tribunals or courts to try offenses in
similar circumstances.258 Congress could also suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus “in cases of rebellion or
invasion.”259 Suspension in eighteenth-century English
practice was a parliamentary power, exercised by passing
temporary statutes to secure public safety.260 Thus, if we set
aside the carve-outs for bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws, the Constitution’s allocation of emergency power
assumes Congress is competent to regulate and even trigger
the response of the national government to emergencies
involving a breakdown in civil authority.261 The Revolution’s
primary lesson appears to have been a narrowing of the
forms by which a legislature should act; it could not exercise
emergency power itself, for example, by trying and
condemning rebels in the assembly by means of a bill of
attainder, but should delegate that power by establishing an
appropriate tribunal and body of law. Where governmental

257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Reinstein, supra note 5, at 302.
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9–11, 18; id. art. I, §§ 9–10.
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
260. Halliday & White, supra note 14, at 613–28, 670–71, 674–76. According
to the authors, “[b]y suspending the action of law, Parliament . . . in effect
captured the royal prerogative.” Id. at 622. This was the tradition of legislative
control over law in times of emergency in which the American revolutionaries
had operated and which the framers of the Constitution largely continued.
261. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 7, at 152–69.
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officers exceeded their authority to meet an emergency,
Congress did retain a quasi-judicial power to judge that
necessity on petition and to indemnify the officer if it thought
his action justified by passage of a private bill.262 Lastly, it
might impeach and convict the officer. Although a Lockean
theory of ‘discretionary’ prerogative might have justified
exclusively vesting these powers in a national executive, the
convention instead preserved a central role for the national
legislature in handling emergencies and approving the use of
armed force. Indeed, the decision to vest Congress with
powers to provide for the “defense of the republic” would play
an important role in federalists’ support of the proposed
Constitution during ratification.263
3. The Place of “Prerogative” in the Ratification Debates
The public debate over ratification of the Constitution,
both in print and in the ratification conventions, drew on
senses of “prerogative” familiar from the imperial crisis.
Despite the presence in Philadelphia of Wilson, Hamilton
and other proponents of a vigorous executive, “prerogative”
seems to have found more use during ratification than
during framing itself. It was not a term reserved for use by
lawyers, or one whose appeal was limited to lawyers, but a
familiar component of Whig orthodoxy. Writing early in the
ratification process, “A True Friend” reminded both the
“advocates for the new federal constitution” and their
“antagonists” that “the liberties and the rights of the people
262. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Adler, supra note 1, at 384–88; James E.
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1062,
1929–31 (2010); Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 324–29. The framers’ embrace of
what Adler’s calls “retroactive ratification” is not eo ipso an embrace of legalism
or rule of law simply because it the legislature does the ratifying; it is vesting
discretionary authority in a popular assembly, to be exercised after the fact, in
the form of approval or disapproval of the prior conduct of an officer. Supposing
this definition, it is unclear whether Adler will still agree that it was consistent
with the American constitutional system, given the place he accords to law in his
construction of that system.
263. EDLING, supra note 200, at 99.
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have been always encroached on, and finally destroyed by
those, whom they had entrusted with the powers of
government,” who “in [their] nature” were continually
“encreasing . . . their prerogatives” and “prolonging . . . the
term of their function.”264 This was the classic constitutional
scheme. “A.B.,” responding to the Anti-Federalist “Brutus” in
the pages of the Hampshire Gazette, counseled against
taking it too far; unlike a monarchy, where the principle
“may be admitted as true in general,” in a government
“strictly elective and popular,” like the proposed federal
government, instead of “extending the prerogative and
incroaching on or abridging the rights of the states or of the
people,” the government would “underact” where “popular
rumour” challenged it.265 Other writers showed how the old
prerogative-v.-privilege frame had adapted itself to an
emerging American doctrine of popular sovereignty. In its
jurisdiction-constituting sense, the prerogative belonged to
the people. “It is the prerogative of freemen,” wrote “The
Landholder,” “to determine their own form of government,”
and thus to settle the form “of the American empire.”266
Although “the right of granting exclusive charters” had been,
“in all old countries,” “considered as one principle branch of
prerogative,” it now belonged to the people, who should not
approve the Constitution without inserting “a restraining
clause, which might prevent the Congress from making any
such grant.”267 This prerogative should remain with the
264. A True Friend, RICHMOND, Dec. 5, 1787, in 14 DHRC, supra note 138, at
373–74.
265. A.B., HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1788, in 5 DHRC, supra note 138, at
671.
266. The Landholder X, CONN. COURANT, Mar. 3, 1788, in 16 DHRC, supra note
138, at 304–05; see also Statement of Thomas FitzSimons, 2 DHRC, supra note
138, at 73 (stating, on the question of whether the Pennsylvania Assembly should
call for a ratification convention, “it is my wish, that the legislature should take
the lead and guide the people into a decent exercise of their prerogative”); A
Delegate Who Has Catched Cold, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 25, 1788, in 10 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 1683 (describing “all peoples existing on the earth and the
nations” as possessing “their prerogatives and their government”).
267. Agrippa VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1787, in 4 DHRC, supra note 138, at
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people. From one point of view, the proposed Constitution
threatened this prerogative—a point, fittingly enough, that
could itself be expressed by describing the national
government as an unconstitutional form of “prerogative.”
According to “Cato Uticensis,” for example, the delegates in
Philadelphia had “proposed to you a high prerogative
government, which, like Aron’s serpent, is to swallow up the
rest,” dissolving the government’s formed by the people in
their states.268
“Prerogative” was invoked, as well, in discussion of
whether the convention had designed an appropriately
independent executive power. Usage in this sense largely
continued the constitutional framework that had emerged
during the state framing process and which also
characterized deliberations at Philadelphia. Executive power
alone was usually distinguished from prerogative.269 Specific
prerogative powers had been added to executive power to
insulate the department from legislative interference. AntiFederalists thought the porridge too hot, and that this
‘President’ was in reality a king; as “Tamony” observed,
428.
268. Cato Uticensis, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1787, in 8 DHRC, supra note
138, at 73 (emphasis added).
269. See, e.g., A Farmer, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 23, 1788, in 17
DHRC, supra note 138, at 134 (identifying as a “general principle[]” that “[t]he
power of making rules or laws to govern or protect the society is the essence of
sovereignty, for by this the executive and the judicial powers are directed and
controuled.”). For an important exception to this view of executive power, rooted
in the Take Care Clause, see William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15,
1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note 138, at 113–14 (“That there must be an executive
power independent of ye. Legislative branch, appears to have been generally
agreed by ye. fabricators of modern Constitutions. . . . But was ever a commission
so brief, so general, as this of our President? Can we exactly say how far a faithful
execution of ye. Laws may extend—or what may be called, or comprehended in,
a faithful execution? . . . Should a Federal act happen to be as generally expressed
as ye. President’s authority, must he not interpret ye. act? For in many cases he
must execute laws independently of any judicial decision.—And should ye.
Legislature direct ye. mode of executing ye. laws, or any particular law, is he
obliged to comply, if he did not think it will amount to a faithful execution? For
to suppose that ye. Legislature can make laws to affect ye. office of ye. President,
is to destroy his independence, & in this case to supersede ye. very constitution.”).
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although the “president is treated with levity and intimated
to be a machine calculated for state pageantry,” in reality
“his great prerogatives” gave him “more supreme power,
than Great Britain allows her hereditary monarchs.”270
Particularly alarming was his command “of a standing
army,” which was “unrestrained by law or limitation.”271
“Brutus” was equally concerned about the President’s power
to enter treaties with the approval of the Senate, which,
under the Constitution, would be “the supreme law of the
land”—a power greater than that possessed by the British
King, who could not alter the law of the land.272 “An Old
Whig” thought the President possessed every “important
prerogative the King of Great Britain is entitled to,” and that
subjecting such an office to election was, in fact, “dangerous,”
violating conventional wisdom about the instability of
nations with “an elective King.”273 But to Edmund Pendleton,
these concerns were overblown. “The President is indeed to
be a great man,” he conceded, but this was only “to represent
the Federal dignity & Power”; in substance, the office had “no
latent Prerogatives, nor any Powers but such as are defined
and given him by law.”274 Although he was made
commander-in-chief of the army and navy, “Congress are to
raise & provide for them, & that not for above two years at a
time.”275 He could nominate officers, but required the Senate
to appoint them, and anyway “Congress must first creat[e]
the offices & fix the Emoluments, and may discontinue them
270. Tamony, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1788, in 8 DHRC, supra note 138, at
287.
271. Id.
272. Brutus, VA. INDEP. CHRON., May 14, 1788, in 9 DHRC, supra note 138, at
801–02.
273. An Old Whig V, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, in 13
DHRC, supra note 138, at 541–42. On the authorship of the Old Whig essays,
which consisted of a team of leading Pennsylvania ‘Constitutionalists,’ see id. at
376.
274. Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Oct. 8, 1787), in 8 DHRC, supra
note 138, at 354.
275. Id.
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at pleasure.”276 Pendleton repeated the same point several
months later in a letter to Richard Henry Lee, who opposed
ratification but did not attend the state’s convention. “His
powers are defined, & not left to latent Prerogatives—they
none of them appear too large,” excepting perhaps the pardon
and the treaty power.277 Pendleton thus leaned heavily on
contrasting types of prerogative; “prerogatives undefined,” as
existed under the British constitution, and prerogatives
limited by law and the need for support from the
legislature—a distinction others drew as well.278 Pendleton’s
efforts did not prevent Henry and Mason from leading an
attack in the ratifying convention on a presidency they
thought conferred “too much power”—so much, they said, as
to invite “foreign countries to interfere in his election.”279
There was notably little hysteria over the President’s
veto prerogative. Some Anti-Federalists doubted the veto
would be used, citing the example of the British monarch,280
276. Id.
277. Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 18 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 182.
278. 10 DHRC, supra note 138, at 1196 (statement of Edmund Pendleton in
the Virginia Convention (June 12, 1788)); see also John Brown Cutting to William
Short (Dec. 13, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note 138, at 477 (“[T]he powers of a
senate and house of representatives as marked out by the american constitutionwoud more than counter-ballance those even of an hereditary President—whose
prerogatives and authorities were definite, supported & circumscrib’d by lawaltho You even admit them to be much more enormous & influential than those
confided to his possession by virtue of the new plan. . . . [Again contrasting the
British King,] I pass over the absolute prerogatives of making peace wartreaties—prorogations dissolutions and sudden conventions of a Septennial
House of Commons . . . .”).
279. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION,
1787–1788, at 286 (2010); see also PRAKASH, supra note 1, at 20.
280. E.g., Brutus, supra note 272, at 800; Centinel II, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN’S
J., Oct. 24, 1787, in 13 DHRC, supra note 138, at 464 (“Even the king of England,
circumstanced as he is, has not dared to exercise it for near a century past.”).
Federalists made this point as well, arguing from the British example that the
power would not be abused. See, e.g., 9 DHRC, supra note 138, at 922 (statement
of George Nicholas in the Virginia Convention (June 4, 1788)) (“[T]here is scarcely
an instance, for a century past, of the Crown’s exercising its undoubted
prerogative, of rejecting a bill sent up to it by the two Houses of Parliament.”).
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while others maintained it was inappropriate in a
government where the executive did not possess “the
sovereignty of the nation,” as the British King did.281
Defenses emphasized that Massachusetts had already
granted its executive a veto, and that the nation’s President
would be a person of great public virtue.282 Much more
heated was the debate over the need for a bill of rights, a
debate in which “prerogative” played an important role in the
Virginia Convention. As Pauline Maier has described,
Patrick Henry’s “persistent demands that the Constitution
needed a bill of rights could not be dismissed” and on several
occasions nearly derailed the Virginia convention.283 English
experience proved the need for explicit, clear guarantees of
liberties. “The people of England lived without a declaration
of rights,” Henry observed, until Charles “made usurpations
upon the rights of the people.”284 The King had been able to
do so because “rights were in a great measure before that
time undefined,” and their measure “depended on
implication and logical discussion.”285 It was only when the
English “Bill of Rights put an end to all construction and
implication” that liberty was made secured, “by defining the
281. The Impartial Examiner IV, VA. INDEP. CHRON. June 11, 1788, in 10
DHRC, supra note 138, at 1610–11.
282. See, e.g., A Native of Virginia, Observations upon the Proposed Plan of
Federal Government, in 9 DHRC, supra note 138, at 668–69 (“This power in the
President [the veto] is derived from the State government of Massachusetts and
New York. . . . [It] goes only to a reconsideration of the public measures . . . .
[T]he President [will] in all probability be a man of great experience, and abilities,
and as far as his powers extend, ought to be considered as representing the
Union; and consequently would be well acquainted with the interests of the
whole. Great utility is therefore likely to arise to Congress form his knowledge,
and his reasoning upon their acts of Legislation. Farther, the experience of all
ages proves that all popular assemblies are frequently governed by prejudices,
passions, and partial views of the subject; nay sometimes by indecent heats and
animosities. . . .”); Debate in the South Carolina Legislature (Jan. 16, 1788), in 3
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 249 (statement of Charles Pinckney).
283. MAIER, supra note 279, at 284–85, 294–95, 300, 306–07.
284. 10 DHRC, supra note 138, at 1212 (statement of Patrick Henry in the
Virginia Convention (June 12, 1788)).
285. Id.
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rights of the people, and limiting the King’s prerogative.”286
The key point for Henry was the general or undefined
character of the prerogative, in which “every possible right
which is not reserved to the people by some express provision
or compact, is within the King’s prerogative.”287 Over time,
rights were “reserved to the people,” by efforts to “enumerate
the exceptions to his prerogative.”288 Henry returned to the
point repeatedly; several days later, he observed again that
“the prerogative of the King, and the frequent attacks on the
privileges of the people,” made clear the “necessity of
excluding implication.”289 George Mason, who also pushed
for the necessity of a bill of rights, thought common law had
supplied the necessary limits. It was the “common law,”
Mason averred, that had “prevented the power of the crown
from destroying the immunities of the people.”290 Although
Virginia had received the common law by statute, the
proposed federal Constitution made no provision for the
common law. Absent some such guarantee, there was
nothing to keep the President and Senate from, said Mason,
“a dismemberment of the empire,” selling off territory or
even a state—a “prerogative” prohibited to the British
monarch.291
The invocation of “prerogative” complicated, to some
degree, the federalist response to Henry and Mason’s

286. Id.
287. Id. at 1328–29 (statement of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention
(June 16, 1788)).
288. Id. at 1333.
289. Id. at 1505 (statement of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention (June
24, 1788)).
290. Id. at 1390 (statement of George Mason in the Virginia Convention (June
19, 1788)).
291. Id. at 1390–91. A related argument was that there was nothing to prevent
Congress from constituting tribunals or courts that did not follow the common
law, thereby undermining its protections. Agrippa VI, supra note 267, at 427.
Notably, Mason reversed the reasoning of the patriots during the imperial crisis,
who had insisted that the King’s prerogative did extend to such grants. See supra
Section I.A.
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demand for a bill of rights. The stock reply was that the
grants of power to the federal government were few and
defined, obviating any need for an explicit reservation of
rights. A written constitution, defining the powers of the
executive department, would itself secure liberty against
prerogative.292 Yet the Constitution did grant the executive
certain prerogatives; thus, if “prerogative” was understood to
entail a broad discretion to act to protect the public, the
limited nature of federal authority would offer little
protection from tyranny. “A True Friend” insisted that,
“[n]otwithstanding Mr. Wilson’s assertion, that every thing
which is not given up by this federal constitution, is reserved
to the body of the people; that security is not sufficient to calm
the inquietude of a whole nation.”293 Not only was there a
need for a bill of rights, explained “A Delegate who has
Catched Cold,” but for one “so expressive, so clear, and at the
same time so short, as never to require either comment or
interpretations.”294 Defenders of the Constitution adopted
several different responses. Some, like Pendleton, drew a
distinction between the general and undefined character of
the prerogatives of the British King, at least historically, and
the particular, limited and legal prerogatives granted to the

292. 9 DHRC, supra note 138, at 1092, 1135–36 (statement of George Nicholas
in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788)) (“In England, in all
disputes between the King and people, recurrence is had to the enumerated
rights of the people to determine. Are the rights in dispute secured—Are they
included in Magna Charta, Bill of Rights, &c? If not, they are, generally speaking,
within the King’s prerogative. In disputes between Congress and the people, the
reverse of the proposition holds. Is the disputed right enumerated? If not,
Congress cannot meddle with it.”); A Native of Virginia, supra note 282, at 660
(“It may be asked, why did the English consider a Bill of Rights necessary for the
security of their liberty? The answer is, because they had no written Constitution,
or form of government. . . . [Even their bill of rights left] the prerogative still
inaccurately defined, [allowing the monarch] to claim by implification the
exercise of all powers not denied it by that declaration.”).
293. A True Friend, supra note 264, at 373, 376 (emphasis in original). In a
reversal of usage not unusual for “prerogative,” “A True Friend” then insisted
that what was required was “a declaration of our rights, or an enumeration of our
prerogatives, as a sovereign people.” Id. (emphasis added).
294. A Delegate who has Catched Cold, supra note 266, at 1683.
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President and the Congress under the Constitution.295 Other
Federalists maintained that English charters, petitions, bills
and other such guarantees were largely symbolic and had
done little to actually limit monarchical power—pointedly
reversing the valence of patriot thinking during the imperial
crisis. In an undelivered speech, William Cushing, a delegate
to the Massachusetts Convention, observed that “Bills of
rights originated in ancient despotic times; in the times of
despotic Kings, whose prerogatives were boundless & whole
will alone was law.”296 In response to the conduct of King
Charles, “Ld. Coke & others drew up a bill of rights,” “[b]ut
it was of no consequences, for no sooner had he assented to
the bill of rights than he trampled the whole under foot.”297
As Pendleton put this point, adopting the English Bill of
Rights as a model for this country was “humiliating &
unsafe,” because, first, the people would be accepting from an
“Agent of their Power a Charter of their rights,” and, second,
such an origin “admits a Power in the Donor to take away,” a
source of “mischief” that explained Magna Charta’s
“numerous Ratifications.”298 The presence of prerogative
powers in the Constitution thus forced federalists to
characterize “prerogative” as legally limited and to
subordinate it to the sovereignty of the people.
The Federalist letters brought largely the same
arguments to the debate over ratification in New York.299 In
Number 26, Hamilton adopted the familiar framing on an
establishment Whig in describing the effect of the Glorious

295. See Cutting to Short, in 14 DHRC supra note 138, at 476–77; Pendleton
to Lee, supra note 138, at 179–80; Pendleton to Madison, supra note 274, at 46.
296. William Cushing, Undelivered Speech (c. Feb. 4, 1788), in 6 DHRC, supra
note 138, at 1431.
297. Id. at 1432.
298. Pendleton to Lee, supra note 138, at 179 (emphasis in original).
299. See LORRI GLOVER, THE FATE OF THE REVOLUTION: VIRGINIANS DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION 59 (2016); Onuf, supra note 27, at 366 (arguing that The Federalist
was persuasive to the extent that it was responsive to arguments aired
elsewhere).
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Revolution on the royal prerogative to raise armies. “Inroads
were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favour of
liberty,” he wrote, “[b]ut it was not ‘till the revolution in
1688” that liberty “was completely triumphant,” secured by
a requirement in the Bill of Rights that the prerogative be
exercised with the consent of Parliament.300 In Number 47,
Madison identified the other prerogative powers
traditionally exercised by the King, including “the
prerogative of making treaties,” appointing judges, and
“put[ting] a negative on every law,” in the course of
examining how the British constitution mixed the functions
of government, a pattern early state constitutions had
followed.301 ‘Paper’ constitutional boundaries between the
departments had proved insufficient to maintain the
functional distinctions that did exist, and thus, in Number
48 Madison turned, famously, to providing “some practical
security for each, against the invasion of the others.”302 The
“executive power,” in particular, “being restrained within a
narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature,” had
been victimized by legislative assemblies, rendering it
“dependent,” an account Madison then illustrated by citing
Jefferson’s discussion of Virginia government in Notes on the
State of Virginia.303 What was required, in the case of the
executive department, was to increase “the constitutional
rights of the place” to the point they were “commensurate to
the danger of attack.”304 Madison was building the
conventional case for returning royal prerogatives to the
executive to insure its independence, a case he left to be

300. Publius, The Federalist 26, N.Y. INDEP. J., Dec. 22, 1787, in 15 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 66.
301. Publius, The Federalist 47, N.Y. INDEP. J., Jan. 30, 1788, in 15 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 500–04.
302. Publius, The Federalist 48, N.Y. Packet, Feb. 1, 1788, in 16 DHRC, supra
note 138, at 4.
303. Id. at 5–6.
304. Publius, The Federalist 51, N.Y. INDEP. J., Feb. 6, 1788, in 16 DHRC, supra
note 138, at 44.
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concluded by Hamilton in the last of the essays.305 In
Number 69, Hamilton undertook to demonstrate that the
convention had not given the executive powers by which it
could dominate or corrupt the national legislature, by
comparing its powers to those of the British monarch.306 He
began with the qualified veto, which he contrasted with the
King’s “prerogative,” an absolute negative, but likened to the
weaker “revisionary authority of the council of revision of
this State [i.e., New York], of which the governor is a
constituent part.”307 He turned, then, to the other
prerogative powers vested in the national executive,
including command of the army, navy and militia; the
pardon; the power to adjourn the national legislature in
limited cases; and the power to make treaties with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate.308 Comparing each
with its analogue royal prerogative, as described by
Blackstone, Hamilton concluded that the President was not,
in fact, nearly as powerful as the British king. The argument
was tendentious (as many understood, Blackstone’s chapter
on prerogative both overstated the monarch’s constitutional
power and understated its political power), but the same
position had been advocated three months earlier in New
York by “Americanus,” and by writers in other states as
well.309 Most disputants agreed on the premise—the need for
305. See SOFAER, supra note 10, at 51, 56 (describing the aim of The Federalist
as defending a vigorous, independent executive department with sufficient
powers to avoid legislative control).
306. Publius, The Federalist 69, N.Y. PACKET, Mar. 14, 1788, in 16 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 388.
307. Id. at 388–92.
308. Id. at 388–92.
309. See Americanus IV, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 5–6, 1787, in 19 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 359–59 (“The most effectual way, perhaps, of effacing these
gloomy fears from our minds, is to compare the distribution of power made by
this Constitution, with the distribution of power which has taken place in the
Government of Great-Britain. . . .”). For another example of this argument, again
made some three months before Hamilton published Federalist 69, see Cutting
to Short, supra note 295, at 477 (“[s]elect the king of this monarchic republic
Britain-and compare his powers and prerogatives with those of our President.”).
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an “energetic Executive”—since, as Hamilton put it in
Federalist 70, “A feeble executive implies a feeble execution
of the government,” and a feeble execution “is but another
phrase for a bad execution.”310 The conventional strategy for
making an executive energetic was to grant it certain
prerogative powers. This is what the proposed Constitution
did; the powers it vested in the national executive—
negotiating with foreign powers, preparing plans of finance,
arranging the army and navy, directing the operations of
war—were “most properly understood” as part of “the
administration of government.”311 A government with such
prerogative powers was necessary, Hamilton reasoned, for
“the security of liberty”—an idea of central importance,
which with Hamilton had opened the letters in Federalist
1.312
Finally, in Number 84, Hamilton answered the
argument in favor of a bill of rights based on the English
experience with prerogative. He began by acknowledging the
usual view that “bills of rights are in their origin,
stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments
of prerogative in favor of privilege.”313 But these agreements
“have no application to constitutions professedly founded

The debate about who was more powerful, the President or the British King, was
common and usually carried out by comparing prerogatives and ‘influence’ over
legislation. On the defects of Hamilton’s comparison in The Federalist, see
NELSON, supra note 32, at 217–19; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 21;
SOFAER, supra note 10, at 45, 51; Reinstein, supra note 5, at 267–69, 288–96.
310. Publius, The Federalist 70, N.Y. PACKET, Mar. 15, 1788, in 16 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 396.
311. Id. at 612. The idea that prerogatives were powers necessary for the
administration of government was, as we have seen, invoked during the imperial
crisis. See supra Section I.A. When applied to these powers, the term
“prerogative” was hardly, as Richard Pious describes it, a “forbidden term.” Pious,
supra note 1, at 69.
312. Publius, supra note 310, at 451; see also id. at 91 (“the vigour of
government is essential to the security of liberty”). On the association of
“prerogative” and liberty, see supra Section I.B.
313. Publius, The Federalist 84, N.Y. PACKET, July 29, 1788, in 16 DHRC,
supra note 138, at 128.
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upon the power of the people,” since “in strictness, the people
surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have
no need of particular reservations.”314 There was no attempt
to meet the argument that the grant of prerogative powers to
the executive might be understood to convey broad,
discretionary powers to protect the public—a suggestion,
apparently, in no need of a response.
II. USING “PREROGATIVE” TO CONSTRUCT ARTICLE II
“Prerogative” had no single meaning for early
Americans. It had multiple meanings, which grew out of the
different uses to which the term could be put in political,
legal and constitutional argument. While those uses drew on
a law of prerogative and English political writings of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Americans did not
typically treat the term as a technical one, in the sense that
it was strictly bound by English theorizing. American usage
did not conform to the expositions of Blackstone or Locke,
although Blackstone’s catalogue of royal prerogative powers
clearly influenced American thinking and did so to a degree
far beyond Locke’s theory of prerogative. If the term had a
core connotation for Americans, it was something like ‘strong
government’ or ‘rights to government.’ They used
“prerogative” to press a case for self-government, republican
government and vigorous government, in each case to secure
their rights.
The constitutional arguments described above also
suggest some principles useful for own constructions of
Article II and its relationship to Article I. These, as I said at
the outset, are not meant to provide answers to concrete
questions about executive power. The first two principles I
have in mind function something like canons, constraining
our interpretation of the constitutional text, while the last is
really a set of values for guiding analysis within the larger

314. Id. at 130.
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context of emergency power. The first principle is that we
should distinguish prerogative from executive power in the
constitutional context (as opposed to, say, in political
writings or legal treatises). The grant of executive power in
the Article II Vesting Clause may be a substantive power,
but, other considerations aside, it should be understood as a
grant of the power to carry out the law, not prerogative
power. Second, there is nothing about “prerogative” per se
that immunizes it from legislative regulations. We should
presume that presidential prerogatives are defeasible. Yet,
in light of the functions that executive prerogatives serve,
there must be some limits to legislative powers. I suggest
two. Congressional regulation of presidential prerogatives
should not compromise the President’s independence of
judgment. Moreover, since a principal purpose of vesting
prerogative powers in the President was to create a vigorous
government capable of securing liberty and protecting
property, courts should interpret his prerogative powers in
ways that advance this purpose. The last principle I take
from the discussion above is that we should generally
presume that Locke has little to tell us about how our
Constitution provides for meeting emergencies. The early
American approach to emergencies involved both legislative
and executive branches in a way that ensured emergency
government remained a government of law and responsible
for its actions. Although important elements of this approach
have been displaced, the present statutory framework
regulating emergency power, as well as the leading judicial
framework set out in the Steel Seizure Case, continue to
reflect the political values behind it.
A. Prerogative and Executive Power
As we have seen, Americans engaged in framing
constitutions distinguished “executive power” from
“prerogative.” They used “executive” in what has been called
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its “principal,” “primary,” “precise” or “dictionary” sense.315
Why should Americans distinguish “executive power” and
“prerogative” in this context, when in political tracts, legal
treatises and similar texts, “the executive” and “executive
powers” could be used in ways that included prerogative
power?316 Americans drew such a distinction when, and to
the extent that, they thought it necessary for the project of
framing a vigorous republican executive, for showing
doubters that such a form of government was possible. In this
context, it was crucial to distinguish traditional executive
offices, which (like the King’s) might possess prerogatives,
from the executive governmental function, and the powers
necessary to discharge that function adequately. For
example, the famous Essex Result, in which the delegates of
Essex County, Massachusetts explained their rejection of a
proposed state constitution, uses “executive” in both these
senses within the same paragraph, describing first an
“internal executive power, which is employed in the peace,
security and protection of the subject and his property, and
in the defence of the state.”317 In this sense, the aim of
executive power was “to enforce the law, and to carry into
execution all the orders of the legislative powers,” and,
perhaps, to protect the instruments of civil government
against the rebellious.318 In contrast, war, treaty and the
prerogatives of the British King relating to foreign nations
were categorized as powers of “the external executive,” and
which the federal Constitution would assign to the
legislature.319
Thus, when James Wilson remarked that “[h]e did not
consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper
315. MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 130–49; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at
65, 84–86, 108; Adler, supra note 1, at 380; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 334.
316. See, e.g., PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 31.
317. The Essex Result, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 112, 117 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
318. See id.
319. Id.
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guide in defining the Executive powers,” his concern was the
function (here, “Executive” is used adjectivally, not
nominally, as in ‘the Executive’s powers’); and his point was
that in defining the powers necessary to execute the law (the
function), one should not look to the traditional prerogatives
of the office of the British King.320 The only prerogative
necessary to carry out the law was, said Wilson, the
appointment of executive officers.321 On this point—the
meaning of executive power—Wilson’s principal opponent,
Roger Sherman, was necessarily agreed, remarking that “the
Executive magistracy [was] nothing more than an institution
for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect.”322 The two
disagreed as to whether the executive should carry out the
law according to his own, independent judgment; and
whether, to this end, the office should be vested with
prerogative powers. Madison’s suggestion that the delegates
“fix the extent of the Executive authority” by identifying
powers “in their nature Executive,” was, similarly, a
suggestion that they use executive function as a guide to
fixing the powers of a national executive office, including any
prerogatives.323
Naturally there is room to contest too firm a distinction
between uses of “prerogative” and “executive power,” even in
the relatively narrow context of late eighteenth-century
constitutional framing. But assume, for a moment, that the
balance tilts in favor of drawing such a distinction and
consider what follows. The Vesting Clause of Article II vests
“the executive power” in a President serving for a term of four
years.324 What does this mean? Is it a substantive grant of
power or merely a requirement that the office be held by a
320. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65 (emphasis added).
321. Id. at 66 (“The only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of
executing the laws, and appointing officers, not <appertaining to and> appointed
by the Legislature.”).
322. Id. at 65.
323. Id. at 66–67.
324. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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single person for a length of four years?325 To a considerable
degree, the perceived stakes of this debate are a result of
conflating executive power with prerogative.326 If “executive
power” includes prerogative, and “prerogative” includes a
discretion to act in the absence of law or even contrary to law,
then the grant of executive power in the Vesting Clause is a
mighty thing indeed. Its scope will almost certainly be
settled by the President alone, and one struggles to imagine
any President narrowing the power in the face of a crisis, or
even threats of the kind almost constantly present.327 As the
scope of this power pushes outward, it gradually loses its
resemblance to executive power (the power to carry out the
law), and increases its resemblance to an absolute power
whose only substantive limit is, as Locke required,
promoting the public good.328 The idea that such a thing

325. PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 63 (describing the debate). See
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48–50 (1994) and Prakash, supra note 17, at 713–20, for
representative positions. The former argues that the Vesting Clause fixes the
title of the national executive and makes it a singular office while the latter
argues that the Vesting Clause is a substantive grant of power, including
“executive power” in a strict sense and prerogative powers traditionally
associated with executives.
326. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952);
id. at 640–41 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The Solicitor General seeks the power of
seizure in three clauses of the Executive Article . . . Lest I be thought to
exaggerate, I quote the interpretation which his brief puts upon it: ‘In our view,
this clause constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the
Government is capable.’ If that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers
bothered to add several specific items, including some trifling ones.”); CORWIN,
supra note 7, at 7–8; CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 12–13
(1948); Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 321–22.
327. As Justice Jackson memorably put this proposition, “emergency powers
would tend to kindle emergencies.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
328. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 375 (“Many things there are, which the Law can
by no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of
him, that has the Executive Power in his hands . . .”). See Louis Fisher, The
Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569 (2010)
for a more in-depth discussion on the tendency of this power to become absolute.
Fisher argued that assertions of inherent power—power deriving from the
executive office itself—”move a nation from one of limited powers to boundless
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could be lurking in the Vesting Clause has seemed to many
outrageous.
If the Vesting Clause merely vests the President with a
power to carry out the law, however, less is at stake. The
power vested by the clause is still significant. That the
President possesses executive power in this “dictionary”
sense does not imply, as Harvey Mansfield suggested, that
he is merely “an errand boy.”329 A grant of executive power
conveys with it considerable discretion. The discretion is
considerable, but not unbounded; it is bounded by its
purpose, which is carrying out the law.
That a grant of power to carry out the law must convey
with it a discretion of considerable scope becomes apparent
when one considers what the task involves. Legal accounts
of executive power describe some of its key elements:
interpreting the law, issuing orders or administrative rules,
and using force.330 Each requires an exercise of discretion in
the sense of choice.331 Officers and executive attorneys must
interpret laws open to a range of reasonable constructions;
executive agencies are tasked with developing rules within
broad statutory frameworks, whose details have been left
open to allow agencies to determine how best to implement
the legislative mandate, subject in recent decades to
increasing supervision and review through the Executive

and ill-defined authority.” Id. at 589.
329. MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 2–3. Chief Justice Vinson similarly referred
to the “messenger-boy” conception of presidential power. Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 708 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
330. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law
enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of
‘execution’ of the law.”); CORWIN, supra note 7, at 141–61 (discussing executive
interpretation, use of force); MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 159, 316, 318 (2d ed. 2013) (interpretation, execution, and
non-prosecution).
331. See Cary Coglianese & Christopher S. Yoo, Introduction: The Bounds of
Executive Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1591–1605
(2016); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 671, 696–98 (2014).
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Office of the President.332 Presidents themselves engage in
rulemaking using executive orders and guidance
memoranda, and thereby “set national policy on a wide range
of issues.”333 Executive discretion arises, as well, from limits
imposed by fixed resources and time, which require agencies
to establish enforcement priorities.334 Relatedly, sometimes
law enforcement officers decide to “crack down” on an
offense, directing additional resources to the enforcement of
those laws.335 The result of these kinds of policies is a partial
non-enforcement of the law, the scope and content of which
may settled by administrators balancing a range of
332. Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031,
1044–45 (2013); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 21, at 2295–97, 2307–08;
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 224, 2248–50
(2001); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J.
1836, 1857 (2015); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39, 42–43, 57–59 (1993); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential
Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 968–69 (1997). Goldsmith and Manning’s
analysis of what they call the presidential “completion power” is most persuasive
when described as a power to “prescribe incidental details needed to carry into
execution a legislative scheme,” Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 20, at 2282
(emphasis added), a power they argue is implied by the grant of executive power
in the Vesting Clause. See id. at 2304–05. Far less persuasive is their suggestion,
building on Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent in Youngstown, that the President has
a residual constitutional power to carry into effect “a mass of legislation,” or a
“legislative scheme” evidenced principally by appropriations acts. Id. at 2285. As
Robert Reinstein has argued, and as the authors appear to acknowledge, the
latter power shades into a prerogative to make law by proclamation or dispense
with inconsistent congressional requirements in emergencies. Id. at 2309;
Monaghan, supra note 332, at 40–41; Reinstein, supra note 5, at 311–13.
333. Metzger, supra note 332, at 1856.
334. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291–92 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Obviously the President cannot secure full execution of the laws, if
Congress denies to him adequate means of doing so. Full execution may be
defeated because Congress declines to create offices indispensable for that
purpose. Or, because Congress, having created the office, declines to make the
indispensable appropriation. Or, because Congress, having both created the office
and made the appropriation, prevents, by restrictions which it imposes, the
appointment of officials who in quality and character are indispensable to the
efficient execution of the law. . . . The President performs his full constitutional
duty, if, with the means and instruments provided by Congress and within the
limitations prescribed by it, he uses his best endeavors to secure the faithful
execution of the laws enacted.”).
335. Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 42–48 (2017).
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factors.336 For similar reasons, a President vested with the
power to carry out the law enjoys a discretion to prohibit a
prosecution from being initiated, or to direct the entry of a
nolle prosequi, as do United States Attorneys.337 The
President might also forbid a prosecution because he judges
it inequitable in the circumstances, or because it conflicts
with other enforcement priorities.338
These forms of executive discretion are well-known to
legal scholarship. My purpose here is not to intervene in this
literature, but to observe a distinction, immanent in most
accounts, between executive discretion and the Lockean
prerogative. Executive discretion is suited to problems of
application and administration of a complex system; it
requires a capacity, for instance, to adapt a general rule (or
set of rules) to particular circumstances, or to ensure that the
law as carried out will be adequate for legislative
purposes.339 Lockean prerogative, in contrast, is triggered by

336. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (“First, an agency
decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of
factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only
assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best
spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s
overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to
undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each technical
violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better
equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper
ordering of its priorities.”); CORWIN, supra note 7, at 144 (stating a similar
argument, with respect to the President).
337. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1967); id. at 196
(Wisdom, J., specially concurring); The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op.
Att’y Gen. 482 (1831), reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 50, 52 (1999); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 21, at
2293–94.
338. See, e.g., The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, supra note 331, at 52.
339. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABROGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 53 (2016) for a discussion on the executive’s need to
“fill in the details.” “The power to fill in the details is an indispensable element
of what ‘executive’ power means; that to execute a law inevitably entails giving
it additional specification, in the course of applying it to real problems and cases.”
Id.; see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 20, at 2289, 2302–03, 2308; Price,
THE
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sudden change, and in particular those changes that
threaten to destroy or seriously impair the state, where the
costs of acting by law are thought to be too great to
tolerate.340 This conceptual distinction is evident in a range
of institutional differences. In the former case, Congress can
set the scope of discretion as it sees fit; it can leave law open
or highly general, and allow the President or administration
to develop policies within the law’s scope that are fitted to
the circumstances; or Congress can narrow the law, even
overturning some executive policies post hoc using the
Congressional Review Act.341 Thus, it is unsurprising to
discover that a conception of executive discretion as
delegated legislative power was common in early America.342
In contrast, a constitutional power to act in the absence of
law or to violate the law during an emergency is, by
definition, beyond the power of Congress to regulate.
Perhaps, then, we should read Madison’s anger over the
“Pacificus” letters not as stemming from Hamilton’s
suggestion that the Vesting Clause conferred a substantive
supra note 331, at 675. A related idea is that executive power includes a quasiequitable authority to interpret and give effect to the law in a way that makes it
just and equal to its purposes. This is sometimes described using Aristotle’s
notion of epieikeia. See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 843–45; cf.
CROMARTIE, supra note 15, at 185 (describing a view of epieikeia as a form of
equity “internal to the [legal] system”); R. H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT
77 (2015) (describing an “internalist” use of natural law to “discover the meaning
of existing laws”). Equity in this sense is not an authority to change the law, but
a discretion to construct and implement it in a way that, admittedly, can have
largely the same effect as changing it.
340. MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 203 (“Locke’s practical objection to the
supremacy of the legislative power arises from the changeableness of things—a
Machiavellian consideration—rather than from the generality of law that does
not allow for the best case, as with Aristotle.”).
341. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012). Congressional “levers of control” over
“administrative policymaking” include “its ability to revise statutory mandates,
reverse administrative decisions, cut agency budgets, block presidential
nominees, or even conduct serious oversight hearings.” Kagan, supra note 326, at
2256. Then-Professor Kagan acknowledged the conventional view that Congress
rarely used these “levers,” as well as a body of political science scholarship
challenging it. See id. at 2256-60.
342. Scigliano, supra note 1, at 249.
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power at all, but that it implied a power to abrogate a treaty
because the President believed the peace and security of the
United States to be in danger.343 The discretion conferred by
a grant of executive power did not extend to ignoring the law
during an emergency, and to suggest it did could endanger
the ability of the legislature to effectively regulate executive
power.
The only prerogative framers thought necessary for the
President to exercise executive power was appointment.344
This suggests that we should the Article II Vesting Clause
and the Appointments Clause together, as jointly conferring
“executive power.” From this perspective, the executive
power vested by the Constitution in the President is best
described as a power of his administration to carry out the
law. We can discern something, as well, about the President’s
relationship to this administration from the contrast
Americans drew between prerogative and executive power.
The clearest cases of powers the President must exercise
personally, like the pardon and the veto, are prerogatives
conveyed by enumerated grants of power.345 The Vesting
Clause, however, is a general grant of power, which is
consistent with a view that the President’s primary role in
carrying out the law is supervisory, rather than personal.
The examples of early presidents directing or forbidding
prosecutions, adduced by proponents of a ‘unitary theory’ of
executive power, do nothing to evidence an understanding
that the President could personally execute the law, by
standing in place of a ‘line officer’ or prosecutor over a
significant period of time, in contrast to making periodic
343. See MADISON, supra note 220, at 67 (“The natural province of the
executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is to make
laws. . . . A treaty is not an execution of laws: it does not presuppose the existence
of laws. It is, on the contrary, to have itself the force of a law, and to be carried
into execution, like all other laws, by the executive magistrate.”).
344. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 66.
345. See Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y
Gen. 453 (1855), in POWELL supra note 337, at 131, 138; CORWIN, supra note 7, at
94–96; Mashaw, supra note 345, at 695–96.
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interventions.346 To be sure, supervision may include explicit
instruction, as in the case of cabinet Secretaries exercising
powers conferred on the President by law, or officers
discharging statutory duties to take direction from the
President.347 In other cases, however, the offices to which
individuals are appointed themselves convey an organic
discretion, shaped by professional norms, the culture of the
agency and what Bruce Wyman called its “internal law,”
which makes the discharge of that office something more
than an exercise of mere political discretion.348
Constitutionally inferior officers are perhaps most likely to
enjoy this kind of professional discretion, but Congress may

346. Compare STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 49, 60–61 (2008),
with Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 323, 327–29, 345 (2016), Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was
Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 585–90, 637 (1989), and Harold J. Krent,
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History,
38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286–90 (1989). PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 29
describes an occasion “when all the secretaries were away from the capital, [and]
all departmental matters were transmitted to the president for his decision,” but
this shows only the President issuing orders, which no one would doubt his
authority to do, not standing in for (say) line prosecutors. Even exercising
military power, although President Washington (himself a former general)
“marched with the militia,” he did not command them during the encounter with
the Whiskey rebels, but, as Prakash puts it, “execut[ed] the tax laws from afar.”
Id. at 99. On this use, however, “executing the tax laws” is functionally
indistinguishable from directing that they be executed by someone else.
347. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165 (1803); Jerry Mashaw,
Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the Antebellum
Republic, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 665, 667, 668–69, 675 (2008).
348. BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING
RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 4, 16 (1904); see also Jerry L. Mashaw,
Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J.
1362, 1368–73 (2010); cf. The President and the Accounting Officers, supra note
331, at 29, 30 (arguing that the Constitution assumes the President will not
personally exercise certain line offices); Mashaw, supra note 345, at 681–87
(describing a series of Wirt opinions on this issue). A related case, which Krent
and Shane have described, is the legislative vesting of executive power in officers
over whom the chief executive has no control whatsoever. See Krent, supra note
346; Shane, supra note 346, at 345–47.
THE
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explicitly provide it by statute for principal officers as well.349
Though they may be “executive,” the nature of these offices
seems to require that the President’s authority be
supervisory in a looser sense, so that explicit instruction is
generally disfavored or even prohibited by procedural rules—
and, in cases where the President himself has an interest,
politically explosive.350
B. Regulating and Interpreting Prerogative Powers: The
Example of the Take Care Clause
The power of the legislature to regulate prerogative was
emphasized by many American writers during the imperial
crisis. The prerogative they invoked was “prerogative under
law,” or “legal prerogative,” rather than “high prerogative” or

349. See Mashaw, supra note 345, at 677–78, 683, 695 (“No President [in the
first seventy-five years under the Constitution] seems to have claimed that the
President has authority to exercise personally the statutory jurisdiction of an
officer empowered by Congress to make a particular decision or take a particular
action.”); Metzger, supra note 332, at 1881, 1883 (describing a principle of
“hierarchical superintendence,” under which the President supervises primarily
principal officers, but there is not “broad presidential control” of inferior officers).
350. An example of procedural guidelines regulating the investigation of
federal crime, a purely executive function, are the Attorney General’s Guidelines
for the FBI. See John T. Elliff, Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI
Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786, 793–94 (1984) (describing the
adoption of the “Levi Guidelines”). These guidelines do not expressly bar
presidential involvement with prosecutions, but as one commentator recently
noted, they form part of a web of formal and informal norms insulating the work
of the Department of Justice from political interference. Benjamin Wittes, Trump
and the Powers of the American Presidency (Part I), LAWFARE BLOG (May 25, 2016,
3:44 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-and-powers-american-presidencypart-i (“The Justice Department has some institutional defenses against
[presidential, politically motivated interference] . . . They mostly do not reside in
statute or in the sort of complex oversight structures [characteristic of
intelligence gathering]. They reside in the Levi Guidelines, in certain normative
rules about contacts between the Justice Department and the White House, in
norms that have developed over the years in the FBI. And they reside in the
hearts of a lot of replaceable people.”). The paradigm of a politically explosive
presidential interference with a purely executive function is, of course, the
Saturday Night Massacre during Watergate. See Strauss, supra note 332, at 972–
74, 984.
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“absolute power.”351 This idea was essential to selfgovernment, whether under royal charter or constitution,
since prerogative powers could be employed to deprive
persons of liberty and property.352 An absolute (irregulable)
prerogative would make it impossible for a person to use his
property and freedom as he might hope and reasonably
expect to do—it would make him, in the language of the
framing generation, a “slave,” someone subject to the
arbitrary will of another.353 This suggests that we should
presume prerogative powers are defeasible; nothing about
how Americans used “prerogative” implies that, as Abraham
Sofaer suggested, “the executive could take any action falling
within the prerogative on its own responsibility, without
consulting [the legislature] in advance.”354 Vesting a power
in an independent department surely implies that the
department may decide for itself when to exercise the
power.355 Nevertheless, we should presume that the scope of
the power and procedures for exercising it may be settled by
legislative regulation, and subject to post hoc investigation
or even adjudication. This the Constitution expressly
recognizes in the Sweeping Clause and impeachment
provisions of Article I.356
The texts reviewed above also suggest important limits
to the regulability of prerogative, in addition to a
requirement of reasonableness that courts have attached to
Congress’s implied powers. If prerogative powers were added

351. WORMUTH, supra note 18, at 69–71, 74–77 (discussing a royalist theory of
high prerogative and “reason of state” that entailed the King should be free of the
law); Oakley, supra note 18, at 323–24, 326–27, 343 (describing the evolution of
a distinction between “absolute” and “ordinary” powers of the King).
352. See supra Section I.A.
353. See ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY,
1750–1804 115–19 (2016).
354. SOFAER, supra note 10, at 14.
355. See Matthew Steilen, Collaborative Departmentalism, 61 BUFF. L. REV.
345, 359 (2013).
356. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 4.
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to the executive department to ensure its independence from
the legislature, with the goal of making government
“vigorous” and securing liberty, then the legislature’s
regulation of these prerogatives should not compromise this
independence. The degree to which regulation compromises
the independence of the President may differ depending on
the prerogative power in question. For example, the veto was
thought to be the primary device by which the President
could resist congressional encroachment on his office. Any
legislative limitations of the veto would impair this purpose
and be presumptively impermissible. Pardons, too, might be
used defensively against federal investigation or
prosecutions that undermined the President’s constitutional
authority; a regulation of the pardon that, say, prohibited its
corrupt use or prevented it from impairing private rights
would need to be construed in ways that preserved its
defensive use.357 In contrast, the President’s power to initiate
armed conflict is of less use in defending the executive power
against congressional interference, and therefore regulations
of that power would be generally permissible, the chief
exception being an interference with command. It follows,
then, that some of the presidential prerogatives are
regulable to a greater degree than others. If we were to
describe a scale of defeasibility, the veto might occupy one
end and the Commander-in-Chief clause the other.
This principle can also be applied with some benefit to
the rather enigmatic Take Care Clause, whose text requires
that the President “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed,” and to which the Supreme Court has pinned a
medley of constitutional doctrines.358 Some of these doctrines

357. On such limits to the British King’s prerogative to pardon, see, e.g.,
JUDSON, supra note 18, at 36, 38. This approach would permit legislative
regulation of the presidential pardon, in contrast to the view taken by the
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) and Schick v. Reed,
419 U.S. 256, 262–63 (1974).
358. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1836–37 (2016).
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are manifestly in tension with one another: for example, the
clause is said to prohibit a presidential prerogative to
“suspend” the law or grant “dispensations,” as English Kings
once asserted an authority to do, but also to grant the
President a discretion not to prosecute or enforce the law.359
This state of affairs leads the authors of a recent article to
plead for a careful judicial construction of the clause,
although, as we have seen, contrariety or polarity was typical
of eighteenth-century arguments about prerogative, and its
presence in the doctrine may evidence the continuing
influence of such arguments on the Court’s construction of
the clause.360 Particularly relevant to the discussion here are
what might be called ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of
the Take Care Clause. Internally, the clause has been used
to describe the President’s relationship to the
administration, and, in particular, his power to remove
executive officers for failing to faithfully execute the law.361
This is the Take Care Clause as the missing ‘Removal
Clause.’ Externally, the clause has been cited as the basis of
a “protective power” in the President to safeguard the
property of the United States and its officers, even absent
law authorizing such action.362 In this respect, the Take Care
Clause empowers the President to protect the “peace of the
nation” by shielding its government and instrumentalities
from attack.363
359. Id. at 1838, 1863.
360. See supra Part I.
361. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
503–04 (2010); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926); Metzger, supra
note 332, at 1875–79.
362. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–68 (1890); Monaghan, supra note 332, at 61–
70. This is much like what The Essex Result described as the “internal executive
power” to act “in defence of the state.” See The Essex Result, supra note 317, at
117.
363. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395
(1879) (stating that government has the power to “command obedience to its laws,
and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.”); see also Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 691 (1952) (Vinson, J. dissenting) (“As
we understand the doctrine of the Neagle case, and the cases therein cited, it is
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Both dimensions describe familiar royal prerogatives. It
is thus consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to
treat the Take Care Clause as primarily a grant of
prerogative power.364 (Unlike the Court, however, I would
distinguish Take Care from the Article II Vesting Clause,
which I read as a grant of executive power, not prerogative.)
A presumption that presidential prerogatives are intended to
ensure the independence of the office, vigorous government
and a concomitant security of liberty and property can be
fashioned not only as a limit on the regulatory power of
Congress, but also as an interpretive canon for use by courts.
We might put this canon as follows: “Interpret presidential
prerogatives so as not to defeat the purpose of vesting them
in the executive: to strengthen government and thereby
protect liberty and property.” Applied to the ‘internal’
dimension of the Take Care Clause, the canon provides
support for the judicial rule that the President enjoys an
absolute removal power over officers central to the execution
of federal law.365
clearly this: The Executive is authorized to exert the power of the United
States when he finds this necessary for the protection of the agencies, the
instrumentalities, or the property of the Government.”) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Brief of Solicitor General John W. Davis); Publius, supra note 310, at
396 (“[A] vigorous executive is . . . not less essential . . . to the protection of
property against those irregular and high handed combinations, which
sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice to the security of liberty
against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy.”).
364. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 171 (describing the King as
“conservator of the peace of the kingdom”); 1 id. at 175 (“erecting and disposing
of offices”); see also 4 BACON, supra note 55, at 174 (noting the King’s prerogative
in creating offices).
365. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (“[W]e simply do not
see how the President’s need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central
to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of
constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President.”). It is
consistent, as well, with the (old) rule that officers exercising quasi-legislative
power may enjoy good-cause tenure, at least on the assumption that they are not
tasked with executing government. This was the principle of Wiener, at least prior
to Morrison. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (“The claims
were to be adjudicated according to law, . . . by a body that was entirely free from
the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either the Executive or the
Congress.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The principle admittedly
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Applied to the ‘external’ dimension of the clause, the
canon also makes sense of a presidential “protective power”
in cases where the instruments of civil government are under
attack. The President’s take-care duty is to safeguard the
personnel and property of government itself, preserving the
peace of the United States and the concomitant security of
private liberty and property that follows from government.366
Note the distinction with the Lockean prerogative power; the
presidential “protective power” is not a general power to act
in the absence of statutory law or against law during an
emergency, but merely a power to protect civil government
during such an emergency, guaranteeing peace by
vindicating government under law.367 So constructed, the
Take Care Clause gives the President a key role in securing
the benefits of government. Insofar as the preservation of
peace by government is at its center, the presidential office
lies not in the intellectual tradition of Machiavelli or the
Lockean “supream executive,” armed with a discretion to act
against law, but that of Erasmus, who urged that “the
Prince’s first and most important objective is to strive his
utmost to preclude any future need for the science of war,”
and to secure liberty and property by means of ordinary
justice and police.368
Considering the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions
together, the picture that emerges is of a clause that
describes the President’s special relationship to government
itself. The Take Care Clause captures the chief sense in
does little to explain why such protections should also extend to officers with
quasi-judicial powers, whose ‘independence’ is clearly accounted for by a policy
that it is desirable to insulate their decisions from the effects of partisanship.
366. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 65–66; Monaghan, supra note 332, at 61.
367. Monaghan, supra note 332, at 70. Mortenson’s “republican prerogative,”
though framed more broadly, amounts largely to a protective power of
government. See Mortenson, supra note 1, at 75–76.
368. JOHN GITTINGS, THE GLORIOUS ART OF PEACE: FROM THE ILLIAD TO IRAQ 105
(2012). See Bruff, supra note 1, at 13 and MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 247–78,
for a discussion on Lockean and Machiavellian approaches to the American
presidency.
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which the President is the head of government. One
eighteenth-century usage of “take care” signaled the
patriarch’s superintendence of a complex household, in
which the father did not exercise the functions of household
members himself, but was entrusted with ensuring that
everyone played his or her part, thereby securing the welfare
of them all.369 This superintendence required supervision,
removal of those who did not play their role or who
understood that role on terms fundamentally inconsistent
with the patriarch, an occasional direct intervention, and the
defense of the household itself against threats. This
prerogative, captured best by the idea of ‘ensuring peace by
government,’ is perhaps the core value of the Take Care
Clause.
C. The Constitutional Structure of Emergency Power
In an important article, political scientist Robert
Scigliano traced the influence of Locke on constructions of
American executive power to the publication of Edward
Corwin’s monograph, The President: Office and Powers.370
Scigliano asserted that Corwin was the first modern scholar
to advance the hypothesis that executive power included a
Lockean prerogative, and that one could observe in the
political science literature on the presidency after 1941 a
dramatic rise in discussions of Locke. Although he did not
offer an explanation as to why Lockean prerogative suddenly
found such a large audience, a plausible hypothesis is surely
369. A classic example of this usage occurs in a letter from leading Virginia
planter William Byrd II to Charles, earl of Orrery. Describing his plantation,
Byrd writes, “I have a large Family of my own, and my Doors are open to Every
Body, yet I have no Bills to pay . . . Like one of the Patriarchs, I have my Flocks
and my Herds, my Bond-men and Bond-women, and every Soart of Trade
amongst my own Servants, so that I live in a kind of Independence on every one
but Providence. However . . . I must take care to keep all my people to their Duty,
to set all the Springs in motion and to make every one draw his equal Share to
carry the Machine forward.” Letter from William Byrd II to Charles, Earl of
Orrery (July 5, 1726), in 32 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 26, 27 (1924).
370. Scigliano, supra note 1, at 237.
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that it answered a need for security that the time impressed
on all who were living through it. Locke “constitutionalized”
executive power, placing it for the most part under the rule
of the legislature, but allowing also for an emergency
prerogative in cases where the state was threatened with
extinction.371 As another commentator observed of the postwar period, the United States’ “new role as the world’s
dominant superpower fed an obsession with crisis,” involving
us in an unending series of armed conflicts around the world
in which national security was thought to be at stake. 372
Having normalized a state of emergency, the Constitution’s
grant of executive powers became a natural repository for
emergency power.373
Another political scientist writing around the same time,
Lucius Wilmerding, described a very different view of
emergency power.374 The root of the idea was a concept of
high office he attributed to the framers. As Wilmerding
explained it, the framers “thought it incumbent on those who
accept great charges to risk themselves on great occasions,
when the safety of the nation or some of its very high
interests were at stake.”375 Yet, he continued, “they never
confounded acts which the law says may be lawfully done in
a case of necessity with acts done in violation of the law for
the public good.”376 The latter were illegal. If, however, an

371. See MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 203–04, 258.
372. Lobel, supra note 1, at 1400–04.
373. Id. at 1404–05; see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 77–88, 109–114 (2015) (arguing that the Cold War brought about
a change in the construction of war power and presidential authority to initiate
conflict). Lobel saw the leading academic expression of this view as Clinton
Rossiter’s book Constitutional Dictatorship, which was published several years
after the first edition of Corwin’s monograph. ROSSITER, supra note 326, at 12–
13. In contrast to the argument that I have developed here, Lobel describes
Locke’s theory of prerogative as representative of the views of early Americans.
Lobel, supra note 1, at 1392.
374. Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 322–24.
375. Id. at 322 (“high office” is my term).
376. Id. at 322–23.
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officer immediately informed Congress of his action, a “full
investigation” was performed, and Congress agreed that
there had been an “urgent necessity as he professes,” then it
was “the duty of the Congress to sanction his illegal act—if
damages have been recovered against him, to indemnify him
for those damages.”377
Our study of “prerogative” provides some support for
Wilmerding’s characterization of early American views, and
thus for the historiographical thesis that American
conceptions of emergency power have changed markedly over
time. As I have argued, that Americans distinguished
“executive power” from “prerogative” suggests that they did
not constitutionalize the Lockean prerogative. Nor did early
Americans generally use “prerogative” when describing
governmental power to respond to emergencies.378 Above we
saw the example of Virginia Governor Patrick Henry, who
sought assistance from the state’s General Assembly in
dealing with a request that he remove loyalists from a
certain county, reminding the assemblymen that, as “the
executive power” was “not competent to such a purpose, I
must beg leave to submit the whole matter to the general
Assembly, who are the only Judges how far the methods of
proceeding directed by Law, are to be dispensed with on this
occasion.”379 When, at another time, Henry went ahead and
removed such individuals merely on the advice of his privy
council, the legislature indemnified him.380 These examples
can be readily multiplied.381
What relevance does the early American approach to
377. Id. at 324.
378. See supra Section I.B.
379. Letter from Governor Patrick Henry to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates, Benjamin Harrison (May 27, 1778), in 1 OFFICIAL LETTERS OF THE
GOVERNORS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 282, 282–83 (H. R. McIlwaine ed., 1926).
380. Bill Indemnifying the Executive for Removing and Confining Suspected
Persons, in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120, at 119.
381. See MACMILLAN, supra note 187, at 83; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1,
at 94; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 323–29.
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emergency power have for us today? What relevance can it
have, given the present dangers of terrorism, global
instability and anti-liberalism? At the very least, we can take
two things from the early American approach to emergency
power. First, their approach suggests a presumption of
institutional “joint action” in emergencies, involving the
President and Congress, rather than a regime of executive
unilateralism.382 While our procedures and institutions have
changed, the modern statutory framework continues to
reflect this institutional presumption, as well as the political
values that lie behind it. Second, the early American
approach to emergency power also suggests an active role for
courts of law, namely, safeguarding a regime of “joint action”
in emergencies.
First, the presumption of “joint action.” We should begin
by acknowledging that the early American regime
Wilmerding describes of illegal action followed by legislative
indemnity has largely been displaced. Judicial doctrines of
official immunity protect officers from tort liability in many
cases, and there is no longer a significant practice of
congressional indemnification.383 Assuming, as I think we
should, that these developments are unlikely to be reversed,
older practices remain important for what they can reveal of
how Americans went about preserving important political
values in times of crisis. The legislature’s establishment of
an administration and ex ante regulation of executive powers
helped to ensure the continuance of civil government under
law when an emergency unfolded. Consultation,

382. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism
and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND
COMPLACENCY 161, 162 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
383. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L.
REV. 45, 51–61 (2018); Pfander & Hunt, supra note 262, at 1868. As Baude
observes, police officers today are generally indemnified against liability arising
out of their work; my point is that indemnification does not take the form of a
special act passed by the legislature in response to a petition, as it did in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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investigation and adjudication before and afterwards made
executive officers responsible to the people’s representatives
for their exercise of governmental power. An officer seeking
indemnity was, in the words of one early representative,
“throw[ing] himself upon the justice of his country,” much as
he might before a jury in a parallel action for wrongful
arrest.384
These political values—government under law and
responsible government—are reflected today in a series of
framework statutes that continue to marry executive
discretion with various forms of legislative supervision,
regulation and control. The War Powers Resolution, the
National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act together define “national emergency”
and require the President to exercise his constitutional
powers by following a set of procedures.385 The statutes are
afforced by doctrinal limits on the use of executive orders,
which reflect a view that the President is under law even in
conditions of emergency.386 The War Powers Resolution
requires, further, that the President inform Congress when
practicable before introducing the armed forces into
hostilities, and it obligates him to continue reporting to
384. Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 326 (quoting 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 516 (1807))
(statement of Representative Barnabas Bidwell).
385. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2012), for the definition
of national emergency triggering the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers.
“The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . are exercised only pursuant
to . . . (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” Id.; see also National Emergencies
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2012) (authorizing the President to declare national
emergencies as defined under “Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise . . . of
any special or extraordinary power”); International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012) (limiting presidential emergency authority to “any
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial
part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy
of the United States”).
386. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 48 (stating that the President may not,
by executive order or proclamation, change the law or affect legal rights); Price,
supra note 331, at 689–95.
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Congress for the duration of conflict.387 Despite the perennial
controversy that surrounds these acts (and in particular the
War Powers Resolution), the framework they establish
continues the early American preference for institutional
“joint action” in emergencies.388 Congress also uses its
powers of investigation to subpoena government officers to
testify about threats, attacks and governmental
responses.389 This contributes to a process of “disclosure” and
“public judgment” of executive conduct.390
Historically Congress has also used its power to
retroactively ratify illegal executive conduct.391 Although it
is perhaps more controversial, we should presume that
Congress may also ratify presidential violations of the War
Powers Resolution and other statutes regulating emergency
responses. The lesson of the Cold War is that national
security risks can generate irresistible pressures to discover
the Lockean prerogative lurking within ordinary executive
power.392 In contrast, a practice of legislative ratification
enables Congress to exercise discretion in responding to
387. See 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a), (c) (2012).
388. The greatest constitutional objection is to a provision in the War Powers
Resolution that requires the President to withdraw armed forces from hostilities
outside the United States “if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.”
50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (2012). This use of a concurrent resolution is a legislative veto
of the type held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Immigration &
Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 921 (1983).
389. For a recent account of the procedures employed in congressional
investigations and the constitutional limitations on congressional power, see
Andrew McCanse Wright, Congressional Due Process, 85 MISS. L.J. 401, 423–56
(2016). Congressional investigations may, of course, serve partisan purposes, like
any exercise of congressional power. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. House of
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Statement
on Progress of Bipartisan HPSCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docu
mentID=758.
390. See Mortenson, supra note 1, at 80–81.
391. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1863).
392. These forces have already operated to narrow key provisions in framework
statutes so as to enhance the President’s discretion in handling emergencies. See
Lobel, supra note 1, at 1405.

664

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

emergencies. Ratification preserves a role for Congress after
the fact, lessening the need for excessive ex ante delegations
or a doctrine of executive unilateralism. The price, of course,
is publicly acknowledging illegal conduct by the United
States President. Whether one is willing to pay the price will
depend on the value one places on firm limits on executive
power.393
The second lesson we can take from early American
approaches to emergency power is that it supports a role for
courts of law. Once we divorce executive power from the
Lockean prerogative, it becomes easier to describe a
reasonable use of judicial power in marking its limits.394 In
part, this role consists of adjudicating civil damages claims
against executive officers, although, as I mentioned, this is
now tempered by official immunity doctrines. There is also
the possibility of prospective injunctive relief, although there
is concern about the nationwide scope of injunctions and we
may see this form of relief trimmed as well.395 Yet courts can
also play a role in enforcing a constitutional regime of “joint
action.” As a number of commentators have observed, this

393. A second cost to this approach is acknowledging congressional power to
act in ways other than by passing general, forward-looking rules. Julian
Mortensen describes this as “turning our backs on the rule of law.” Mortenson,
supra note 1, at 64. However, an extraconstitutional executive power to violate
the law in cases of a sudden threat to the state, such as Mortenson defends, is
also premised on limits to the rule of law. The key difference is apparently its
narrower scope. The moral argument Mortenson advances for this power is, in all
likelihood, much like the reasoning legislators would employ. See id. at 73–83. As
I see it, the important question is whether we commit to the legislature a power
to examine the executive’s moral reasoning post hoc. The long tradition of
investigation, indemnification, and ratification in American legislative
assemblies reflects the usefulness of these practices in checking executive
unilateralism.
394. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 1412 (arguing that the need for a flexible
emergency power in the executive, combined with legal realism, left courts
unwilling to draw lines between regimes of ordinary and extraordinary law).
395. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148–50 (1908); Katie Benner, A DACA
Question: Should Judges Use Local Cases to Halt National Orders?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/us/politics/federal-injunct
ions-judicial-power.html.
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does not require that courts decide whether the executive has
violated constitutionally protected rights, but that they
determine in the course of adjudicating a case or controversy
whether Congress has authorized the executive’s conduct,
thus guarding the vision of an “institutional process”
involving both branches.396 The role is what one should
expect, if one assumes presidential prerogatives are
generally regulable. In exercising its own war powers and in
regulating the President’s commander-in-chief powers,
Congress has established by law regular procedures for the
exercise of these powers, and these are precisely the sort of
limits that courts of law are institutionally equipped to
enforce, in contrast to measuring an exercise of Lockean
prerogative against the President’s assertion that it
ultimately served the public good.
This brings us to the Steel Seizure Case. Fortunately,
there is no need to add a lengthy discussion to the many
excellent treatments of the case already in existence. My
point is a relatively narrow one: that the early American
political values and modern institutional roles just described
are also at work in Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence.397
Jackson’s premise, recall, is that the Constitution must
“integrate the dispersed powers” of the Congress and the
President “into a workable government.” Governing requires
that the branches be ‘interdependent’ and they exercise
‘reciprocal’ powers, that is, that they act on one another. In
one sense, however, the branches are not perfectly
coordinate, since, as Jackson frames it, the President’s power
“fluctuates” depending on what Congress has already done.
The formulation gives Congress what one former executivebranch attorney has described as “legal priority.”398 By
creating an administrative structure and specifying the

396. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 382, at 167–68.
397. Id. at 179–80.
398. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: AN ESSAY
102 (2014).
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procedures through which the President can exercise his
powers, Congress ensures that presidential action is under
law—a concept Jackson described as “free government.”399
The courts then ensure the President is made responsible for
his action. From this perspective, the significance of
Jackson’s three categories is that they are described in the
language of standards of judicial review, ranging from
deferential to strict. The framework thereby establishes
judicially workable standards for examining the exercise of
powers whose scope is necessarily in flux. The effect is very
different from a regime based on Lockean executive power,
which also fluctuates, but whose contours are unilaterally
determined, incapable of being regulated by law, judicially
indeterminable, and thus made responsible to the people
only through election.
CONCLUSION
In discussing the American patriots’ appeals to royal
prerogative during the imperial crisis, John Phillip Reid
remarked that “[t]he Twentieth Century may no longer
understand what was going on in the 1770s.”400 The
comment was off-hand, but we should take seriously the
prospect it suggests: some ways in which the world appeared
to the elites who led the Revolution, and some ways in which
they aimed to take hold of that world by their arguments,
may be beyond our ability now to grasp. (Call this, if you
want, ‘skepticism about historical knowledge.’) In thinking
through this possibility, it seems right to assume that our
own experiences have some effect on what we can hope to
understand about the past, just as they do the present lives
of others. So even if Reid was right, and the Twentieth
Century did not understand what was going on in the 1770s,
the Twenty-First Century may now understand it quite well.
Too well. The dangers of the present moment may help us
399. Id. at 103–04.
400. REID, supra note 34, at 154.
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understand the framers’ perspective in a way that even the
1930s, the 1950s and 2001 did not.
In the story as I have told it, appeals to prerogative were
often appeals to the benefits of government. The benefits of
government were security of liberty and protection of
property. The framers valued liberty and property and so
they wanted vigorous self-government. Today’s dinner-table
talk of civil dissolution, breakup of the United States,
revision or rejection of the Constitution, all help to make real
the framers’ way of viewing the world. Peeling away civil
government, considering what would occur if this country’s
government were to be unable to execute the law, puts flesh
and blood on the framing perspective. Everything one
values—the security of loved ones, one’s home and the things
in it, the expectations, hopes and plans that can arise in
conditions of security and peace—all these things are put at
risk by the lapse of civil government. During the Revolution,
men and women on either side risked losing their home to
confiscation, being forcibly relocated, being harassed or
jailed for their associations and expressions of allegiance, not
hearing from or seeing loved ones for months on end and
suffering from the poverty that follows severe disruption.
The framers described an ever-present prospect of arbitrary
deprivation of liberty or property as “slavery.” They knew
this condition because they held slaves. To be free, to not be
a slave, required civil government by traditional forms. Since
government was founded on prerogative, since the exercise
of its power was an exercise of prerogative, prerogative was
necessary to the liberty and property that made people free.
Most of the time, when Americans were appealing to
“prerogative,” this was what they were appealing to.
Prerogative was “constitutional” in the sense that it figured
in Americans’ understanding of the ordinary political order
and the security and protection this order entailed. It is
understandable, then, that although the elites who led the
Revolution and framed our constitutions had read Locke and
found use for him elsewhere, they rarely found it appealing
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to use “prerogative” as he had used it, to signal an executive
discretion to act in the absence of law or against law. The
disruption of the 1780s did not alter this perspective but
reinforced it; prerogative powers would be necessary for a
vigorous national government, just as they had been for
imperial government, and the question was how many of
these powers should be vested in an executive department to
guarantee security of liberty and protection of property,
without creating the appearance of a monarchy.
These patterns of arguing and thinking remain relevant
today, as we consider the benefits of civil government under
our Constitution, and how to handle emergencies so as not
by our own conduct to approximate the dissolution of
government, but, rather, to secure its vital instruments
against attack.

